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Abstract
The use of personal, sensitive information, such as privileges and attributes, to gain access to 
computer resources in distributed environments raises an interesting paradox. On one hand, in 
order to make the services and resources accessible to legitimate users, access control 
infrastructure requires valid and provable service clients' identities or attributes to make 
decisions. On the other hand, the service clients may not be prepared to disclose their identity 
information or attributes to a remote party without determining in advance whether the service 
provider can be trusted with such sensitive information. Moreover, when clients give out 
personal information, they still are unsure of the extent of propagation and use of the 
information. This thesis describes an investigation of privacy preserving options in access 
control infrastructures, and proposes a security model to support the management of those 
options, based on extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) and Security 
Access Markup Language (SAML), both of which are OASIS security standards. Existing 
access control systems are typically unilateral in that the enterprise service provider assigns the 
access rights and makes the access control decisions, and there is no negotiation between the 
client and the service provider. As access control management systems lean towards being 
user-centric or federated, unilateral approaches can no longer adequately preserve the client's 
privacy, particularly where communicating parties have no pre-existing trust relationship. As a 
result, a unified approach that significantly improves privacy and confidentiality protection in 
distributed environments was considered. This resulted in the development of XACML Trust 
Management Authorization Infrastructure (XTMAI) designed to handle privacy and 
confidentiality mutually and simultaneously using the concept of Obligation of Trust (OoT) 
protocol. The OoT enables two or more transaction parties to exchange Notice of Obligations 
(NoB) (obligating constraints) as well as Signed Acceptance of Obligation (SAO), a proof of 
acceptance, as security assurances before exchange of sensitive resources.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Overview
The Internet has opened unprecedented opportunities for business collaboration among 
corporate organizations tailored to share common automated services and resources, but not 
without cost. Business transactions now cut across geo-political boundaries with and without 
pre-existing trust relationships aimed at providing competitive offering to both consumers and 
supplier of services. The emergence of Web Services platform [1] which is a promising vehicle 
for dynamic composition of services and offerings is revolutionizing global transactions in an 
unanticipated way. Yet, these new ways of service provision are raising fresh security threats 
including privacy, confidentiality and trust [2, 3]. Access control [4-7] has emerged as a 
popular solution for treating application level security in the context of resources control 
against unauthorized access.
Trends in emerging access management systems raise an interesting paradox. On the one hand, 
service providers' applications require identity/attribute related information in order to validate 
a user's request. On the other hand, users may not wish to disclose their information or 
attributes to a remote Service Provider (SP) without determining in advance whether the 
service provider can be trusted to comply with their privacy preferences. In spite of this, 
current access control and privacy protection systems are typically unilateral and provider- 
centric, in that the enterprise service provider assigns the access rights, makes the access 
control decisions, and determines the privacy policy. However, in closed systems [8, 9] where 
a sort of pre-knowledge exists among communicating parties, security or privacy threats are of 
less concern than in open systems comprising several parties who may not share any pre- 
existing knowledge or trust relationships. Consequently, privacy is a growing concern, and has 
raised a number of social, cultural, legal and technical issues which make the protection of 
privacy across security realms more challenging.
The quest for efficient privacy measures has received enormous inputs from both research 
communities [10-12], privacy protection advocates [13-15] and technical standards [16, 17]. 
Access control is the mechanism for constraining access to sensitive resources. In high-level 
security environments i.e. those in which the risks involved in business transactions are high,
this usually takes place in two phases, namely authentication and authorization [18]. Whilst 
authentication is the process of verifying and validating the identity claim of an entity 
attempting to perform some action, such as accessing a network or partaking in a transaction, 
authorization deals with the process of determining whether this authenticated entity has the 
privilege to access the resources under given local conditions and rules. Both phases imply the 
use of personal identifiable information (PII) that is likely to be traceable to a communicating 
entity.
It is important to state that an individual is associated with a diverse set of attributes and/or 
properties, which may be used in access control operations, and have the potential of being 
correlated. That is, the individuality is connected with a range of attributes, or properties 
including driver's license, postal address, national insurance number, marriage certificates, 
email addresses, telephone numbers, membership certificates, vehicle plate numbers, job 
functions, affiliations, etc. Additionally, individual activities can generate information that can 
be traceable e.g. when an individual purchases an item online, and is given a proof of purchase, 
e.g. a receipt, this can later be linked to that individual and used in a manner that is undesirable.
1.2 Background
Privacy as a socio-economic problem has impacts on individuals, communities, governments 
and businesses. It is burdened by legal, social, behavioural, psychological and cultural factors, 
which are subject to numerous expectations and interpretations [19]. These expectations are 
affected by certain compelling forces including economic benefits, enterprise business interests 
[20], regulation, legislation [21] and advances in technology [22]. These raise the question of 
how realistically we can expect privacy protection, given increasingly varying digital 
environments. These forces when viewed from a socio-economic perspective explain why 
finding widely acceptable privacy violation countermeasures is becoming increasingly 
difficult [23]. The fact that privacy is often perceived from dissimilar cultural backgrounds, 
resulting in an array of unfulfilled expectations and trust levels, further complicates the privacy 
problem space.
Furthermore, many individuals' poor understanding of privacy and its importance [10], plus the 
fact that emerging activities that have the potential to violate privacy are sophisticated, further 
erode the user's ability to participate in privacy self governance. In most cases, users are not
fully aware of the information held about them, where the information is stored, or the risks of 
undesirable use. Acquisti et al argue that a considerable number of individuals may be willing 
to exchange privacy for convenience or agree to release PII in return for small benefits or 
rewards [19]. For example, a credit card company could make an insignificant offer (e.g. 
slightly reduced interest rate) to lure individuals into giving PII. Another example is where an 
online survey company may give out vouchers to individuals that are willing to participate in a 
marketing survey. Moreover, empirical study [20] has shown that users are not even 
sufficiently informed to make important decisions or risks assessment concerning their privacy. 
Acquisti et al in [20] stated three main challenges faced by an individual's privacy decision 
making process as:
  Incomplete information caused by external factors: Third party sharing of 
information in a transaction without the individual's consent or even when the 
individual is not part of the transaction;
  Information asymmetries: Information that is applicable to the privacy decision 
process may be available to only a subset of the parties involved in making the 
decision;
  Individual innate bounded rationality: Individual's inability to sensibly process a 
large amount of information in depth prior to making a decision.
In [19], they also argue that "subjective perceptions of threats and potential damage, 
psychological needs, and actual personal economic returns" affect individuals' privacy 
decision making process. Nevertheless, the individual is faced with privacy realities and 
expectations, and any attempt to view privacy from an extreme standpoint could mean secrecy, 
anonymity and solitude. The implication is that any move to attain absolute privacy could then 
result in total anonymity such as the absence of traceability, linkability and observerability of 
the privacy subject [10]. Of course, these would result in the inability to conduct business 
where personal information is needed in order to process and complete business transactions.
Privacy has also raised a number of fundamental questions [24, 25] regarding so called 
personal data: i.e. which information can be classified as personal? Who should be the 
custodian of it? Who should control access to it and under what conditions? What is the context 
under which personal data should be accessed, i.e. for what purposes and what should happen
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afterwards? Other issues of concern include whether the techniques used during collection, 
processing and use are by any means legal. Furthermore, other considerations comprise 
whether the data owner is fully aware about the data and the processing- consent, notice and 
awareness, the quality of data, i.e. is the data accurate and a true representation of the data 
subjects' attributes or properties?
Though some researchers and various privacy standards and principles [13, 14, 26] have been 
attempting to address these questions, development of efficient technical solutions that address 
the privacy concerns, remains a challenge that has continued to attract research inputs [27]. 
Another critical privacy factor is the inherent conflict between privacy protecting PII on the 
one hand, and the legitimate free flow of information on the other. This buttresses the point that 
absolute privacy will pose undue interference with the legitimate free flow of information [28]. 
Bearing these factors in mind, it can be argued that privacy protection can be viewed from two 
angles: the need to decouple identifying information from real world identities whenever 
practicable, and where it is impractical, the appropriate enforcement of privacy measures based 
on the individual's security preferences.
At this point, it is useful to clarify more precisely what we mean by PII. To this end, the 
following definitions are offered:
i. Personal Identifying Information is information that may be used to establish the 
identity of an individual (or an entity).
ii. Personal Identifiable Information is information that may be associated with an 
identifiable individual (or an entity).
iii. Personal Identifiable Information is information that may be used in a manner that 
causes harm to an individual with whom it is associated.
iv. Personal Identifying Information is any digital content the unauthorized disclosure of 
which may raise privacy and confidentiality concerns.
In this thesis, the term PII is used in respect of definition 2 above. In other words, PII refers to 
any piece of information associated with appearance, personality, knowledge and 
characteristics that describe an individual (or an entity) [29].
Several attempts have been made to address privacy concerns especially when computer 
databases became widely used. In recent times, many of the privacy initiatives focus on 
website privacy activities, that is, purely on how websites collect, share PII and what they 
promise to do with PII. So far, privacy concerns have not received the required attention in 
distributed access control infrastructure. In cases where privacy issues are addressed, privacy is 
considered from the client's perspective and confidentiality from the service provider's. But at 
both ends, clients and service providers [30] require to determine in advance the assurance that 
the other party can act in a manner that is compatible with their own security preferences.
Nonetheless, the distinction between preserving the privacy of service outputs and the 
confidentiality of service meta-information (identities, attributes, policies etc.) is becoming 
blurred [31]. The underlying assumptions have led to the development of solutions that are 
typically unilateral and asymmetric. In contrast, emerging access control requirements point to 
a need for a bilateral paradigm, simply because both the server and client entities may have 
privacy and confidentiality concerns. This has resulted in a new research area otherwise known 
as trust access management systems which employ trust negotiation concepts whereby 
communicating parties can reciprocally release access control policies and credentials [8, 32, 
33].
Furthermore, growing business requirements may demand the dynamic exchange of service 
requirements, contractual and service level agreements in order to assess the mutual benefits 
and associated risks before engaging in high-risk business transactions. Enabling the runtime 
exchange of these business requirements requires a bilateral and symmetric infrastructure that 
will allow communicating peers to indicate their willingness to accept constraints imposed by 
the other party, before the latter is prepared to reveal their sensitive information. There is some 
overlap between users' privacy requirements and business requirements, meaning that privacy, 
confidentiality and trust are typically associated.
Addressing confidentiality and privacy problems mutually and simultaneously, requires that 
parties in distributed transactions should have a uniform way of declaring their security 
requirements alongside the constraints they may impose on the use of their information before 
sharing it. This provision will ensure that parties evaluate the risks associated with giving out 
their information and determine the degree to which they are prepared to trust other 
participating parties. This entails the requirement for communicating parties to identify
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constraints and obligations they may wish to place on the others concerning the use of their 
resources.
1.3 Current Technological Situation
A variety of solutions have been proposed in an attempt to solve the problems imposed by 
privacy and security concerns including anonymous schemes [34], the W3C Platform for 
Privacy Preference (P3P) [16, 35], Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) [24, 
36], amongst others; and they have had impact in reducing privacy risks. However, most of 
these efforts focused primarily on website privacy and less in access control operations. 
Equally, where privacy is considered in existing access control solutions, it falls short of basic 
principles of privacy. As a consequence, the investigation of privacy options is approached in a 
more pragmatic way focusing on the development of a viable system that addresses privacy 
and confidentiality with the capability to ensure remote enforcement of security constraints. 
More importantly, the outcome of this work technically speaking is a model that has the 
potential to merge mechanical and socio-legal privacy components into a common framework. 
The following summarizes the characteristics of existing systems:
  Most existing attribute-based access control systems are unilateral: the service user 
(client) is required to disclose PII unconditionally to the service (service provider 
application), irrespective of whether the service can adhere to the security 
preferences of the user, otherwise access to the service cannot be allowed.
  The mechanism for privacy assurance is overlooked. The client cannot be confident 
that the information passed to another party will be well protected and used only by 
the authorized parties and for the intended purposes. The assumption here is the fact 
that the attribute consuming party does not sign any obligating constraints before 
the collection of personal data.
  Given that preserving privacy may demand the fulfilment of contractual obligations 
e.g. compliance with foundational privacy principles, such as Fair Information 
Practice (FIP)[14], current systems have not provided effective means to allow a 
client to participate actively in the governance of attribute-information.
  Current systems fail to consider server side privacy. On the other hand, service 
providers may have certain information that the client would like to see (i.e. policy, 
metadata, etc) disclosure of which to arbitrary strangers may leak important 
business information.
  Traditionally, an access management system involves a so-called trusted third party 
(TTP); the privacy of third party affiliates is disregarded at present. The 
consequence is that the arbitrary disclosure of trust relationships with a TTP may 
sometimes violate important business rules.
These characteristics establish the need for further investigation of access control infrastructure 
with a particular focus on privacy. The bilateral treatment of privacy, confidentiality and trust 
is critical for privacy assurance. Based on this assumption, the focus was on access control 
frameworks that can be derived from conventional concepts [8, 33, 37] and standards [37, 38], 
and which potentially will enable bilateral privacy negotiation between a service and a client. 
This led to the development of the concept of Obligation of Trust (OoT) [31], whereby two 
parties can exchange difficult-to-repudiate 1 digitally signed business constraints and proof of 
acceptance.
1.4 Research Motivation
The explosion of the Internet resulted in unprecedented manipulation of PII in terms of 
collection, storage and dissemination [21, 39]. As a result, the level of identity fraud has 
continued to increase dramatically, which leaves ordinary users disadvantaged [40-42]. In the 
UK, a Cabinet Office Study in 2002 indicated a rise in the use of false and stolen identities, and 
estimated that crime caused by identity fraud may cost the UK about £1.3 billion per year [40]. 
Arguably, in many cases, the violations of privacy are economically and politically 
encouraged, and often, the individual is trapped into them naively due to economic or other 
incentives [21, 23]. In the commencement of the study, the author participated actively in the
1 We use the term "difficult-to-repudiate" rather than non-repudiation, since repudiation is a legal issue that has to 
be determined in a court of law. The technical constructs proposed in this thesis should make it more difficult for 
an entity to repudiate their actions.
design and development of an access control policy editor, an empirical usability evaluation of 
which was published in [43, 44]; thus exposing him to access control issues. The motivation to 
undertake this work came from the quest to investigate privacy problems, which if uncontrolled 
may potentially outweigh the benefits of Internet computing. This work therefore intends to 
provide a novel interface that could significantly contribute to addressing privacy problems, 
and make a substantive contribution to the body of knowledge in the area of privacy and 
security.
1.5 Research Aims and Objectives
The principal aim of this study is to develop a means to allow parties in business transactions 
to participate actively in privacy preservation in access control infrastructures. In order to 
address this, it is necessary to undertake an empirical investigation of the options for 
addressing privacy concerns in access management operations. This involved a thorough 
investigation and analysis of the privacy problem space, especially in the context of open 
environments where business transactions are likely to involve parties with or without pre- 
existing trust relationships. The main objectives of the study are outlined below:
  Examine and understand the privacy space, confidentiality and trust concerns in 
open systems through formal investigation of related security and privacy concerns;
  Investigate existing systems in the context of privacy protection to expose the gaps 
if any, highlight their benefits, strengths and weaknesses, and develop a viable 
solution to fill the gaps;
  Examine trust in the context of privacy across the boundaries of security domains 
from the standpoint of dynamic trust establishment;
  Examine how existing Internet standards such as XACML, SAML, etc, and privacy 
enhancement technologies can be utilized in addressing the privacy problem, and if 
necessary extend such standards to support the technical solutions;
  Develop a framework that has the potential to address some of the privacy problems 
with a software implementation as a proof concept;
  Critically appraise the work with respect to successes and substantive contributions 
to the body of knowledge in the field of privacy and security.
The final deliverable is an infrastructure that is capable of addressing the privacy problems 
uncovered by this study.
1.6 Research Questions
The main question addressed by this work is "how can privacy be preserved when a 
communicating party's personal information is involved in access control operations"? In other 
words, can the recipient party (or system) be made to treat a party's PII in a manner that 
respects privacy? This main question is further broken into the following:
1. How can a party be made to protect the privacy and confidentiality of personal 
information provided to it?
2. How can a communicating party participate in decisions regarding protection of 
privacy and confidentiality in access control operations?
3. How can privacy be guaranteed across security domains of trust?
4. How effectively can privacy guarantees be enforced across autonomous security 
boundaries?
5. How can individual security preferences be balanced against the legitimate free 
flow of information, given that a party's privacy may sometimes clash with 
national, socio-economic or business interests?
1.7 Key Contributions
The thesis, through the research process followed in seeking to answer the above research 
questions establishes new knowledge in the areas of privacy and security, and particularly in 
the infrastructure required to support privacy and security. The knowledge gained is viewed 
from two angles: theoretical and practical. 
In theoretical terms, the study provides:
  detailed review and analysis of the privacy and security problem space;
  critical comparative analysis of current access control systems with respect to 
privacy;
  new insight into the relationships between privacy, confidentiality and trust in 
addressing a common problem;
  exposure of the unrealistic assumption about privacy and confidentiality in server- 
client architectures, as well as how trust is related to both;
  support for a symmetrical architecture, which allows both service consumers and 
providers to mutually negotiate for the release of their resources and properties that 
raise privacy concerns;
  supplementary substantiation in the literature that too much dependence on 
transitive trust provided by trusted third parties can no longer sufficiently protect 
privacy and confidentiality in high-risk business environments;
  contributions to refereed privacy and security literature [30, 31, 43, 45-47]. 
In practical terms:
  a conceptual design and development of a technical infrastructure that can automate 
the provision of 'hard-to-repudiate evidence ' i.e. a digitally signed acceptance of 
obligations (constraints imposed by a party) that can possibly be used in a court of 
law should a dispute arise, and that can be automatically processed by the obligating 
party;
  the product of this work is a significant deviation from traditional access control 
systems, but is based on well-known standards, making the approach pragmatic and 
adaptable;
  the software implementation demonstrates a proof of concept, and the potential 
applicability of the framework in real-world scenarios.
2 The term evidence refers to a piece of information that is critical to convincing management or legal authorities 
that some kind of a breach has occurred.
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1.8 Structure of the Thesis
Research is an extensive study that requires a proven methodology, and systematic approaches 
underpinning the rigorous investigation, analyses and appraisal of an entire study. The design 
of an appropriate paradigm and the understanding of its philosophical underpinnings are 
critical elements in the success of a research endeavour. Chapter 2 discusses this work's 
research methodology.
Privacy and confidentiality are key challenges facing ubiquitous computing environments and 
the Internet in particular. Privacy concerns have raised a number of legal and regulatory issues, 
legislation and regional guidelines; and so this requires an understanding and assessment of 
foundational privacy principles [48]. Chapter 3 looks into privacy concepts from the 
perspective of privacy laws, standards, legislation, regulations, and principles, and assesses 
them in the context of this work.
Access control mechanisms are important security services that can deal with application level 
security and privacy concerns. However, many access control systems make extensive use of 
PII to determine the access privileges of system resource users. The use of PII in access control 
operations raises key privacy and security concerns, particularly in distributed environments 
with different autonomous security domains. Chapter 4 discusses foundational elements of 
access control, examines privacy characteristics of current systems in the context of distributed 
environment. The primary goal is to expose their strengths and weakness, and presents a 
critical analysis of these systems in the context of the privacy problem space.
The advent of computer and communication networks changed the landscape of human 
interactions with others, resulting in the need to make information unreadable to unintended 
recipients. In order to conceal information from unintended recipients, extensive studies have 
been undertaken to find ways to make information opaque to others. Chapter 5 takes a look 
into the fundamentals of information security focusing on technologies that help to alleviate 
privacy and confidentiality problems. These technologies are considered very relevant in the 
development of a viable technical infrastructure that can support privacy and confidentiality 
protection in distributed environments.
Security Standards provide the platform for promoting application service interoperability. 
Utilizing standardized tools that have been reviewed by a large community of experts and users
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is considered as a way to ensure that the resultant utility of his work can be adapted in real- 
world scenarios. Chapter 6 explains the basic concepts and key features of the specific 
standards, components and architectures that significantly influenced the study. In particular, 
the XACML and SAML standards are described and analyzed in more details.
One of the expected outcomes of this work, besides new contributions to the knowledge, is the 
development of an artefact that demonstrates the applicability of the basic concepts discussed. 
Given the multiple level of interactions between participating parties in distributed access 
control operations, a requirements gathering and analysis are critical to the development of the 
proposed technical framework. The systematic development of an artefact is an important 
design-research strategy, which can substantiate the relevance of a study in the context of 
research work. In Chapter 7 an XACML Trust Management Infrastructure is proposed to 
incorporate privacy and trust into the XACML access control framework. It describes a 
security threat modelling, which helps to determine the key privacy vulnerabilities and security 
threats. The idea is to validate earlier assumptions made and provide an interface for the 
concrete implementation of a proof of concept.
One fundamental challenge faced by this study is how to make parties in autonomous security 
domains treat PII with respect to privacy. The problem is intrinsic due to the open 
characteristics of the underlying communication networks that provide the backbone for the 
interactions. In the progression of this work, the notion of Obligation of Trust protocol was 
conceptualized in an attempt to address the remote enforcement of privacy obligations. Chapter 
8 gives details of the concepts that underline its protocol and message exchanges.
The implementation of a software as a proof of concept that demonstrates the applicability and 
capabilities of the proposed technical framework was considered essential. Chapter 9 describes 
that systematic implementation with a detailed technical design of XTMAI system architecture 
and core building blocks, plus an illustration of how the system works.
A formal evaluation of a research study is a critical success factor, which provides a feedback 
whether the work met its stated objectives in terms of the quality of the design process. Chapter 
10 presents the critical appraisal of this work in the context of the research questions and 
selected current systems.
Chapter 11 concludes this thesis with highlights of the benefits, strengths and limitations of the
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resultant framework plus suggestions for further and future work.
1.9 Conclusion
The Internet, which has provided the backbone for unprecedented business collaboration 
among parties, is faced with a range of security problems including privacy and confidentiality. 
Most existing access control systems designed to restrict access to sensitive resources 
overlooked these aspects from client's perspective. This chapter has introduced the background 
materials in the subject area, overviewed the privacy problem space, plus the indication of 
current status of the privacy protection capabilities of existing access control solutions in 
distributed environments. The motivation for and objectives of this work, and the questions 
addressed by it have been thoroughly dealt with in this chapter. Finally, key contributions to 
the body of knowledge presented in this thesis and an overview of the rest of the chapters of it 
are also highlighted.
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Chapter 2. Research Methodology
2.1 Introduction
In [49, 50], methodology is described as the "the analysis of the principles of methods, rules, 
and postulates" or "a collection of theories, concepts or ideas" that underpins a particular field 
of study. Gates [51], defines a methodology as a "combination of research strategies and data 
generation methods" employed in the research work, and argues that it is essential to 
differentiate research work from normal project-oriented development. Research methodology 
is an intricate aspect of any research work, partly because of the diversity of the philosophical 
underpinnings, but essentially as research involves rigorous processes with many assumptions 
that can affect the applicability of the results.
This chapter discusses a set of approaches and techniques that underpin this work, the rationale 
for the design decisions taken and the various analyses carried out. The philosophical approach 
[52] that justifies a thorough research activity is also presented.
2.2 Philosophical Approach
This work relates to a socio-economic problem which impacts on individuals, communities, 
governments and businesses. This problem is intrinsic to the relationships and interactions 
between these parties, and its solution involves trade-offs between competing interests, and 
individual perceptions. Because of this, it is important to consider the philosophical 
underpinnings of this research. In a research community, situating a research study based on its 
philosophical stance is often one of the most intriguing challenges faced by a researcher. This 
is simply because a research work can cut across several domains of knowledge and various 
disciplines. The Positivist, Interpretive and Critical epistemologies [53] dominate 
contemporary social research. The positivist assumptions are based on the fact that empirical 
scientific techniques suggest that reality is a function of objectivity and can be measured 
independent of the observer [54, 55]. The interpretive approach is based on the assumption that 
access to reality is through social constructs and that the understanding of a phenomenon can 
be through 'people's perception' i.e. people assigning meaning to an event. On the other hand, 
the criticalist's assumption is that social reality is historically dependent, and so can be
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produced by people [53]. However, in [54], Lee argued that these epistemological approaches 
are philosophically distinct, but in reality their distinctions are blurred.
Science has been viewed by many as a social phenomenon and a problem-solving undertaking 
that underscores its assumptions on theories whose predictions can be experimentally 
disproved or proved [55]. Arguably, this study relates to a socio-economic problem that has 
multiple effects (i.e. socio-economic, political and cultural impacts) on individuals, 
governments, and businesses. This study falls under the positivist epistemology, it is a 
problem-solving process [52], which is about developing a technical solution that aims to 
address a socio-economic problem concerned with privacy violations. The understanding of the 
issues and variables (characteristics) inherent in developing a suitable technical framework to 
address the problem requires extensive research activity.
Therefore, this study aims to develop a technical framework that supports communicating 
parties in business transactions by allowing them to participate actively in decision making 
with respect to privacy protection in access control infrastructures. In summary, therefore, this 
work can be classed as a process concerned with the creation of suitable technology to aid the 
resolution of a socio-economic problem, which can result in the production of an artefact [51, 
52]. In [51, 56, 57], this is classified as design and creation research, whilst in [52] it is referred 
to as design-science research. According to Hevner et al [52], IT artefacts are "constructs 
(vocabulary and symbols), models (abstractions and representations), methods (algorithms and 
practices), and instantiations (implemented and prototype systems)". They argue that the result 
of the design-science research is "a purposeful IT artifact created to address an important 
organizational problem". Overall, the purpose of this work is to address privacy concerns 
through the "building and evaluation" [52] of a viable technical framework.
2.3 Overview of the Research Design
This work is divided into two logical segments, namely investigation of the problem space and 
the development of a technical solution to address the problem considered.
  Investigation of the problem space: This segment deals with the empirical 
investigation and analysis of the problem space without too much emphasis on the 
technological underpinnings and implementation. The idea is to capture the problem
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domain, and understand the conceptual variables and complexity without reference 
to any implementation details. Chapters 1, 3 and 4 cover this segment.
  Technical solution: This stage is concerned with the technical requirements, 
systems analysis, architectural model and a software implementation as a proof of 
concept of this work. Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 cover this aspect of the work.
In both phases, the approaches described in [51, 58] were followed; and figure 2.1 is the 
conceptual research design that shows the overall steps taken in conducting this study, and they 
are described in the sections that follow.
2.3.1 Awareness of Problem
According to [51], this stage is the recognition and identification of the problem domain in 
terms of the main issues of concern. There are several social and technical issues that make 
privacy problems a growing concern. Thus there is a need for a deepening understanding of the 
characteristics of these, and they are essential in developing potential technical solutions that 
could address the privacy concerns. In the awareness phase, the sources of materials include 
literature reviews of relevant work, various Internet standards, technical documents, and 
concrete access control implementations, in an attempt to identifying their strengths, 
limitations, and gaps in existing knowledge. Additionally, it is important to identify some of 
the underlying assumptions underpinning existing systems and their approaches. The rationale 
is to develop an in-depth understanding of the socio-economic elements of privacy and security 
in the context of access control operations in distributed environments. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 
cover this segment of the thesis.
2.3.2 Suggestion
This phase is concerned with the development of the research motivation, the objectives and 
main questions addressed by his work. The deductions from the awareness of the problem, 
serve as an input to this phase. In the process, it may be essential to examine further the 
outcome of the awareness stage with a view to analyzing the underpinning theories and 
assumptions identified in order to put the generated ideas into proper context. It may require 
further investigation of relevant literature and analysis of the current systems. While chapters 3 
and 4 served as inputs to this phase, chapter 1 deals with this aspect of the thesis.
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2.3.3 Development
This phase may be called the "build-and-evaluate loop" [52], and is inherently iterative. It is 
concerned with the requirement analysis, the architectural model design, and the 
implementation of the software system of the proposed technical solution. The technical 
requirements are analyzed based on a security threat modelling technique [59] discussed in 
chapter 7. The purpose of the security threat modelling is to capture the privacy and 
confidentiality requirements in terms of vulnerabilities and associated threats from which 
architectural model design can be drawn. The modelling helps to deconstruct the interactions 
among the actors involved in distributed access control operations, and to determine how 
effective trust relationships can be established among them to guarantee privacy and 
confidentiality protection.
Chapters 5 and 6 provide useful inputs in conceptualizing the design of the framework. The 
development stage also involves the design and modelling of the system components using 
Unified Modeling Language (UML) techniques [60] to show object classes and relationships
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among them. As shown in figure 2.1, in this, revisiting of previous stages might be necessary 
to gradually modify and improve on the solution considered. Chapters 8 and 9 provide more 
technical details of this segment of the thesis. The techniques employed in this phase are 
detailed below.
2.3.3.1 Developmental Issues
The first thing considered is the various technical options and approaches that might be 
adopted in addressing the main research question. There are several approaches to addressing 
privacy and confidentiality concerns including anonymous credential systems [61] [62], access 
control systems [63, 64], etc. Anonymous schemes can support the protection of users' privacy 
and confidentiality but in environments in which transactional risks are high, and tangible 
credentials are required before access is granted, anonymous solutions can make accountability 
and non-repudiation of privacy invasions difficult. In contrast, policy driven access control 
schemes can support the protection of users' privacy and confidentiality, and provide 
mechanisms that allow accountability and non-repudiation, but can be vulnerable to abuse 
and/or misuse. These options are considered in the context of the problem domain.
Second, other issues considered include the availability of privacy enhancement technologies 
and standards, and how they can fit into the technical solution. In particular, the choice of an 
access control model that is flexible and extendable to support the potential solution is a critical 
design decision to be made. When considering the programming language and platform to use, 
the availability of an open source Application Programming Interface (API) that could support 
the software implementation was primarily considered.
2.3.3.2 Requirement Analysis
Traditionally, the software engineering process is independent of the application area, project 
size or complexity and primarily consists of three key concepts: the "what"? (Problem 
definition phase), the "how"? (design and development phase) and "support" which focuses on 
the changes that may be necessary after development [65]. The definition phase captures all the 
what questions: the information to be processed (i.e. privacy and confidentiality concerns to be 
addressed), requirements in terms of functionality and performance issues, system behaviour 
and interfaces, design constraints, evaluation and verification criteria. This phase focuses on 
two basic steps: requirements analysis and conceptual design (presented in chapters 7). The
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purpose is to deconstruct the different actors in distributed access control operations, which is 
critical in understanding of the risks involved in the exchange of attribute information. In 
addition, the analysis of technical issues surrounding the building of trust relationships between 
communicating parties from different autonomous security domains will dictate whether a 
given trust relationship model is suitable and appropriate in the environment under 
consideration.
2.3.3.3 Implementation Approach
The Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) is considered, which is a proven process of 
software development that has the benefit of structured planning and control [56]. This generic 
model provides the platform for using other techniques such as Object Oriented Programming 
(OOP) in the application architecture and UML in modelling the object classes. These 
techniques help in determining the system components' dependencies and relationships. 
Project based developments usually follow stepwise methods such as the waterfall lifecycle 
[56, 65]. In contrast, research based developments favour rapid application development 
(RAD) paradigms, which are more iterative, and allow refinement in the entire development 
process. The RADs are essentially good where all technical requirements cannot be determined 
beforehand [66] such as in research environments. According to [51], requirements can be 
refined as a result of further analysis of problem space and recycling of the development 
process becomes imperative. According to [66], the respectability of prototype paradigms is as 
a result of a proven track record of dynamic responses to changes in user requirements, which 
reduces the amount of reworking needed and has helped to control the risks of incomplete or 
inaccurate requirements. The rapid prototyping paradigm is considered for the software 
implementation. Besides the general notion that rapid prototyping is suitable for research 
projects [51], the rationale for the choice is complemented by the author's previous experience 
[43].
2.3.3.4 Software Debugging
Two approaches are used in the debugging phase. First, a repeatable incremental unit test 
technique that can detect errors at the earlier stage of the process. The objective is to 
significantly reduce the cost of reworking, minimize system failures and reduce the amount of 
potential bugs. Rapid prototyping is found useful in this context, it allows incremental and unit 
testing of unit blocks aimed at verifying that the codes actually perform what they are designed
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to do. In a software lab environment, sandbox-testing tools would give rapid and more 
meaningful results in both testing the functional and non-functional requirements. However, in 
a research environment sandbox tools are unavailable, which usually prompts the use of in- 
built debugging tools within the software Integrated Development Environment (IDE), which 
in this case is Netbeans 6.1 [67].
2.3.3.5 Technical Testing and Evaluation
In this segment, a range of technical tests and evaluations to validate the software against the 
assessment of the main research aim was planned. Although traditional software testing 
techniques such as the unit test are employed during the coding process, object classes and 
method [56], testing of the software in terms of functionality and performance is important. 
Two main types of validation, namely technical functionality and performance are chosen as 
rationale to justify the capability and applicability of the product of this work. The evaluation is 
done in two steps. First is an assessment of how the developed prototype addressed the main 
research challenge in view of its requirements. Another segment is a performance test such as a 
throughput test to determine the average response-time of a typical negotiation between 
communicating parties in distributed access control operations.
2.3.4 Evaluation
The evaluation stage is critical and should have some measurable metrics. Hevner et al [52], 
and Gates [51], stated that a design research which resulted in an artefact can be evaluated in 
terms of functionality, completeness, performance, accuracy, usability, etc, but has to fit into 
the original objective of the research. The evaluation compares the solutions against the 
objectives and research questions. In line with the above, three metrics are considered upon 
which to evaluate the resultant technical framework. First, technical validation seeks to test the 
functionality against the objectives and research questions using experimental and simulation 
approaches. Second, performance evaluation seeks to measure the average response-time 
during the privacy negotiations. This particular evaluation hinges on many factors i.e. network 
characteristics, volume of computation depending on the number of rounds and access control 
input data. Third, carryout a comparative assessment of the proposed solution against some of 
the work reviewed in chapter 4. Chapter 10 covers the evaluation phase.
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2.3.5 Conclusion of Study
This segment concludes the study and gives a summary of the research outcomes; draw useful 
conclusions based on the research successes, knowledge gained and the known limitations of 
the work. In addition, key contributions to the body of knowledge in the area of privacy and 
security, and useful suggestions for future work will be presented.
2.4 Conclusion
The need to discuss the methodology that underpins a research work is essential to substantiate 
its rigorous processes. This chapter discussed the philosophical and methodological 
underpinnings of the work described by this thesis, the system development paradigms, 
methods and techniques employed in developing the resulting framework. Additionally, the 
rationale that justifies some of the choices made in the design of the technical framework and 
software implementation has also been presented.
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Chapter 3. Review of Concepts of Privacy
3.1 Introduction
Extensive studies have shown that privacy related issues are growing in the current ubiquitous 
network environments based on the Internet, and are receiving widespread investigation within 
the research community [11, 23, 68, 69]. In spite of the fact that the Internet has had significant 
visible impacts in enhancing distributed transactions with exceptional economic benefits to 
individuals and businesses, the rising security threats and challenges are disquieting [70]. 
Although various efforts in advancing security techniques to deal with these threats are 
partially successful, the level of sophistication of new technologies continues to evolve 
significant new threats [22].
The failure of existing solutions to effectively tackle these challenges cannot completely be 
ascribed to system failures; fresh business requirements demand new technologies, which in 
turn also raise new security issues [71]. This is worse in a heterogeneous environment where 
transactions span multiple autonomous security realms and are unsafe. Moreover, complexities 
in the gathering, processing and sharing of personal information are changing the landscape of 
these Internet security problems. Privacy is a critical concern, and has generated unprecedented 
debate, perhaps due to the complexity and ambiguity of its notion coupled with the fact that it 
lacks an agreed definition [23]. This complexity, plus the fact that it is only vaguely 
understood, hampers any effort to find a common solution [23]. As complementary efforts, 
privacy laws, legislation and standards have been enacted by regional institutions and 
governments to help in reducing the impact privacy challenges impose on the network-centric 
global economy.
This chapter examines the foundational privacy problem space, and reviews the concept of 
anonymity with emphasis on its strengths and limitations. In addition, a few of the privacy 
protection initiatives and principles in some economic regions including the United State and 
Europe are examined. Finally, a comparative analysis of these privacy principles is given to 
broaden the understanding of privacy protection requirements in the context of access control 
system infrastructure.
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3.2 A Survey of Privacy Problems
The first mention of privacy is generally accredited to Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. 
Brandeis in their famous paper: The Right to Privacy, in which they defined privacy as "the 
right to be left alone" [72]. Alan Westin [73] of Columbia University expanded on the 
definition of privacy as "the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others". 
Arguably, Westin's definition somehow influenced the general perception of the term privacy, 
and to a certain extent may have driven many privacy standards and initiatives. The dawn of 
the Internet, and the increasing reliance on network based business transactions opened up a 
separate new socio-economic dimension that impinged on privacy, confidentiality and trust. 
This demanded more investigation of the privacy problem domain. Privacy as a concept is 
affected by a variety of socio-economic factors, including business interests, regulation, legal 
requirements and the advancement of technology [34]. The individual needs to transact 
business with others, and this requires exposure of personal information. Businesses want to 
offer customized services and this requires personal information and profiles [74]. 
Governments want to ensure security and require some aspects of strategic personal 
information. New technologies that promise better user experience raise fresh privacy 
dimensions. For example, the Federated Identity Management(FIM) scheme which gives a 
Single Sign On (SSO) experience, i.e. the use of several application resources without the 
requirement to logon multiple times has exposed new privacy risks [75]. Simply put, FIM has 
the potential to expose PII to arbitrary strangers [70, 76, 77].
The incidence of privacy breaches such as identity theft, unsolicited offers, phishing attacks, 
and probing attacks with their far reaching costly consequences continues to increase 
dramatically [76]. In the UK, a Cabinet Office Study in 2002 revealed the rise in the use of 
false and stolen identities [40]. According to [78], the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
received 255,565 consumer complaints in 2005 concerning identity theft cases. A report by the 
Identity Theft Resource Center in the US revealed the impact of privacy breaches on their 
victims, and the fact that a significant number of the victims bear the liabilities for such crimes 
[79]. In the US, the dominant threat to personal information is data brokering, which involves 
gathering, processing and dispersal of personal information by third parties, and is vulnerable 
to various misuse and abuse. In effect, data brokers who sell personal information have
unconstrained access to many databases where personal information is stored [76]. The
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implication is that there are concerns about the undesirable use of personal information; 
whether it is obtained by lawful means or not is not the issue. Moreover, a study published in 
1999 by AT& T Research [80] revealed that about 87% of users were "very or somewhat 
concerned about threats to personal privacy while online". But, in [20], Acquisti et al, state that 
an individual's behaviour with respect to privacy decision making can be affected by social 
preferences, norms or cultures. This implies that the factors that can contribute to the inability 
of an individual to make privacy sensitive decisions may not be explicitly controlled by the 
individual.
Therefore, the results of identity disclosures, linking data traffic to identity, location 
disclosures, user profiling and the undesirable disclosure of identity information to third parties 
give rise to a multiplicity of privacy concerns. The quest for privacy is not unconnected with 
public craving and individual yearning for proper data governance. Individuals are increasingly 
vulnerable to privacy threats because of the radical change in information sharing mechanisms 
driven by the Internet [22, 70]. Companies have automated their data collection mechanisms 
allegedly to provide their customers with customized services, value offers, competitive 
offerings, etc [22]. The pretence upon which privacy violators amass huge amounts of personal 
identifiable information from network entities which they can employ to create detailed 
profiles for aggressive marketing campaigns (on the side of commercial entities), fraud (in the 
cases of identity thieves), and national security countermeasures (in the case of government 
agencies) [21, 76] is disturbing and unsafe. Incidents of privacy violations are frequently 
reported in the media [21, 81, 82]. It is inevitable that as entities use public networks, they 
leave traces of information at different nodes or sites, which can probably be collected and 
analyzed by interested parties.
The above insight establishes that privacy activities are complex and sophisticated, and require 
several aspects including technologies, legislation, laws and guidelines to be examined. The 
underlying disclosures of privacy concerns raise the question of how much privacy protection 
we can realistically expect given the inherent characteristics of open environments. Several 
organizations have distinct and often conflicting security requirements and expectations which 
complicate privacy solutions. The issue of establishing sufficient trust to screen access requests 
effectively, for both internal and external users, implies significant technical tasks to be carried 
out. Individuals are concerned with the information that they pass to others, and yet they want
to reveal information that can facilitate interaction. Consequently, privacy is a concern to
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everyone due to the misuse and/or abuse of PII, which in most cases leaves the victim 
disadvantaged. On many occasions the individual is made to bear the risks associated with 
privacy invasion. These risks may be in the form described in [3, 20, 23] and are summarized 
as follows:
  financial loss due to stolen identity or interaction with imposters, (i.e. a phishing 
attack tricks its victims into revealing their credentials such as online banking 
authentication details. The attacker can use a victim's credentials to make 
undesirable financial transactions on the internet);
  the unintended release of identity attributes may impact on the individual's financial 
credit status;
  long term consequences of misused credential attributes that can significantly 
disrupt an individual's social life and status;
  discrimination such as social services exclusions [20], economic and political 
alienation.
The enforcement of privacy across multiple domains is intrinsically problematic [30, 31]. The 
gains achievable from distributed transactions cannot be fully realized without addressing 
privacy barriers to them [11, 14, 20, 23, 25]. Moreover, the need arises to consider the impact 
of privacy principles and legal frameworks as they relate to protecting privacy. Besides, there 
are interest groups putting forward anonymity as a means to solving privacy problems, this 
leans towards total privacy but is of course difficult to realize in the real world [33]. From 
Westin's notion of privacy plus the fact that privacy related activities are complex, it still 
debatable whether addressing privacy problems through technology alone is sufficient.
3.3 Anonymity as a Panacea for Privacy Violation
Anonymity is one solution to the problem of how to preserve privacy. Anonymity has a very 
long history predating the advent of computers and simply refers to the state of being unknown 
or unacknowledged. In network communication, it refers to a subject using a computer 
resource or service without disclosing their identity or being linked to the usage [83]. Law 
enforcement agencies have used anonymous sources for both crime prevention and
prosecution. People are sometimes willing to say something they don't want to put their
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signature to for fear of reprisal [84]. Historically, the use of anonymity in crime prevention 
invariably has inherent problems such as the credibility of sources and their reliability, and can 
sometimes be abused. Consequently, anonymity when not applied with caution can ruin the 
lives of innocent people. The properties of anonymity include untraceability, unobservability 
and unlinkabiliry; and collectively they provide extreme privacy. The characteristic of 
unobservability is that a network entity can use a computing service without being observed by 
any party. Similarly, unlinkability refers to the notion that an entity cannot be linked to its use 
of computing services, and untraceability refers to the property that an entity uses services 
without creating traceable patterns.
Whether or not complete anonymity is desirable is debatable. In [85], Rowland suggests that 
measures that foster anonymity in order to protect privacy may, incidentally, facilitate or even 
encourage anti-social and illicit behaviour. However, anonymity has its proper use in privacy 
safeguards. There are several occasions where people have a legitimate need to remain private 
and unnoticed. People may have a high potential risk of being harassed, threatened or 
discriminated against upon the revelation of certain personal information such as medical 
records, political affiliation, etc. Another significant factor that encourages anonymity is the 
threat of price discrimination, which is very popular in online sales. In [74], Acquisti refers to 
price discrimination as the "seller's ability to provide the same commodity or service at 
different prices to different customers". The seller must have the capacity to track, trace and 
build considerable profiles of individuals in order to predict their purchasing capabilities if it is 
to implement price discrimination to its benefit.
3.3.1 Pseudonymity
The notion of pseudonymity is simply, establishing forms of transparent identifiers that cannot 
be directly linked to an identity. Pseudonymity has become an important privacy tool in recent 
times and is highly used in emerging Federated Access Management computer networks [86]. 
In distributed systems, a pseudonym possesses varying degrees of anonymity and is highly 
dependent on the existence of well-established vocabularies among communities of users. 
There are persistent identifiers that are traceable to users as well as single use identifiers, which 
completely conceal the user's identity but obviously reveal something about the user's origin.
The fundamental idea is that pseudonymity systems provide the means to shield real-world
identities from being identified by undesirable parties but still provide mechanisms for giving
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account for the use of them. They offer a kind of 'trusted anonymous' identity i.e. a certified 
reference identifier, which when issued by an asserting party, can be recognized and trusted by 
the recipient party. The recipient can use it to determine whether or not to grant or deny access 
to resources. Essentially, the identity information of the user is not explicitly revealed to the 
recipient or relying party. The relying party trusts the identifier as a valid identity based on the 
trust it has established with the attesting party. This is the idea behind the popular SSO [86, 
87], and its use is plausible where people can do business without the need to explicitly 
identify themselves at the service endpoints.
3.3.2 Pros and Cons of Anonymity
In some cases, anonymity is the failsafe to preserve privacy in the event that the relying party 
may not be trusted to preserve confidentiality. Consider, for example, a political activist who 
may trust the Inland Revenue to keep her PII confidential, but fears what a government security 
agency might do with her PII under the guise of national security. Various anonymity schemes 
[34] have attempted to address privacy problems in such cases. Though anonymity may be the 
only guaranteed option in certain situations, in many cases it is not a viable option [88]. There 
are cases where an entity must disclose personal identifiable attribute information in order to 
obtain a service or complete a transaction. This is the primary scope of this study; to 
investigate those cases requiring the confidentiality of information at the consuming endpoints. 
In particular, how to ensure privacy at remote site based on the security preferences of the 
providing entity. The main drawbacks of protecting privacy using anonymity are as follows:
  Anonymity has the ability to ruin the trustworthiness of an organization; typically, 
the underlying infrastructure could be misused or abused.
  Anonymity has the potential of being hijacked for illegal transactions, modification 
of sensitive data, spreading of virus and worms, hate speeches, threatening 
messages, etc.
  It can be susceptible to spreading of false information across the boundary of trust, 
which can be very damaging.
Anonymity may not provide privacy protection in many situations, particularly where other 
identity-attributes of a user may be required to complete access control based transactions.
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Nevertheless, pseudonymity techniques are considered in this work, especially in distributed 
transactions where users must assess the risks of releasing their attribute information. In the 
context of this work, pseudonymity plays an important function in filtering out the service- 
requesting client, and providing a mutual way for communicating parties to establish initial 
trust context upon which higher trust can be established.
3.4 Privacy Legal Framework and Principles
The explosion in Internet transactions has escalated privacy concerns; organizations now 
consider privacy as a business requirement that must be fulfilled [89]. Privacy is a multi- 
disciplinary subject that spans technical, social, legal, and cultural issues, with an array of 
measures available aimed at protecting online privacy. Privacy is a rising socio-economic and 
technical problem that captures the interest of everyone using the ubiquitous networks and will 
continue to attract wider publicity resulting in more and more public awareness [21]. This has 
fuelled agitation for privacy safeguards and countermeasures to combat the impact of 
unregulated public networks on an individual's privacy. This quest has brought about the 
emergence of privacy laws, regulations, and legislation as well as fair information practices in 
most regions of the world. The varying privacy laws enacted worldwide are a bid to reduce the 
adverse effect of privacy violations by creating a privacy friendly environment that should 
consolidate the gains of the Internet. However, trends show that nations are also interested in 
balancing national security interests against privacy. This brings a debate about the roles the 
various privacy stakeholders can play amidst the requirements, dimensions and expectations of 
privacy [21, 89]. As a way of regularizing privacy enforcement, privacy standards have 
evolved in recent times not only to create the necessary awareness, but also to help a range of 
stakeholders to better estimate the risks associated with privacy activities [90]. The intense 
efforts by regulatory authorities, technical or business organizations centrally are in tune with 
the individual's increasing eagerness to be familiar with not only the privacy rights they can 
expect, but also what techniques or mechanisms are available to help enforce their privacy 
rights [20, 76]. The overall goal is to protect individuals with respect to the processing of their 
personal information.
Privacy laws and regulations emerged as safeguards to provide legislative and legal 
frameworks for treating information across organizations, regional boundaries, etc in terms of 
collection, storage, and sharing of information that links an identity. Empirically, these privacy
28
regulations and guidelines are expected to influence some design decisions especially in terms 
of the interplay between individual substantive self-control and the legitimate free flow of 
information. In the following section, various privacy initiatives in the European Union, the 
US, the Asian Pacific, etc, are briefly discussed.
3.4.1 EU Directive 95/46/EC
The EU Directive 95/46/EC [28] deals with the aspect of protection of Individuals with regard 
to the processing of Personal Data and on the free movement of such data This directive has 
two main objectives:
1 "Member States shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and 
in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data".
2 Privacy protection should neither restrict nor hamper the free flow of personal data among 
member states based on the above.
This directive requires that a 'Data Controller' in member states be charged with the 
responsibility of determining the "purposes and means of processing" of PII "in accordance 
with national and community laws or regulations" in the context of a "natural person's 
privacy". In summary, the directive imposes that:
1 The processing of data is done fairly and by lawful means.
2 The collection of data should be carried out for "specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes", and not subsequently be processed in a way inconsistent with the stated 
original purposes. In the case of "historical, statistical or scientific purposes", the 
processing "shall not be considered as incompatible" provided adequate protection 
mechanisms are provided by the member state.
3 The collection should be to the "extent that is sufficient and relevant", and must be 
justifiable and related to the intended purposes.
4 The collection of data "should be accurate and up-to-date". Appropriate safeguards shall 
be in place to "ensure that inaccurate, or incomplete" data be erased or corrected.
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5 The data is "kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects", and "not longer 
than is necessary", and "only for the purposes for which the data" was originally 
collected.
6 Data shall not be transferred to third party countries that may not have appropriate levels 
of privacy protection safeguards.
Furthermore, the directive requires that the data owner be informed adequately in a manner the 
"purpose for which personal data will be used" is understandable i.e. for some category of data, 
explicit consent is required before processing of such personal data. Alternatively, the data 
processing should be necessary for "the fulfilment of a legal obligation" to which the data 
controller is subject, or be a necessary safeguard for the overall interests of the data owner. An 
example is where the processing of the data is for the public interest or in pursuit of national 
security interest, or criminal justice, etc. In this case, the requirement demands that it is the 
"responsibility" of the data "controller to ensure that the processing" is carried out only for 
legitimate purposes.
The EU Data Protection Directive for electronic communication (2002/58/EC) attempts to 
complement the above-mentioned directives. It primarily focuses on aspects of the electronic 
communications in terms of confidentiality, data traffic and location data. This later directive 
outlined the restrictions and requirements on the use of Internet browser security features and 
unsolicited electronic communications in general.
3.4.2 United States Privacy Initiatives
The US privacy activities span public, private and other organizations, covering several 
specific industry sectors. The US is one region with noticeable privacy activities and concerns 
due to the various illicit privacy cases that span the public, government, commercial and 
identity thieves [21, 77, 90]. In fact the sale of personal information seems to be a legitimate 
commercial activity that has resulted in many abuses of PII in this region [76]. In this light, 
several sectors have set-out regulations and guidelines including the US Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which deals with how to use and process 
healthcare related data, the Gramm Leach Bliley Act (GLB Act) [91], concerned with the 
collection, use and disclosure of PII by the financial service providers. Similar to these acts is 
the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), which was developed to regulate the
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collection, processing and use of information about children under 13 years. Overall, these 
privacy acts focus on notice, and consent, and disclosure of personal information with 
appropriate security safeguards to ensure data confidentiality and accuracy.
3.4.3 Canadian Privacy Initiatives
The Canadian Privacy Act is a private sector oriented approach to privacy, which specifies how 
collection, use or disclosure of PII, especially in commercial activities, shall be handled. It 
covers ten significant areas concerning accountability, consent, limiting collection, identifying 
purpose, limiting usage, disclosure and retention, accuracy, openness, safeguards, individual 
access, and the provision of challenging compliance.
3.5 Privacy Protection Information Principles
Independent Organizations in an attempt to broker privacy activities have outlined a set of Fair 
Information Practices (FIP) regarding the collection, processing and use of PII. These include, 
among others, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) [13], 
the Online Privacy Alliance (OPA) [26], the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) 
[15], etc. The differences reflect the various sectors' privacy perspectives. The following 
subsection outlines some of these principles.
3.5.1 OECD Guidelines
OECD is an international organization concerned with global economic cooperation and 
development. Its guidelines focus on the protection of privacy and the trans-border flow of 
personal information based on eight main principles [13].
1 Collection Limitation: This deals with the aspect of data collection which stipulates that 
data be collected by "lawful and fair means", and where suitable with the explicit consent 
and knowledge of the data owner.
2 Data Quality: Data collection should be appropriate to the purposes for which it is 
intended to be used, correct, complete and it is up to date.
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3 Purpose Specification: This requires that the purposes for which personal information is 
collected be stated before or at the instance of data collection and further use be limited to 
the stated original purposes.
4 Use Limitation: The use of personal information shall be compatible with the purposes 
stated, and should not be disclosed or made available other than to those stated in 
accordance with purpose specification. Exception is made in the case of a demand with 
the authority of law or with appropriate consent of the data owner.
5 Security Safeguards: This requires the storage of personal information to be protected by 
"reasonable security measures against loss, unauthorized access, destruction, 
modification" and undesirable disclosure.
6 Openness: The use, administration and management of personal information should be 
transparent as regarding "developments, practices and policies". In addition, it requires 
the availability of mechanisms to "establish existence and nature of personal 
information", their use purposes and the particulars of the data controller.
7 Individual Participation: This aspect deals with the data owner's participation in the 
governance of their personal data. In particular, "an individual should have the right to 
obtain from the data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data 
controller has data relating to him", and to have it communicated to him within a 
reasonable time, perhaps at a charge, if any, but this should not be excessive. Moreover, if 
the data owner is unable to obtain personal data, when requested, it can challenge any 
such denial, and if there are misrepresentations in the personal data, they should be 
deleted or amended accordingly.
8 Accountability: This aspect provides an instrument for allowing the data controller to 
comply with all measures to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the above 
principles.
3.5.2 OPA Guidelines
The Online Privacy Alliance [26] is an industry alliance of more than 100 global organizations 
and trade associations which offers guidelines regarding how companies in Internet industry
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can function in commercial environments in terms of data and information privacy. It describes 
five main principles:
1. Adoption and Implementation of a Privacy Policy: This mandates organizations to 
"adopt and implement an appropriate policy framework" tailored to protecting the 
privacy of individuals' personal data.
2. Notice and Disclosure: This requires that an "organization's privacy policy be made 
precise, clear, and easy to locate" as well as being available before or at the instance 
of collection of personal data. It requires that the "policy statement specify the type 
of information collected", and "whether disclosure to third parties is permissible". It 
demands that organizations categorically make a statement of commitment 
regarding data security as well as the necessary steps they aim to take to ensure data 
quality and access, including addressing the aspects of accountability, disputes and 
remedy mechanisms.
3. Choice/Consent: The requirement is that the data owner "shall be given the chance 
to, or options to make a choice" regarding how their PII collected by an 
organization can be used when subsequent proposed use may be incompatible with 
the originally stated purposes of collection, including the distribution of such PII to 
any third party, other than originally stated.
4. Data Security: This aspect requires that "organizations adopt appropriate security 
measures when creating, maintaining, using or disseminating personal data". In 
addition, measures should be in place to guarantee "data reliability, protection 
against loss, damage, misuse, or modification". In the event of lawful disclosure or 
transfer of data to third parties, it is the responsibility of the organization to ensure 
that such third parties are aware of the security safeguards on the transferred data.
5. Data Quality and Access: This states the need for organizations to take proper steps 
to "ensure that the life cycle of information is consistent, accurate, complete and 
timely" for the mentioned purposes of use. It includes the provision of suitable 
apparatus for the legitimate rectification of inaccurate data, unreliable data source, 
collection methods, reasonable access control measures and protection against 
accidental damage or loss.
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3.5.3 The APEC Framework
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation privacy framework [92] is a regional privacy 
framework for Asia Pacific member communities which regulates privacy activities for the 
region's mutual benefit. This program is driven by the realization of the economic potential of 
electronic commerce in today's global business environments, namely cost savings, transparent 
competitiveness and general improvement of quality of life among citizenry. Similar to other 
regional initiatives, it seeks to enable regional data transfers with mutual benefit to consumers, 
businesses, and governments, develop an effective privacy protection mechanism to dismantle 
potential barriers to information flows, and hence promote economic growth within the APEC 
region. Most of its principles are derived from the OECD guidelines, except for some subtle 
interpretations given to some of the components.
3.5.4 Comparative Analyses of Privacy Guidelines and Principles
Central to the philosophy of these laws, legislation and regulations, and FIPs are to devise a set 
of guidelines and principles aimed at influencing decisions, actions and other activities 
concerning the collection, processing and sharing of information of a personal nature. The 
implication is that any piece of information, which explicitly or implicitly can be linked to an 
identity, should be treated with respect to privacy. It is expected that consumers may have 
more trust and confidence, if their PII is treated with utmost privacy. This will promote 
healthier transactions and competition, resulting in greater use of electronic commerce. The 
balance between legitimate free flow of information and privacy rights can be enshrined by 
setting the scope, and limits on the collection, processing and use of PII, so that stakeholders 
can comply appropriately with these regulatory principles that underpin privacy data handling 
concerns. Having examined a range of privacy directives and principles, it is equally important 
to put them in the context of this study. It is important to mention that access control 
infrastructures, which involve the use of PII, should comply with fundamental privacy 
principles. Given that data collection limitation is widely supported by most of the principles 
covered, in access control infrastructure, a data consuming party should be made to ask for the 
minimum set of PII that will satisfy its access requirements. In a typical legitimate access 
control transaction, the reason for collection is implicit, since the system will require at some 
point the PII to make an access decision. It also implies that the data owner's consent is 
implicitly relevant and the intended purpose should be clear. A comparative analysis of these
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principles with respect to access control infrastructure is therefore imperative and is given 
below.
1 Purpose/Notice: In existing access control systems, usually, purpose and notice are 
assumed implicit because PII is collected before or at the time of access control operation. 
However, the above assumption overlooks any subsequent processing or use of the 
information that may be incompatible with the original purpose of collection. Potentially, 
to comply with the above principles, the data consuming party should communicate the 
purpose explicitly in a dynamic way by conveying the policy or requirements to the 
service requestor, perhaps at runtime. The adverse implication is that this can be 
vulnerable to probing attack, and business information may be exposed unnecessarily.
2 Use Limitation: In access control, the data consuming party should be made to limit the 
use of PII to the specified purposes (i.e. to determine the access privileges of the data 
owner in access control operation). Unauthorized disclosure to third parties, subsequent 
use or disclosure that is incompatible with the original stated purpose should be 
communicated to the data owner, and if possible, the data owner's consent obtained. This 
requirement is fundamental, but hard to implement, simply because once PII is in the 
hand of a third party, controlling its usage is extremely difficult.
3 Choice/Consent: Given that choice is the notion of giving the data owner options to say 
how and when its information should be used and/or processed, consent relates to the 
secondary use of the data, which in principle should be communicated to the data 
providing party. Satisfying this requirement in an access control environment would 
require the dynamic negotiation of service meta-information through perhaps mutual 
disclosure of access requirements and means of fulfilling the requirements. This in 
essence gives a party the opportunity to calculate the risks for giving out its resources plus 
placing obligating constraints on the receiver that should be respected.
4 Accountability: This aspect deals with liabilities, enforcement, redress and remedies 
through civil or criminal enforcement mechanisms. Arguably, in the event of privacy 
breaches, compromises, disputes, etc, entities usually limit or explicitly refuse to incur 
liability resulting from representations they make to others in their contracts. In an access 
control infrastructure, it is important to have a mechanism that would aid in the
achievement of accountability. Given the distributed and open nature of the privacy
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environment, this would require 'difficult-to repudiate' technical evidence as described in 
[31].
5 Data Security and Quality: This aspect relates to the data quality in terms of reliability, 
accuracy, completeness as well as the data being up-to-date. In an access control 
infrastructure, this should be more of a concern to the data consuming party, which relies 
on the accurateness of the PII provided to make an access decision. Usually, from the 
consuming party's perspective, it would rely on an underlying trust relationship 
mechanism to verify and validate the data received from the providing party.
6 Individual Participation: This deals with how the individual would be made to actively 
participate in the handling of information that concerns him or her. It partially, relates to 
views about user-centric approaches [87, 93] in handling PII. Arguably, individual 
participation does not necessarily mean that the entity that the data refers to should be the 
custodian of such data, but it should have a say on how, when, where and who should use 
or process such data unambiguously. For example, the data owner can allow a bank to 
transfer some of his personal details to a third party, even though the data owner does not 
hold the data. Overall, user-centric should imply usage with an appropriate control and 
consent by the data owner, and can be addressed in context partially by the use of a 
suitable policy framework, so that an entity can explicitly express its security preferences 
concerning information about it.
3.6 Conclusion
Privacy has continued to generate concerns due to its growing importance in the current 
Internet environment. It is a socio-economic problem that has many facets requiring a survey 
of its problem space. This chapter has presented background material on the concepts of 
privacy, the notion of anonymity and pseudonymity as privacy safeguards. Furthermore, the 
chapter has looked into the spectrum of some of the aspects of privacy laws, legislation, FIPs 
and guidelines. In general, the various privacy viewpoints showed similarities and differences 
in the perception of privacy by different interest groups. Lastly, the comparative assessment of 
these guidelines and principles contextually provides insight into how to tackle the privacy 
problem in the domain of access control.
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Chapter 4. Review of the Privacy Characteristics of Access Control Systems
4.1 Introduction
The Internet has forever changed the way some of the enterprise systems are configured due to 
the need to share their resources with others. In the past, organizations have relied heavily on 
closed security systems to control access to their resources, and required a form of pre- 
established knowledge (trusted and known users) between the server and the clients. The 
closed security systems are no longer robust and cannot scale proportionally in providing 
secure access due to the need to accommodate users outside the trusted boundary. Thus the 
benefits and gains of using the Internet for connecting heterogeneous systems are being 
hampered by the lack of flexibility and sophistication in dealing with increasing security 
threats [71].
One notable approach in dealing with these threats at application level is access control 
management systems [4, 6, 94-96], but access control systems make extensive use of 
identifying information of subjects and objects [6, 22], which raises other security issues and 
challenges [20, 22, 96, 97]. The emergence of globalization, the increasing pervasiveness of 
electronic Business to Business (B2B) collaborations, and the upsurge in the use of e- 
commerce, are growing to a degree that was never anticipated [77]. This, arguably, puts the 
burden on organizations to provide robust, effective, and scalable security mechanisms to 
support the restriction of unauthorized access to information assets for both internal and 
external users. The proliferation of distributed transactions has created the need for enterprises 
to be able to expose all or part of their applications' functionality to other applications over 
open networks [3, 98]. Web services help to solve the problem of merging applications that 
have been developed autonomously and run on a variety of software and hardware platforms.
The Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) based on Web services is promising to revolutionize 
the implementation of open and dynamic transactions in many industries [1, 99]. Though web 
services are more tailored towards application-to-application interactions [1], where access 
control is a requirement it will make use of some attribute information, credentials, properties 
or privileges that may identify an entity in order to determine the access privileges of that 
entity. This raises new security and privacy challenges when services have to be restricted to a 
certain community of clients. The result is that both service clients and providers are faced with
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the need to balance security with the increasing demand for prompt access to their information 
and resources. Access control schemes are an emerging application level security, essentially 
designed to restrict access to computer resources only to users with provable attribute-identity, 
properties or privileges. In a ubiquitous environment such as the Internet, users as well as 
service providers exist in multiple domains with different security preferences and 
expectations.
This chapter demonstrates extensive investigation of current related work from a technological 
perspective. It covers the overview of characteristics of open and dynamic systems, with an 
introductory discussion on authentication, authorization and digital trust. A detailed review is 
given of a few selected access control management models, especially architectural overviews, 
with some of their important characteristics. Finally, the comparative analysis of the systems 
reviewed with a focus on their strengths, weakness and limitations is given.
4.2 Characteristics of Distributed Systems
In distributed environments, there are three functional application level security components 
that peers in communication have to address: Authentication, Authorization and Trust. Whilst 
authentication addresses the question of 'who are you?' authorization answers the question 
'what can you do?' after we know who you are. In contrast, trust deals with 'who says this 
about you?', and how the recipient can place confidence in the entity that makes this statement 
the attesting party. The new federated service architecture (i.e. SOA based on web services) 
results in a need for authentication and authorization to be managed operationally in 
autonomous security domains, which requires a trust relationship to be established between 
those domains. For example, authentication could be handled at the service initiator's domain, 
whilst authorization could be handled at the service provider's domain based on attributes 
asserted by a third domain. Consequently trust relationships must be established between all 
the interacting domains, so that the service provider can trust the authentication statement made 
by the initiator's domain, and the attribute statements asserted by the third domain. Trust 
provides the mechanism for validating the authenticity of claims, properties, privileges, etc. 
that the interacting domains use as the basis for allowing access to protected resources. Trust 
may be direct or indirect/transitive e.g. A trusts B (direct trust), B trusts C (direct trust) and A 
trusts C because of B's trust in C (indirect/transitive trust). Often, in distributed environments, 
the common practice is a reliance on indirect trust brokered by trusted third parties (TTPs) who
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issue signed tokens or assertions to multiple clients. These clients can then use these tokens, 
and their mutual trust in the TTP, as a basis for trusting each other. This is how public key 
infrastructures work today, and it is a foundation upon which federated systems are built.
However, web service provisioning introduces a far more extensive and dynamic environment 
for complex transactions that makes brokered trust insufficient to protect the privacy and 
confidentiality of all transactions. Figure 4.1 depicts the multiple actors in federated access 
management. Service clients can have multiple identities issued by autonomous identity 
providers, and the identity providers can broker trust among many clients and providers. It is 
imperative therefore that trust in this case has to be established between people and people, 
between people and services, and between services and services. This highlights the following 
challenges and risks:
  What is the accountability of parties in relation to compromised PII?
  What level of audit takes place regarding how PII is accessed?
  How can a user be assured that a service provider's privacy promises will be 
supported by technological means?
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Figure 4.1 Actors in Federated Access Management
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  How are disputes and liabilities handled? There is a need to establish a respected 
channel for handling and resolving disputes. How can the process of contractual 
negotiations be automated? as traditional methods are time consuming and costly.
  Whose fault is it in the event of a problem with shared attributes or data? Who is 
financially liable? Is there any hard-to-repudiate evidence that parties can use in 
courts of law to support their claims?
Arguably, the underlying challenges suggest that technological means alone will never be able 
to answer all the above questions, and that regulatory compliance, disputes resolution and 
assurance mechanisms will require underpinning with local and trans-border legislation, laws, 
guidelines and principles. Thus the legal and regulatory system is the only significant trusted 
third party that is big enough and ubiquitous enough to broker trust between all the parties 
involved in federated web services. However, technology should be able to contribute to the 
resolution of the above challenges, by providing high quality, difficult to repudiate information 
that can be utilized by the legal and regulatory system when the need arises.
Moreover, the emerging web service provisioning may require that in B2B transactions, both 
parties dynamically exchange service level agreements (SLA) or business level agreements 
(BLA) in order to assess the mutual benefits and associated risks. This will eliminate the static 
contractual agreements that are too time consuming to establish, in order to address the 
opportunities that arise in dynamic business environments. It can be said that BLAs and SLAs 
may contain information that is of privacy concern, meaning that parties would be interested to 
preserve their sensitive contractual information. One way to achieve this would be for each 
party to issue to the other a proof of acceptance of the requirements contained in the SLA or 
BLA of the other party. Enabling the runtime exchange of these requires a bilateral 
symmetrical approach, to allow the communicating parties to indicate their willingness to 
accept constraints imposed by the other party, before the latter is prepared to reveal their 
sensitive information. It is somewhat debatable whether there is some overlap between user 
privacy requirements and business requirements. This entails that in distributed systems, 
remote enforcement of obligating constraints and/or contractual agreements are critical security 
requirements. Even if controlling the use of digital information at the hand of a remote party is 
too difficult, these desirable security requirements should be addressed. This is part of the 
challenges examined by his work and an approach to it is presented in chapter 8. Next, the
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background of three important security components of a distributed access control is given.
4.2.1 Authentication
In computer network systems, authentication addresses the concept of verifying an identity 
claim by an entity. In simple systems, this involves verification of a pre-established trust 
relationship in the form of a username/password pair. In advanced systems, techniques that are 
more sophisticated may be used, which include multi-factor authentication paradigms, PKI 
certificates, SAML tokens, Kerberos tickets, etc. Authentication may involve verifying 
something an entity is, usually biometric identifiers; something an entity has, such as identity 
cards, cell phones (physical security tokens) or something an entity knows, which includes 
username-password pair, paraphrase, or personal identification number (PIN). In most cases, 
using any of these techniques entails that a form of pre-existing knowledge be established 
between the entity and the verifying systems. In the past, users have had to do this in every 
application service they attempt to access, but recent developments have advanced 
authentication to SSO [62, 86]. SSO has emerged as a more flexible way to pass users' 
authenticated details from one application service to another in an attempt to improve users' 
experiences. In distributed open systems, this has gone further under the platform of Federated 
Identity [86] extending SSO across organizational secure boundaries where some kind of 
federated trust relationships exist among participating members. More importantly, 
authentication is a vital security service predominately used in network systems to provide the 
first defense in controlling access to resources, and in most scenarios, may be sufficient to 
grant access to controlled resources.
At this point, it is useful to define some important terms in the context of this work.
  Credential: a set of provable claims used to authenticate the identity of an entity. 
This includes identifiers for the entity, a proof3 of the entity's identity, and similar 
information for the issuer. Where a credential is digitally signed, it may include 
information such as a digital signature, to indicate that the issuer certifies the claims 
in the credential.
3 Whilst it is recognized that absolute proof is not usually possible, the term "proof here implies that there is 
some evidence that provides a high degree of confidence in the veracity of the credential.
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  Security token: a set of provable claims used to authenticate the identity of an entity. 
This includes identifiers for the entity and a proof of the entity's identity, and for 
the issuer. Where a token is digitally signed, it may include information such as a 
digital signature, to indicate that the issuer certifies the claims in the token.
In reality, the difference between a token and a credential is minimal; however, a security 
token is often associated with the dynamic issuance of short-lived credentials particularly in 
inter-domain authentication and/or authorization services.
  Privilege: a set of allowable access control operations on a target that is assigned to 
a client i.e. a role, a user, an application, etc; that can make a request to access a 
resource.
4.2.2 Authorization
Authorization is the process of assigning privileges or credentials; and the determination of 
whether the capabilities, privileges or credentials of an authenticated entity are sufficient to 
perform certain actions or functions on a system. In broad terms, authorization is the mechanics 
of controlling access to sensitive resources based on local rules (access control lists or 
policies), compared against the access request context provided by the requesting party. The 
term entity or requesting party may be a human being, a computer system, application, or a 
network device. In simple terms, the process involves one authenticated party (the service 
requesting party) submitting some provable property to another entity, the recipient or relying 
party, that determines the requesting party's access rights and takes a decision. In distributed 
platforms, attribute based authorization systems are gaining widespread attention but privacy, 
confidentiality and trust still remain issues that have continued to attract research inputs.
4.2.3 Technical Trust
Trust is another concept that is vaguely understood and lacks any acceptable definition. It 
means different things to several schools of thought and disciplines, even in the information 
systems domain. Its use can sometimes be misleading. Our daily living involves the concept of 
trust which potentially forms part of our decision making process. Though we may not be 
conscious of our trust instinct, we are still mindful of the degree of confidence we ascribe to 
people. Similarly, in the technical sphere, trust has a connotation of confidence, though the
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techniques for determining the degree of confidence may differ. The concern of this study is 
the technical aspect of trust.
In ITU-T X.509, section 3.3.54 [100], trust is defined as "... an entity can be said to 'trust' a 
second entity when the first entity makes the assumption that the second entity will behave 
exactly as the first entity expects". This definition implies that trust has some behavioural 
properties and/or characteristics, i.e. accepting the proposition of another entity based on the 
assumption that the entity will act reliably. Even so, in the digital world, it would be difficult to 
predict a network user's behaviour based on the assumption of an anticipated behaviour. In 
reality, trust when viewed from an empirical perspective can possess qualitative and subjective 
factors. That is, trust assumes a providing party's qualitative behaviour, i.e. expectation in 
respect of the subjective predefined rules by another i.e. the recipient or relying party. Thus, in 
distributed networked systems, it entails that trust is associated with risks and liabilities and 
these variables should be balanced to reduce the amount of risk the communicating parties are 
exposed to at any given time [31]. If the above assumptions suffice, technical confidence relies 
on pre-established knowledge and the expectation that something unusual will not occur in an 
unpredictable way. In the digital world, cryptography is one dominant mode of establishing 
trust, and cryptography is discussed in chapter 5. The subsections that follow discuss some of 
the concrete access control management models examined.
4.3 Access Control Management Systems
An access control management system lets services control access to resources by requiring a 
potential client to submit some kind of provable identity information that it can recognize and 
trust. Several systems have emerged to solve the problem of access to sensitive resources. 
Some of these systems provide basic access control in the form of authentication, while others 
require both authentication and authorization. The sections that follow survey some of the 
popular access control systems.
4.3.1 Kerberos Network Authentication Service
The Kerberos authentication model [101] is a network authentication protocol designed and 
implemented as a trusted third party service. This service is often referred to as a trusted 
security arbitrator [102]. The Kerberos authentication framework provides secure
authentication that relied on symmetric cryptography initially designed around the Data
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Encryption Standard (DES). The primary design goal was to establish an authentication service 
that relies less on the 'Host Operating System', and aimed at eliminating the reliance on the IP 
address of the host as the basis to establish trust [103]. To serve a community of users, the 
Kerberos system shares unique secret keys with every entity (users, network devices, 
programs, etc) that requests or consumes the authentication service. With the shared unique 
keys, the Kerberos system can generate messages that can convince parties in communication 
about each other's identity claims. Kerberos conveys two types of secure credentials called 
tickets and authenticators [101, 103]. The tickets usually contain the client's name, the network 
address, the server's name, a timestamp and a session key.
In conveying the ticket, the server encrypts it with the client's unique secret key and can prove 
the identity for the lifetime of that ticket. Figure 4.2 illustrates a typical Kerberos system 
architecture and the basic steps necessary for a client to securely converse with a server
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Figure 4.2 The Kerberos Architecture
(service provider) using the Kerberos system. In step 1, the client asks for a Ticket-Granting 
Ticket (TGT) from the Kerberos authentication service; if this is a human user, (s) he uses a 
username/password pair to identify themselves to the Kerberos system. In step 2, after the 
authentication, if the service is satisfied with the identity claim of the requesting client, it 
generates a session key (TGT) that is encrypted with the client's unique secret key, and then
sends it to the client. The client conveys the TGT to the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) and
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requests a server ticket in step 3. In step 4, the TGS issues the client a server ticket, which the 
client can now use to request a service from a server (step 5). The Kerberos authentication 
service is widely adopted, and is well advanced in integrating with other services to support 
other security requirements such as authorization. Kerberos has known flaws which include 
storage of secret keys for every user and server on the network, which must be kept highly 
secured; otherwise a compromised administrative access would jeopardize the entire 
infrastructure. It is also possible to cache Kerberos tickets on client systems, giving rise to the 
potential for an imposter to use an authenticated principal's tickets [103]. In terms of privacy 
protection, the Kerberos service addresses confidentiality explicitly by the use of shared secret 
keys among participating entities, but confidentiality does not solve all the privacy problems, 
particularly when not based on known privacy principles and characteristics.
4.3.2 Central Authentication Service (CAS)
The Central Authentication Service (CAS) is another model ostensibly designed to address 
authentication across application services based strictly on the HTTP protocol [104]. The 
primary idea is an attempt to eliminate the need for users to re-authenticate at every service 
endpoint. CAS denotes a server-client architecture originally developed at Yale University 
(which became the JA-SIG project in 2004) to provide a trusted central authentication to other 
applications (clients) in a distributed fashion. Being based on HTTP, each communication 
endpoint is addressable or referenced by a URI i.e. the login, validation and optional logout 
points. Its design and implementation is around the Java servlet environment. It's platform 
independent with a suite of software clients in other programming language including PHP, 
.Net, ColdFusion, Perl, Java, etc. The clients provide application-level authentication 
interfaces, which connect to the CAS server. Its trust management capability is based on a 
multi-tier mode using the idea of signed tickets i.e. opaque strings, to share provable assertions 
among CASified applications. This is similar to the notion of SSO. Although it does not 
explicitly handle authorization, it can integrate with other services to provide authorization.
Notably, privacy seems not to be an issue with the CAS system; this assumption may be 
connected with the belief that authentication using pseudonymity does not reveal PII explicitly. 
Whilst this assumption is true to a certain extent, in some cases, where authentication is not 
sufficient to control access to resources, and more attribute-identities are required, privacy 
becomes an issue. Figure 4.3 illustrates the basic architecture of the CAS service and steps for
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a user to access a service using the CAS infrastructure. In step 1, the user attempts to access a
Figure 4.3 CAS Service Architecture
CASified application service and the CAS client redirects the request to the CAS server in step 
2. In step 3, the user authenticates with the server and if successful, the server returns a signed 
session parameter or ticket, which indicates that authentication, has been successful in step 4. 
The CAS client verifies and validates the ticket and provides the service to the user in step 5.
4.3.3 The OpenID
This is a recent decentralized digital identity framework that promises to deliver single digital 
identity across the Internet, which focuses more on the users' ability to take complete control 
of managing their identity information. The central idea is a lightweight method of identifying 
a web user using existing technologies and frameworks [105]. In [105], one acclaimed benefit 
of OpenID is the ability to provide provable identity without the restriction of having to 
register or be approved by any third party authority. Similar to other SSO services, it uses 
existing standard HTTP(S) protocol requests and responses, meaning that it can easily 
interoperate with the current capabilities of the User-Agent or web based software clients. 
Another benefit mentioned in [105], is that it is neither tied to the browser cookies or specific 
identity persistent method of a relying Party nor the OpenID identity provider. However, this
identity scheme is still in an infant stage at the time of writing this thesis. Arguably, it will
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require more layers of security components to address individual user privacy. In [106], it was 
stated that OpenID based on public domain identifiers, potentially exposes information of a 
personal nature. Moreover, it is yet to provide a standardized protocol for the exchange of 
attribute-information that will make it work seamlessly with authorization systems.
4.3.4 Shibboleth Internet2 Middleware
The Shibboleth Internet 2 Middleware [62] is a Federated Identity Management (FIM) system, 
based on Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [107] which was developed for 
distributed access control management. The primary idea is to allow inter-organizational 
exchange of user attribute-information to facilitate sharing of protected resources in a secure 
and trusted manner. Popular in academia, it provides a platform for a secure transfer of 
attributes of a web-browsing user from the user's origin site - Identity Provider (IdP) to a target 
site - Service Provider (SP).
In a federated sense, when the user first attempts to gain access to a shibbolized site, they are 
redirected to a service called Where Are You From (WAYF), which enables them to pick their 
identity provider (IdP) to perform authentication. This first phase, if successful, prompts the 
user's IdP service to generate a signed one-time session handle for this user, and passes it on to 
the target site via the user's browser. The purpose of this handle (a temporary reference) is to 
enable the target site to ask for more of the user's attributes if necessary, to satisfy other access 
control requirements before access to protected resources is granted. Furthermore, the handle 
being opaque is expected to offer the user some kind of privacy protection.
Figure 4.4 depicts the simplified Shibboleth architecture demonstrating typical IdP, SP, 
WAYE and user interactions. In its basic operation, the user attempts to connect to a resource 
site and their web browser gets redirected to a discovery service-WAYF to help them pick their 
IdP in step 1. In step 2, on picking the IdP, the browser gets redirected back to the resource 
site, which sends an authentication request to the user's IdP. In step 3, the user authenticates to 
the IdP via a username/password pair. If the authentication succeeds, the user's browser is 
redirected back to the initial resources they wanted to access. The resource site decides to grant 
or deny access to the user. In step 4, the resource site may optionally ask for additional 
attributes of the user to complete the authorization process. The following sections describe the 
core components of Shibboleth.
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Identity Provider (IdP): The IdP is the system that authenticates the user and generates a 
SAML assertion which is passed on to the service provider. This service is based on the SAML 
protocols described in SAML core, bindings and profiles specifications. The IdP functional 
blocks include an Authentication Authority, Attribute Authority, Inter-site Transfer Service, 
and a SSO as defined in core Shibboleth specifications.
Authentication Authority: This service is based on SAML specifications and provides
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Figure 4.4 Shibboleth Distributed Architecture Framework
authentication assertions about the authenticated principals to the relying party i.e. the 
resource provider. Though Shibboleth in its specification did not specify any method of 
authentication, it does define the protocol for the exchange of authenticated assertions, 
based on the Browser/POST and Browser/Artifact profiles.
Attribute Authority (AA): This service supplies attributes to the relying party based on 
the SAML protocol binding which comprises <samlp: request> messages containing 
the <samlp: AttributeQuery> element. This service can perform this function only if the 
relying party can return an assertion reference (the handle of an authenticated 
principal). The AA service uses SSL/TLS [RFC 2246] or SAML message signatures to 
mutually exchange attributes. In Shibboleth, the AA service addresses privacy by using 
the notion of an Attribute Release Policy (ARP) that governs the release of attributes of 
principals.
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The SSO: The SSO service processes authentication requests from the service provider 
through the user's HTTP browser capability, and forwards authentication responses to 
the service provider through the inter-site transfer service.
Inter-Site Transfer Service: This service is based on Browser/POST or Browser/Artifact 
profiles which interwork with the authentication authority to generate HTTP responses 
to the user's browser.
Artifact Resolution Service: An artifact resolution service is a system that receives 
requests directly from the service provider when a Browser/Artifact profile is used and 
resolves the SAML artifact into the matching assertions.
Service Provider (SP): The SP serves as a gatekeeper and protects services, applications, or 
resources that are subject to satisfying a set of access control rules. It consists of three primary 
components: the Assertion Consumer Service (ACS), the Attribute Requester, and the 
Resource Manager (RM). When deployed in a distributed environment, it must have a 
reachable unique identifier.
Assertion Consumer Service (ACS): The ACS is defined by the browser profile as an 
HTTP resource controlled service which processes the user request based on the 
BROWSER/POST or HTTP GET request profiles and must conform to the 
BROWSER/Artifact profile. Its primary function is to resolve the handle service artifact 
and establish a new security context for a resource requesting principal.
Attribute Requester (AR): This is the component that is responsible for asking for a 
requesting principal's attributes, based on the assertion contained in the authentication 
handle presented by the ACS component. The AR uses this handle in conjunction with 
the endpoint URL of the corresponding AA to make a request for attributes that it 
desires, and to which it is allowed, from the AA. The AR uses the attribute acceptance 
policy (AAP) to perform some sort of validation and analysis.
Resource Manager (RM): This component is the frontline service, which intercepts and 
responds to requests on shibbolized resources. In normal operation, when the browser 
request hits the RM, it passes the request to the ACS, and uses the attributes supplied 
by the AR through the ACS to enforce access.
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Where Are You From (WAYF): This is a convenient service that facilitates the discovery of 
the requesting principal's preferred handle service - the identity provider. This component is 
usually federated or simply deployed as part of the ACS endpoint to serve as a well-situated 
proxy to allow users to easily locate and access their identity providers.
4.3.4.1 Privacy Protection in Shibboleth
Shibboleth is the acclaimed first generation of FIM; it recognized the importance of privacy 
and approached it in two different ways. First, it uses the notion of pseudonyms in the form of 
opaque strings to shield any identifiable properties of a network user. Second, it uses the 
concept of Attribute Release Policy (ARP) to specify rules that govern access to a user's 
attribute in case the need arises to reveal it. Shibboleth makes a distinction between site ARP 
and individual user ARP, which allows site administrators to define default rules for all users. 
Nevertheless, the implementation of ARP is not in line with any known privacy principles or 
guidelines, and as a result, it lacks foundational privacy functionality. For example, it has no 
provision for specifying conditions or obligating constraints on attribute information. More on 
the limitations of Shibboleth's privacy model will be discussed in section 4.5.
However, Shibboleth is a distributed infrastructure with a tightly coupled trust model that 
assumes that each Shibboleth entity i.e. origin site, or target site must establish a trust 
relationship with the others before any exchange of identity attributes. This tight coupling 
limits its use in a dynamic environment, where trust establishment has to be performed on the 
fly by previously unknown parties.
4.3.5 The PERMIS Middleware
The PERMIS middleware is a Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model typically based on 
the ISO 10181-3 Access Control Framework [64], which uses X.509 attribute certificates 
(ACs) to store Access Control Decision Information (ADI) including policies and user roles. It 
comprises an access control engine, Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI) [108] and a 
GUI policy editing tool [43]. Its core architecture components are an Access Enforcement 
Function (AEF), and an Access Decision Function (ADF), primarily designed to operate in the 
same runtime environment [109]. The PMI provides the framework for the management of 
roles, privileges and role hierarchical relationships using two main administrative components: 
The Source of Authority (SOA) and subordinate entities each of which is called an Attribute
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Authority (AA). The PMI enables the assignment of privileges, delegation, revocation and 
withdrawal of access rights [110]. In X.509 AC[111], the SOA is typically a service provider 
responsible for assigning access rights to other entities within a security domain. It supports the 
delegation of authority with many-to-many relationships, i.e. a SOA can delegate privileges to 
several other AAs. For example, a SOA (an enterprise security administrator) can delegate 
AAs (departmental security administrators) to assign privileges to users (within the 
departments), but the AAs may not be able to certify privileges, although this depends on the 
delegation policy in operation.
In addition, the PMI architecture consists of two other core components namely: the Privilege 
Allocator (PA) and Privilege Verificator (PV) subsystems. Whilst the PA is used to assign 
roles, privileges and access control policies, the PV checks and validates the privileges to 
determine their trustworthiness. Typically, the PV verifies that a trusted SOA actually issued 
the privileges, i.e. that the privilege holder has been directly or indirectly authorized by a 
trusted SOA. The simplified PERMIS architecture is shown in figure 4.5. The AEF and ADF 
are tightly coupled to operate in the same runtime environment; the idea is to ensure that 
message exchange between the two takes place in a trusted manner. This makes the exchange 
fresh and complete so that access requests and responses are presented untampered with [109]. 
Its access control rules are based on the RBAC specification [63], which can define the "roles" 
that have what "access privileges", to "which targets" and allowable actions, under what 
further conditions such access privileges can be allowed. In other words, it assigns rights and 
privileges based on the roles of potential users of the systems. The following section describes 
the main policy elements of PERMIS RBAC.
The <SubjectPolicy> element describes the characteristics of principals/domains that the 
rule(s) refers to and is used to determine access to a requested target.
The <RoleHierarchyPolicy> is the policy node that defines the various roles and hierarchical 
relationships (if any) between the roles.
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The <SOAPolicy> element defines the binding of trust relationships by specifying the 
SOA/AAs that should be trusted by the system; these trusted SOA/AAs can then allocate roles 
and privileges to potential subject entities which the system can trust.
The <RoleAssignmentPolicy> element describes the roles assigned to subjects/principals and 
the assigning party i.e. which SOA/AA assigned the roles to the subjects.
Gatekeeper
Reque; t/Response. AEF
Request/Decision
ADF
Target
Figure 4.5 PERMIS Access Control Architecture 
The <TargetPolicy> element defines the target resources covered by the rule policy.
The <Action?olicy> node defines the set of allowable actions or operations supported by the 
target policy.
The <TargetAccessPolicy> node defines the applicable roles, assigns permissions to them, and 
the actions they can perform on which targets. It optionally includes other environmental 
constraints that may be imposed by the policy.
In principle, the PERMIS language can be used to control access to PII in terms of 
confidentiality but not privacy. It is noteworthy that PERMIS has successfully been deployed 
in many application areas with support for distributed management of trust and delegation of 
authority as described in [94, 112-114].
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4.4 Trust Authorization Management Systems
The concept of the trust management system coined by Blaze et al [115], is another access 
control approach that has received serious attention within the research community. This has 
been popularized as a viable paradigm for controlling access to resources [8, 33, 116, 117]. In 
[32, 118, 119] advances have been made in extending these concepts in distributed 
authorization platforms where communicating parties may not have pre-established trust 
relationships. The basic principle is built upon the premise that traditional authorization 
systems assume an already established trust relationship among communicating parties before 
runtime. In addition, trust management systems, just as in the real world, assume that a single 
identity-attribute of an entity [33, 120] is not sufficient to ascribe trust to an entity, and cannot 
adequately provide the basis for the entity's trustworthiness to access some resources. In 
practice, more than one digital attribute of that entity would be required to advance the 
'threshold' of trust to assign to that entity. These are the underlying concepts upon which trust 
access management systems are fashioned, in an attempt to improve trustworthiness in open 
distributed environments.
In trust access management systems, Automatic Trust Negotiation (ATM) has been coined by 
researchers to refer to the automated gradual and incremental disclosure of policies and digital 
credentials that can satisfy them. In this case, to advance trust negotiation, resource control 
disclosure policies are expressed declaratively in a hierarchical manner, which specifies the 
credentials or properties that a negotiating participant must possess at any stage to satisfy a 
particular internal subset of a local policy. In bilateral mode, both the client's resources and the 
service provider's are considered sensitive (services, digital credentials, and policies), and are 
governed by an access release policy which describes the rules and conditions under which the 
resource or next policy can be released. This field of study is a well researched area covering 
trust negotiation concepts [8], models [33, 120], strategies [118], policy languages and digital 
credentials [121]. In [118] trust negotiation protocols and strategies that describe the sequence 
and type of messages to exchange are discussed. Similarly in [122], Bertino et al focused on 
trust expression language and credential formats for describing the resource access conditions 
and identity attributes respectively. One characterizing component of ATN is the family of 
negotiating strategies that define the order and sequences of policy and credential disclosures 
which in most cases is built around the concept of a negotiating tree [8, 118].
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In spite of the advances in this area, privacy issues have been identified as one major challenge 
which has continued to attract research efforts. In [11], Seamons et al recognized two types of 
privacy vulnerabilities, which they called "probing the possession of sensitive credentials", and 
"transcript privacy vulnerability" [123]. For example, the release of a driving license may 
equally reveal other attributes such as age, and address, which a communicating party may not 
want to disclose. The probing attack happens when an imposter (service provider) can use a 
bogus service to demand the release of a user's attributes or infer information about another 
party. In [123], plausible solutions were suggested for how to tackle some of these 
vulnerabilities using policy migration techniques. Although the suggested solutions can help in 
resolving inferential attacks, they are not applicable to protecting privacy when resources are 
disclosed to a remote party. Moreover in [30], Mbanaso et al proposed using XACML policy 
capabilities to address these limitations and illustrated how negotiating parties can utilize a 
XACML policy declaratively to control the release of sensitive resources including policies 
and credentials to mitigate the inferential attacks. They intuitively demonstrated how a policy 
rule could be used to protect another policy rule, and their evaluations in the context of trust 
negotiation.
The novelty of the trust access management approach is that the degree of trust can be 
established incrementally, as more and more policies and credentials are exchanged by 
negotiating parties. This dynamic negotiation of service parameters, through the gradual 
disclosure of policies and attribute information, is essential where strangers must build trust 
before sharing sensitive resources. Figure 4.6 illustrates a simple TN protocol scheme, showing 
the steps peers in TN can follow to exchange sensitive resources whilst trust is being 
established. The subsections that follow present some concrete access control systems based on 
trust concepts.
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1. Client attempts to access a service
2. Server responses with resource access 
control polic
3. Client sends attribute access control policy
Server sends credentials to satisfy client, 
required
5. Client sends credentials to satisfy policy 
in step 2.
6. server grants client access to resource
Figure 4.6 Trust Access Management Basic Protocol
4.4.1 Keynote Trust Management System
The Keynote Trust Management System developed by Blaze, Feigenbaum, Loannidis and 
Keromytis [124, 125] is popularly believed to be the first trust management system. As often 
stated by the authors, the design philosophy is a system that treats authentication and 
authorization using a unified language, so that implemented security policies, trust 
management components and identity-attributes are uniformly defined. According to [124], 
KeyNote was designed based on five basic concepts:
  A language for describing 'actions' i.e. the operations are to be controlled by the 
system plus the consequences of performing such operations, if any.
  A mechanism for identifying 'principals', which are entities that can be authorized 
to perform actions.
  A language for specifying application 'policies', which govern the actions that a 
principal is authorized to perform.
  A language for specifying 'credentials', which describes the characteristics of 
principals allowed to delegate authorization to other principals.
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  A 'compliance checker', which provides a service to applications for determining 
how an action requested by a principal should be handled, given a policy and a set 
of credentials.
In Keynote, both credentials and policies are collectively referred to as assertions and contain a 
structured description of rule-actions permitted by the holder of a public key, i.e. credentials 
and both are expressed using the same syntax. The implication is that its access control process 
relies entirely on public keys, which must be used by communicating parties to perform access 
control functions. In [8], Bertino et al drew attention to some of its limitations in handling trust 
negotiations and stated its lack of compatibility with contemporary TN approaches. Figure 4.7 
depicts the KeyNote architecture comprising Compliance Checker System, Credential 
Management System, Trusted Local Policy Source and protected Application. Whilst the 
credential management system deals with PKI issues, the trusted local policy source provides 
the policy assertions; and the compliance check makes use of these with request information to 
issue a response to the application.
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Figure 4.7 Simplified KeyNote Architecture
4.4.2 Trust -X Framework
Bertino et al [126], developed an XML-based framework for trust negotiation, particularly 
designed for a peer-to-peer scenarios. It consists of an XML encoding language called X-TNL 
for the representation and formatting of certificates and policies. There are two types of
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certificates: credentials and declarations. The distinction between the two is that a credential is 
certified by a certificate authority, whereas declarations are sets of personal information 
preferences that may not require certification. Additionally, it has the concept of trust tickets, a 
type of certified session identifier that is issued upon successful trust negotiation. The basic 
idea is to avoid undesirable renegotiation of the same service, which is a performance 
enhancement tool designed to speed up further interactions. The Trust-X infrastructure is a 
symmetric architecture like most of the other trust based access control systems. It consists of a 
Policy Base for storing disclosure policies, an X-profile associated with a party, a Tree 
Manager that maintains the state of negotiation, and a Compliance Checker that evaluates 
policies against certificates. Trust-X has two main actors namely: Controller and Requester, 
and each actor is characterized by their Trust-X profile of certificates. Whilst the Controller is 
the entity that provides the negotiated resources, the Requester is the entity attempting to 
access the resources. Basically, a negotiating party can act as a Controller in one interaction, 
while acting as a Requester in another.
4.4.3 The TrustBuilder Trust Model
The TrustBuilder is a product developed jointly by two universities in the US: University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and Brigham Young University. It is based around the basic TN 
concepts [119]. In particular, TrustBuilder was designed to demonstrate a suite of negotiation 
strategies described in [118] and presents language-neutral negotiation protocols that must 
operate within the TrustBuilder architectural framework. It comprises a credential verification 
module, a policy compliance checker, and a negotiation strategy module as depicted in figure 
4.8. According to the authors, the strength of the TrustBuilder architecture is the array of 
negotiation strategies, which dynamically determine which internal local policy and/or 
credentials to disclose (and what sequence to follow) based on the current phase of the TN 
session level already established. Similar to other access management architectures, the 
credential verification module deals with verification and validation of the received credentials. 
The policy language and compliance checker uses an IBM Trust Establishment Software 
engine to perform the matching of the received credential against internal local policy.
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4.4.4 Browser-Based Trust Negotiation
Recognizing that core TN frameworks have not yet been adapted in standardized Internet 
security specifications, in [127], Morris demonstrated the use of SAML and XACML in 
browser-based trust negotiation. He combined SAML 2.0 capabilities, particularly the SSO 
profile definition and the TN concept, to enable bilateral exchange of information between an 
AA and SP. He defined a SAML trust negotiation protocol, an extension of SAML 
request/response, to enable trust establishment between an SP and AA. The SSO protocol 
adopted here is similar to that of the Shibboleth protocol, but with a bilateral trust negotiation 
layer, as opposed to Shibboleth unilateral request-response protocol.
In general, although research efforts in trust based access control management models are 
momentous to open systems security, the unavailability of standardized protocol specifications 
and common vocabularies will hamper any attempt to independently adapt them into real world 
applications.
4.5 W3C Web services Architecture Privacy Requirements
The W3C Web Services Architecture (WSA) specified five important privacy requirements 
that should be considered whenever privacy concerns are security requirements in web service 
environment. These are outlined below:
  AR020.1 implies that WSA must provide the mechanism enabling privacy policy 
statements to be described about Web services.
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  AR020.2 specifies that advertised Web service privacy policies must be described 
using P3P.
  AR020.3 the WSA must provide a way a consumer should access a Web service's 
advertised privacy policy statement.
  AR020.5 the WSA must provide the framework that enables the delegation and 
propagation of the privacy policy.
  AR020.6: implies that Web Services must not be prohibited from "supporting the 
interactions where one or more parties of the interaction are anonymous"
These requirements serve as a guideline to applications that use the web services platform; 
where access control or any form of authentication using PII is involved, it becomes a critical 
requirement that should be considered.
4.6 Critical Appraisal of the Reviewed Systems
One common denominator of all the access control systems reviewed is that they control access 
to computer resources using information that can potentially be of privacy concern. Whether 
the information can be explicitly or implicitly linked to a network user is a matter that relies on 
the capability of the underlying infrastructure. Access control infrastructure such as Kerberos 
and CAS specifically provide authentication services that require offline trust establishment. 
They act as trusted token asserting third parties, though they provide mechanisms for 
confidentiality but not privacy. The rational for reviewing the authentication services is that the 
authentication phase is a critical step in protecting privacy in distributed environments. The 
core access control management systems reviewed share common characteristics including the 
following:
  A policy language for describing the access control participants' attributes i.e. 
resource attributes, subject attributes, action attributes;
  Support for specifying credentials of the subject;
  A policy decision point that determines how action(s) requested by subjects on 
resources are treated.
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  A PKI requirement for trust establishment between the various actors.
In the remainder of this section, a critical analysis and assessment of a few of the selected 
systems is presented.
Fundamental Support for Privacy
The reviewed systems did not take the privacy problem seriously; where privacy is mentioned 
basic foundational privacy principles are hardly considered in the solution. For instance, the 
PERMIS infrastructure did not consider privacy from its inception. Arguably, this could be due 
to its inherent view of the RBAC model, which is chiefly based on the notion of an entity's 
role. The assumption may be that the role-attribute is unlikely to raise privacy concerns in 
access control operations. Nevertheless, it has been established in the literature [22, 48] that the 
role-attribute has the potential to expose a user's capability or profile, which can lead to 
undesirable privacy risks. In the case of Shibboleth, it is principally designed to allow trusted 
anonymous authorization using the concept of pseudonymity. In Shibboleth, privacy is said to 
be addressed in two ways. Firstly, after the user authenticates to the IdP, the Shibboleth 
authentication service generates a onetime handle to identify the user and transmits this to the 
SP. Secondly, the IdP uses Attribute Release Policies (ARP's) to decide whether to release 
specific attributes to the SP or not. This is fine as long as the remote site doesn't require any 
identifiable attributes to complete the service. But this is unlikely to be the case in most 
transaction scenarios. Although it differentiates between site ARP and user ARP, which can be 
combined into the effective ARP, the effective ARP can simply be classified as a coarse grained 
access control policy. Besides, the ARP is not based on any known standard, and typically does 
not reflect basic privacy principles or compliance with known FIP, nor does it have support for 
enforcing obligating constraints. Three main deficiencies of the ARP can be stated as follows:
  The ARP model is inexpressive and structurally defective. It lacks the flexibility 
and support for expressing fine-grained privacy rules. For example, each identity- 
attribute is separately given access rights; there is no way to group attributes. It has 
no environmental expressions for defining environmental conditions and 
obligations;
  It does not take into account privacy principles i.e. purpose specification, 
consent/choice, retention period, etc. which are fundamental to privacy safeguards.
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The purpose for which the relying party is asking for the release of attributes cannot 
be determined;
  Shibboleth SPs do not advertise or convey their privacy policy to the IdP; this is 
vulnerable to exploitation by greedy SPs.
Although Hommel intuitively mapped the ARP into XACML model to extend the ARP 
capabilities [128], his work never considers how to enforce obligating constraints in 
autonomous security domains to ensure privacy. In terms of using pseudonyms for privacy, 
Shibboleth defined standard vocabularies to facilitate the sharing of attribute-information 
across realms, i.e. origin and target sites, without having to reveal the requesting principal's 
PII. In a typical transaction, the target site initially identifies a requesting principal by a 
reference opaque handle. The target site determines access rights based on this handle, but 
could ask for more attributes of the principal if desirable to complete a transaction. Assuming 
that the handle is sufficient to allow access to the requested resources, this means that the target 
site will choose to trust the requesting party based on the trust it has with the IdP. While it can 
be true that the user's real identity is not exposed in this scenario, an inferential knowledge of 
the origin of the users may lead to massive profiling over a time. Moreover, the undesirable 
disclosure of a role attribute can reveal the capability of a principal, which in some 
environments may constitute a privacy risk. The fact that the principal is initially known to the 
target site by a onetime randomly generated handle, and subsequently associates with role 
attribute(s) raises a privacy and confidentiality concerns.
Arguably, privacy in this sense using pseudonyms is vulnerable since there are no strong 
privacy obligations and bindings between the principal and the target site. Simply put, trust in 
this case is typically transitive, which cannot give privacy assurance in high value transactions. 
Furthermore, the use of an opaque handle, which shields the real identity of a principal from 
the target site, is fine as long as the target site does not require any more identifying attribute- 
information of that principal to complete a service request. Nevertheless, this assumption is 
unlikely to be the case in many dynamic transactions where more user attribute-information 
may be required in order to complete a transaction. Consider this classic example of a 
University of Salford student who wants to access the University of Manchester's web 
services. The student authenticates through his IdP (University of Salford) to obtain a token 
before invoking a service. The token attests the fact that he is a bona-fide student of the
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University of Salford.
However, during the session, the student needs to access nuclear related material that requires 
an attribute-identity type: nuclear scientist, before the service can be invoked. The student may 
have some privacy concerns for this attribute. As the student has no way to express and enforce 
his privacy rules at this target site, he faces a privacy risk. In other words, the fact that there are 
no obligating constraints on the side of the service provider potentially places the student's 
privacy in danger. In the case of the TrustBuilder architecture, privacy is not plainly 
considered; fundamental principles for safeguarding privacy are overlooked. However, it did 
consider vulnerabilities such as probing and inferential attacks with respect to privacy. It is 
disputable whether the approach is more about confidentiality safeguards than privacy.
Trust Establishment
All the systems reviewed required one form of trust establishment. The client is required to use 
a form of provable identity attribute issued by a mutually trusted TTP in order to invoke 
services. The provable identity may be in the form of a username/password pair, a certificate or 
token. In a distributed sense, the public key certificate is often relied upon to provide the trust 
mechanism across boundaries of trust, and it is the foundation upon which federated systems 
are built. Most of the reviewed systems rely on the public key certificates for establishing trust 
between security realms.
However, the appraisal of privacy principles in chapter 3 exposes the fact that trust purely 
based on PKI is insufficient to guarantee privacy protection in ubiquitous environments, since 
third party PKI issuers can hardly vouch for how the certificate holder handles other parties' 
information. Automatic trust negotiation is one approach that attempts to enable bilateral 
building of trust using other properties of communicating parties to improve trusted sharing of 
information.
However, PERMIS and Shibboleth systems are typically unilateral in the sense that they do not 
provide a mechanism to negotiate between the service client and provider. The client cannot 
ascertain the trustworthiness of the service provider before giving out its attribute-information. 
The unilateral paradigm reflects one way trust assessment; the service provider can verify and 
validate the claims of the client without the client being able to do the same. The inability of 
the client to negotiate for the release of its attribute information potentially endangers its
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privacy. In contrast, trust management systems favour bilateral and incremental negotiation, 
using access control policies and credentials. Trust management systems are traditionally 
designed to allow previously unknown parties to build trust and exchange sensitive resources. 
The contrary is the case with the PERMIS infrastructure, which requires some form of pre- 
registration of users by offline means. In case of Shibboleth users are only required to establish 
offline trust with their origin sites. In many distributed transactions [8, 117] pre-registration 
seems impractical and uneconomical for all users who are not within the same security domain.
Moreover, in situations where users are unaware of the access requirements, the likelihood is 
that more identity information than required may be disclosed by the client, which defeats 
minimal disclosure principles. One approach is for SPs to advertise their sets of access 
requirement policies to allow clients to determine which attributes to supply in a given service 
invocation. But from the service provider's perspective, advertisement of complete access 
requirements may expose some business information, the undesirable release of which to 
arbitrary strangers can put such business at risk. The consequence is that the absence of an 
effective privacy negotiation mechanism could mean that a party may simply be subjected to 
giving more credentials than are necessary.
Privacy Disputes and Liabilities
None of the systems reviewed mentioned compliance with legal aspects of privacy. It is 
apparent that identity-information collected by service providers is most often stored in the 
corporate repository, to which the organization purportedly controls access on behalf of the 
owners. The implication is that a user may not have the option to choose who to entrust his PII 
to, and may have to cope with the promise that the information will be accorded privacy 
respects and protection. Moreover, in most of these cases, the organizational data handling 
policies are static and apply to everyone whose personal information is held by that enterprise. 
The enforcement of a single static policy on a huge amount of personal data can rarely reflect 
the privacy preferences of each owner.
The above inferences lead to the conclusion that technological means alone will never be able 
to answer all the above questions, and that regulatory compliance, disputes resolution and 
assurance mechanisms will require underpinning with local and trans-border legislation, laws, 
guidelines and principles. Thus the legal and regulatory system is the only significant trusted 
third party that is big enough and ubiquitous enough to broker trust between all the parties
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involved in federated services. However, technology should be able to contribute to the 
resolution of the above challenges, by providing high quality, difficult to repudiate information 
that can be utilized by the legal and regulatory system when the need arises.
It is important to note that the TN systems contributed immensely in shaping the search for 
alternative solutions, especially in the consideration of privacy assurance and remote 
enforcement of obligating constraints. Overall, this study reveals that the traditional 
assumptions that privacy concerns are on the service client's side no longer holds. It has been 
established in the thesis that both the server and client sides have privacy and confidentiality 
concerns that require simultaneous protection. Moreover, new business transactions may 
impose dynamic composition of services on one hand, and the exchange of service 
requirements, agreements, constraints and credentials on the other, making dynamic 
negotiation a novel approach.
4.7 Conclusion
The chapter has provided the basic elements of access control systems in the context of 
privacy, confidentiality and trust in distributed environments, and has further examined privacy 
from the perspective of concrete access control implementations. The literature review has 
established the distinction between preserving the confidentiality of service outputs and the 
privacy of service meta information i.e. identities, attributes, policies etc. The dissimilarities in 
both types of resources have become blurred, and preserving them seems similar and 
symmetric. The fact that communicating parties, be it the service client or provider, are likely 
to possess information that requires some degree of confidentiality and privacy protection gave 
new insight into the kind of privacy infrastructure to develop. The potential for a digital 
resource to be persistent (i.e. having a property of reusability) supports the necessity for a 
privacy solution that is capable of ensuring privacy and confidentiality across multiple security 
domains.
The critical analysis and assessment of similar work exposed the need to alter the current 
approach to developing privacy aware systems, which favours support for symmetrical 
architecture. This complements the need for dynamic negotiation, which can allow 
communicating parties to indicate their willingness to accept constraints being imposed on 
their use of information provided by either party, before sensitive resources are exchanged. The
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idea is to treat any communicating party's sensitive information with a concern for their 
privacy and security preferences. Moreover, since parties' degree of trust threshold may change 
based on perceived risks or knowledge due to business and/or security expectations, the 
dynamic exchange of security requirements can offer both service and client the opportunity to 
weigh service benefits against security risks. To sum up, the analysis and assessment of the 
privacy characteristics of these selected systems open up new knowledge that should influence 
decisions in designing a privacy aware access control systems.
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Chapter 5. Privacy Enhancement Technologies and Security Standards
5.1 Introduction
Historically, making information unintelligible sprang from the requirement to secure military 
and political conversations. Consequently, codes and ciphers were devised to obscure 
messages, and make them unintelligible or unreadable to any interceptor or unintended 
recipient [129]. Before the dawn of telegraphy, telephone and radio communications, obscuring 
information could be traced as far back as 6BC the 'scytale' used by the Greeks to cipher 
messages [129]. Also, during the time of Caesar, codes were formulated to mask information 
from strangers, so that adversaries were kept away from information classified sensitive and 
strategic. Most of these primitive ciphers were permutations and substitutions of characters. In 
Caesar's cipher, a simple substitution mechanism of alphabets based on the manipulation of the 
position of letters in an ordered fashion, (i.e. by the interposition of the alphabets in an 
understood manner) was devised [130]. In this scheme, the letter A can be replaced with the 
letter M, and B is replaced with N, etc and this pattern was preserved to revise the information 
to its original format [102].
The backdrop of making information unreadable is a result of the human 'survival instinct', 
characterized by lack of trust and the quest for domination. The need to keep some secrecy and 
appear discreet has continued to drive making information unintelligible, chiefly done for 
personal, political, warfare and business purposes. This is in fact part of the human survival 
instinct, which tends to achieve competitive advantage over a party or competitors by 
attempting to gain knowledge of the other party's intentions and capabilities., Although these 
techniques may simply appear to be insecure by today's standards, monarchs and military 
dictators used them effectively to secure their conversation from unintended audience. The 
advent of computers and communication networks changed the landscape of information 
security. Initially, the battle was how to secure the computing resources against disgruntled 
staff, in order to stop them causing harm to the underlying infrastructure. The evolution of 
computer networks spanning the public domain brought about the Internet which further placed 
enormous challenges on information security.
The interconnection of computing devices, their subsequent central control and the fact that 
there are a large number of users raised another important dimension in securing information
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[130]. The drive to enshrine trust and accountability in the use of computing systems then 
emerged. Apart from making information unreadable to an unintended audience, the need 
arises to limit what typical users could do with interconnected systems. This ushered in the 
notion of limited user accounts and unlimited administrative accounts to secure the backbone 
infrastructure from potential misuse by using simple usernames and passwords [130].
Thus computer security still revolves around the use of codes and ciphers to manipulate the 
underlying system in such a way that it becomes no longer useful to unintended entities. 
However, modern computer security has advanced through the evolution of cryptography [102, 
129]. The earlier systems include wheel Ciphers (mechanical devices used by the Germans in 
the Second World War, and passphrases used as keys to protect data (Giovan Belaso, 1500s). 
These encryption methods are popularly known as symmetric ciphers. At the turn of the 1970s 
effort to standardized cryptography mechanisms brought about the Data Encryption Standard 
(DES), which uses a 56-bit key to encrypt and decrypt data [102]. Subsequently CAST, RC2 
and Triple DES were developed to overcome the weakness of earlier symmetric systems.
This chapter examines the general concepts, principles and techniques that have evolved over 
the years in an attempt to protect computer and networks against threats, and highlights some 
frameworks that have continued in the advancement of their developments. In particular, this 
chapter overviews the development of cryptography, and how it has contributed immensely to 
the development of privacy enhancement tools. Additionally, it introduces some Internet 
standards and specifications including Secure Socket Layer (SSL), and Transport Layer 
Security (TLS). (Chapter 6 will look more closely at the specific standards that are used in this 
work.)
5.2 Cryptography
Inherently, computer security mirrors the normal physical security that we practice in our daily 
lives. We lock our house to prevent unwanted visitors from having access to it and secretly 
safeguard the keys. Similarly, in the computer world, to keep resources away from strange 
parties we secure them using some sort of lock and safeguard the keys. Cryptography, which 
mimics the physical locks and keys, emerged to help secure the digital world of zeros and ones.
Cryptography is a field of mathematics and computer science, typically concerned with
information security in what mostly happens in two modes: encryption and decryption [102,
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130], and has evolved through empirical and theoretical design efforts. The underlying critical 
factor is the concept of a secret key, which is fundamental to its security. Several studies have 
argued that as long as the key remains undisclosed to an unintended audience, assuming the 
unavailability of powerful computing resources to mount an attack, the security will remain 
uncompromised [102, 130]. It evolved from the need to provide stronger methods of securing 
computer networks in terms of authentication, authorization, integrity, etc, which are 
fundamental to privacy and confidentiality protection. Cryptography has two main models: 
symmetric and asymmetric. These models in many ways have characterized the development 
of privacy and security enhancement technologies.
5.2.1 Symmetric Cryptography
Symmetric cryptography implies using the same secret key for transforming the information 
into gibberish (ciphertext) and for converting the gibberish back to the original text. In this, as 
mentioned previously, the secret key is fundamental to the security it provides. A variety of 
symmetric cryptosystems (algorithms) have been developed over the years including shift 
ciphers such as Caesar, ROT-1, modern symmetric ciphers such as DBS, IDEA, RC5, CAST- 
128, AES [102, 130] , etc. In modern cryptography, computing algorithms, and mathematical 
logic are used to manipulate the processes that transform information into unreadable formats 
and the reversing of the same into readable forms applying the same secret key. Figure 5.1 
depicts the process of using the same cryptographic key to encrypt a piece of data and decrypt
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it back to its original form. For example, if Alice wants to send a secret message to Bob, Alice 
must share the same key with Bob in advance before any ciphertext can be transmitted. In 
addition, this requires the sharing of the key to be carried out separately out-of-band and in a 
secure manner. This out-of-band sharing of the key brings an additional communication 
overhead in the distribution and management of the keys. This is the main drawback of this 
model. More so, if Bob wants to send message to a community of five hundred (500) people in 
a confidential manner, Bob potentially needs 500 secret keys. For a community of n users, the 
number of unique secret keys can grow up to !/2(n2 n). Consequently, there is an overhead in 
the manageability of the key data in terms of maintenance, storage, etc.[131]. For example, if 
Alice, Bob, Charlie and Dan want to send several distinctive messages to one another, they 
must each generate and share a unique secret key with each other; otherwise the confidentiality 
of their conversation could be compromised. This case is worsened, for instance, if each person 
has to generate a fresh unique key to encrypt the messages for every recipient each time [102]. 
Furthermore, the requirement to share keys out-of-band prior to confidential communication 
makes symmetric cryptography difficult to use between parties without pre-existing trust 
establishment. If Alice wants to send PII to Bob, who she has never had any previous 
conversation with, she cannot be certain that she is sharing her key with Bob and not Dan, an 
impersonator who is posing as Bob in order to collect her PII.
5.2.2 Asymmetric Cryptography
The key management and distribution problems inherent in symmetric cryptography prompted 
extensive research efforts. In the mid-1970s, two notable researchers: Whitefield Diffie and 
Martin Hellman presented to the public a major breakthrough that shaped new directions in 
cryptography [132]. They postulated the possibility of using a key pair in performing 
cryptographic functions. The postulate is such that one key can be used to perform encryption 
and the other for decryption. The novelty was generally accepted to have fuelled modern 
inventions in cryptography, popularly known as public key cryptography [129, 131, 133]. 
Public key cryptography, also called asymmetric ciphering, no doubt changed the landscape of 
information security. The idea of asymmetric cryptography is a process whereby a pair of 
mathematically related keys is employed in transforming data into gibberish and transforming 
back to the original data. This gives the notion of public and private keys. The idea is that one 
of the keys can be made public (stored in directory, database or listed in a public telephone
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book, etc.) without the risk of compromising security as long as the other key remains private 
[102, 131].
It is often stated in the literature that, despite the fact that the key pair is mathematically 
related, knowing one key is not sufficient both mathematically and computationally to derive 
the other. The dependability of an asymmetric cryptosystem is based on the belief that it is 
computationally infeasible to derive one key from the other, without the disclosure of the 
underlying mathematical factors. Figure 5.2 illustrates the basic concept of an asymmetric 
system, showing how Bob's key pair can be used in the process of encryption and decryption. 
For Alice to communicate with Bob securely, she uses Bob's public key (PUK), to encrypt the 
message and Bob can use his private key, only known to him, to decrypt the message.
Notwithstanding this extraordinary advance, it has generally been accepted to have some 
inherent drawbacks [102]. One notable flaw is that asymmetric ciphers are quite computing 
intensive and therefore slow in process. This drawback often limits it to ciphering small chunks 
of data, whereas symmetric systems can perform cryptographic operations faster in bulk data 
operations. Although advances have been made in asymmetric cryptography in recent years,
£-4 the
Requir 
ement 
For 
the
softwa
olaintext
A 
&
k
/I Htg%4 
Z-J &%fgs 
hjdjdh 
dhbbx 
x%gds 
gsh& 
%ggd 
hs653 
4fsgsa
ciphertext
Bob's public Key 
(i) Encryption
/I Htg%4 
Z-4 &%fgs 
hjdjdh 
dhbtw 
x%gds 
gsh& 
%ggd 
hs653 
4fsgss
ciphertext
————————— *| Decrypt | —————————— >
A
a
t
i
/\ This is
Requir
ement 
For 
the
softwa 
re
plaintext
Bob's private Key 
(ii) Decryption
Figure 5.2 Asymmetric Cryptography
through algorithm developments such as elliptic curve algorithm, this remains an issue.
However, many modern security mechanisms combine the capabilities of these two models to
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provide highly secure environments in ways that are not possible using any of the models 
alone. To benefit from the key management and distribution capabilities of the public key 
system, the notion of public key infrastructure (PKI) [131] was developed to facilitate the 
sharing of PUK in a tamper-resistant manner4 . This development has changed the landscape of 
security in distributed network environments, allowing previously unknown strangers to 
communicate in a secure manner. The public key cryptography provides the platform for 
enabling important security services, including the digital signature scheme discussed next.
5.3 Digital Signature Scheme
In the physical world, a handwritten signature on a document binds the signer to the content, 
and it can be verified and validated by other relying parties. Similarly, in the digital world, a 
digital signature provides a means of signing documents digitally. A digital signature can be 
verified and validated, thus confirming the identity of the entity (individual, organization or 
system) that made the digital signature. The digital signing process in an asymmetric 
cryptography context is a private key operation on data, which results in a signature value, and 
a public key operation on the same data to verify the signature and check whether the value 
corresponds to the original value [102, 130]. Usually, a cryptographic Hash function [102, 134] 
is used to transform the input data (of any size) into a fixed-size output called the digest. Figure 
5.3 depicts a public key digital signature scheme. To sign data, the signer performs the 
operation in two steps:
  It transforms the data into a fixed-size value (digest) using a Hash function,
  It encrypts the digest with its private key, which results in a signature value.
In order for the relying party to verify and validate the signature, the original message must be 
conveyed with the resultant signature, so that the recipient can perform a reverse operation. 
Similarly, the relying party takes the same two steps in verifying the signature.
  It hashes the received data to a fixed-size value (digest) using the same Hash 
function,
4 Although a certificate is used to guarantee the public key(s) is that of the person who claims to own it, there is a 
need to ensure that an entity's certificate is not tampered with.
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  Using the sender's public key, it decrypts the signature, and then compares the 
result against the computed digest. If the computed digest matches the decrypted 
digest, the signature is verified.
In other words, the successful decryption of the digest proves the fact that the sender actually 
signed the document (assuming the signing key remains secret and can be proved to belong to 
the holder) and the successful comparisons of the digest with the digest generated by the 
recipient attests that the original message has arrived as sent. This scheme addresses two 
important security services: non-repudiation - which thwarts Bob from going back on his 
digital claims, and data integrity- which provides the property of unforgeability, i.e. Charlie 
cannot alter the message Alice sent to Bob. Overall, the idea of using public key cryptography 
in digital signature is that it is computationally infeasible (expensive) for someone to forge 
Alice's signature, and Alice cannot deny (non-repudiation) that she signed the document5 as 
long as her private key remains private.
The Hash functions are based on one-way cryptographic algorithms that transform an input 
data of arbitrary size to a fixed-size output (e.g. 160 bits for SHA-1, 128 bits for MD5). The
5 Though Alice can still claim that she did not sign the document by asserting that her key was lost, other security 
measures are in place to ensure that Alice cannot deny the fact that she signed the document on the basis of 
compromise.
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assumption is that the one-way function makes finding two different hash inputs that give the 
same hash output computationally expensive. Notwithstanding this, there has been a number of 
attacks on digital signature schemes, which can be found in [134, 135]. Over the years, a 
variety of Hash algorithms have emerged including the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) 
described in NIST- the U.S. Department of Commerce publication [136], the MD family [RFC 
1319, RFC 1320] and particularly, MD5 [RFC 1321] developed by Ron Rivest, the Secure Hash 
Algorithm (SHA) family [SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512] also 
published in NIST publications [137]. In general, the strength of the digital signature to a large 
extent depends on the Hash algorithm used in generating the digest, and its length. Notably, 
short length digests are potentially vulnerable to attacks [102, 135] such as birthday attacks. In 
practice, the recommendation is to use Hash functions that can produce outputs that are long 
enough to make the birthday attacks potentially infeasible.
In summary, digital signature schemes provide important security services such as proof of 
authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation. Consequently, the relevance of these services is 
crucial, especially in the context of guaranteeing the remote enforcement of privacy and 
confidentiality as described in chapter 8. In practice, there are limitations in the use of digital 
signature which will be discussed further in chapter 10.
5.4 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
The full benefits of Public Key Technology (PICT) could not have been realized without 
devising a trustworthy way to address the key distribution and management problems raised by 
the use of cryptography in large-scale public networks. Computer security is often based on the 
concepts of trust, knowledge and to some extent accountability. The PKI provides such an 
enabling framework that provides support for the binding of identity (and other identity 
attributes) to a public key through the process of registration and issuance. Securing disparate 
systems requires this pervasive infrastructure, which is not only available to the participating 
community, but can also be scalable proportionally in many respects to provide the needed 
security across multiple domains.
Moreover, there is a need to ensure that the public key (or other attributes associated with the 
key) is not tampered with, that is, the binding of the public key to a claimed holder must be 
done in a trustworthy manner. It implies that the relying party has to be assured of the
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authenticity of the public key. By using the PKI, the identity attributes, public key, the binding 
operation and validity are made unforgeable. This makes it possible for entities without 
previous contact to authenticate each other and exchange data in secure fashion. Today, most 
essential security services used in open networks to provide trust, authenticity, integrity and 
confidentiality are enabled, to a large extent, by PKI services. Outlined below are some of the 
components of PKI, and the highlights of the services they provide:
Certification Authority (CA): In PKI terms, certification can be described as an act of binding 
an identity6 with public key. Accordingly, the CA can be described as a trusted third party that 
certifies and digitally signs a data structure containing some representation of one or more 
attributes of an identity and a corresponding public key [131]. The concept of a CA provides a 
powerful channel for the issuance and distribution of public keys in large scale environments. 
It enables entities to make their public PUK component available and accessible to a 
communicating community. A holder of a PUK must convince others that the PUK component 
actually belongs to it, and has not been altered, i.e. proving ownership and integrity of the key. 
The Public Key Certificate (PKC) was invented to bind an identity to public key(s) which must 
be digitally signed by one or more CAs. One variant of the PKC is specified by the X.509 ITU- 
T standard [138]. The X.509 ITU-T standard specifies standard formats for public key 
certificates, certificate revocation lists, a certification path validation algorithms, etc. The 
generic ITU-T X.509 certificate structure is described in section 5.3.1.1.
Certificate Repository: Whilst the concepts of an X.509 certificate and CA are convenient 
mechanisms for making PUK available, the absence of an accessible repository or directory to 
store and easily locate the PKC will defeat its gains. Although in a small user community, it is 
possible for an entity to disseminate its PKC using out-of-band mechanisms, in a large-scale 
network, manual distribution of the PKC causes both administrative and security bottlenecks 
[131]. For example, a private key can be compromised; dealing with situations where keys are 
compromised will not only be too difficult to handle by individuals, but the exchange of 
revocation may also be unreliable. Thus, the need to manage the life cycle of PUK is critical to 
the overall security of PKI. The provision of an accessible location for the PKC solves the 
problem of key distribution, and provides a means to check for validity. The certificate
6 It is possible to include other attributes of the identity.
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repository is a logical central storage system capable of handling the life-cycle management of 
the PKC and its revocations. The RFC2538 [139] specifies the Domain Name System (DNS) 
for storing certificates including LDAP servers, X.500 Directory System Agents (DSAs), web 
servers using http and ftp (RFC2585) protocols, and corporate domain database systems.
Certificate Revocation: As previously mentioned, a private key can be lost or compromised 
which invalidates the use of the corresponding certificate. In practice, the relationship between 
a CA and a key holder may change, thus breaking the binding and its validity. The CA needs a 
convenient mechanism to alert the community of users that such a certificate can no longer be 
trusted, or that it has ceased to vouch for the certificate. This component enables the CA to 
publish its certificate revocation list within the same repository making it possible to verify the 
expiry of certificates before their use.
Other services of the PKI include Automatic Key Update, Cross-Certification, Key Backup and 
Recovery, Key History, etc. These services make up a comprehensive PKI and are necessary to 
realize the full benefits of public key cryptography. Readers interested in PKI can find more 
detailed information in [131].
5. 4.LI The Public Key Certificate
Public key cryptography makes use of a key pair: public and private keys to perform 
cryptographic operations. The attractiveness of public key cryptography from the perspective 
of scalability is the fact that the public key component of the key pair could be distributed 
freely among the community of users. To support a wider scale of services provided by the 
public key technology, it is needful to assure the public key relying party (i.e. the entity that 
uses the public key and associated attributes for some security services) that:
  The integrity of the public key (and other associated attributes) is not tampered 
with.
  The binding of the public key (and other associated attributes) to the claimed holder 
has been done in trustworthy manner.
The concept of public key certificates was invented to fulfill the above stated goals [131]. Thus 
a public key certificate can be described as a data structure issued and digitally signed by a 
trusted third party (the issuer and signer), which binds an identity (and other associated
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attributes of that identity) with the corresponding public key of the claimed holder. For the sake 
of interoperability, a variety of standards that define the structure and semantics of public key 
certificate, including X.509 [138, 140], Simply Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) [141, 142], 
OpenPGP [143], etc, have emerged in recent times. Figure 5.4 shows the generic structure of 
X.509 certificate version 3 adapted from [131] [144] showing its fields which are described 
below.
  The Version describes the certificate version number (e.g. 1, 2, or 3).
  The Serial Number indicates a unique identifier that identifies the certificate within 
the issuer's domain.
  The Signature describes the identifier of the digital signature processing algorithm 
used (i.e. the Object Identifier (OID)7 and other parameters) e.g. an Object identifier 
for SHA-1 with RSA indicates that the hash function algorithm is SHA-1 encrypted 
using RSA public key algorithm.
  The Issuer describes the CA that issued and signed the certificate, and is usually 
indicated by the Distinguished Name (DN) of that CA. This field must be non-null.
  The Validity indicates the start and end dates the certificate should be considered 
valid.
7 OID is a hierarchically globally interpretable identifier to identify mechanisms and name formats; the sstructure 
and encoding of OID is defined in ISOIEC-8824 and ISOIEC-8825.
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The Subject specifies the name or DN of the certificate holder, and must be non- 
null.
The Subject Public Key Info specifies the public key and the associated public key 
algorithm used in generating the holder's key pair.
The Issuer Unique ID specifies a unique identifier of the issuer, and could be 
present in versions 2 and 3 only8 .
The Subject Unique ID specifies a unique identifier of the certificate holder, and 
could be present in versions 2 and 3 only9 .
The Extensions is an optional field present in version 3 only, and is used to specify 
recognized options and private extensions. Details of these standard options are 
detailed in [131].
The Digital Signature contains the resultant signature block and algorithm 
identifiers.
X. 509 certificate
[ Version ] -
[ Serial Number |
( Signature ]
f Issuer J
(~~ Validity ]
( Subject ]
[ Subject Public key Info )
( Issuer Unique 10 j
[ Subject Unique ID j
[ Extensions ]-
Digital Signature
-•^
1
1
1
V Signed by Authorized CA
1
1
1•-'
Figure 5.4 X.509 version 3 Certificate Structure
It is not recommended for use by rfc3280 
9 It is not recommended for use by rfc3280
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5.5 Network and Transport Layer Security
The interconnection of public networks based on the TCP/IP stack is open and vulnerable to 
the threat of eavesdropping and traffic monitoring activities. There is, therefore, the 
requirement for end-to-end secure conversation between communicating devices to ensure 
confidentiality. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [145] defined a suite of security 
protocols that use a range of cryptographic techniques at the network and transport layers of 
the stack. Figure 5.3 depicts transport and network layers security in a TCP/IP stack, 
respectively. The sections that follow describe the two main modes of the protocols.
5.5.1 Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS)
TLS defined by RFC2246 and SSL[146] are cryptographic protocols designed to provide a 
secure pipe between two communication endpoints in the transport layer of the TCP/IP stack. 
They primarily offer mechanisms to establish secure session parameters, authenticity of 
communicating devices (server and/or client), as well as data integrity. They use both 
symmetric and asymmetric cryptography in the management of security between 
communicating devices during a session. They define a suite of extensible protocols,
FTP SMTP HTTP
Application Layer
TCP
SSL/TLS
IP Layer
FTP SMTP HTTP
Application Layer
TCP
iP/IPSec
a. Transport Security b. Network security
Figure 5.5 Network and Transport Security Stack
cryptographic algorithms, and require that communicating participants (i.e. server and the 
client) are aware of the protocols and algorithms. The SSL (and TLS) makes use of public key 
certificates to support the services provided, as well as providing the mechanism for 
establishing trust between the endpoints. Consequently, the reliability of the services offered
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depends on the establishment of trust, or the relying parties may simply wish to trust the 
certificates at their own risk. The TLS is an advanced variant of SSL with extended features 
and capabilities.
5.5.2 Internet Protocol Security (IPSec)
The IPSec standard also developed by the IETF provides end-to-end IP layer security that 
enables private conversation over public networks offering confidentiality, integrity, and 
authenticity of data communication. It has two main protocols: Authentication Header (AH) 
and Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) protocols. These protocols work together using 
appropriate algorithm(s), and cipher keys to provide high-level end-to-end network security.
The difference between IPSec and SSL/TLS is the layer at which confidentiality is provided 
between the endpoints. Whilst IPSec provides a secure pipe from the IP layer, so that the 
source and destination IP addresses are hidden from the public, TLS provides a secure pipe 
outside the IP layer, exposing both the source and destination IP addresses. Whilst IPSec is 
suitable for connecting private networks together through public networks, TLS is appropriate 
for securing communication between two or more connected networks. It is worthwhile 
mentioning that IPSec and SSL/TLS address confidentiality, integrity and endpoint 
authentication at the wire level to mitigate against threats posed by man-in-the-middle attacks; 
and they are not sufficient for addressing application message layer security, particularly in 
exchanging structured data.
5.6 Conclusion
Information security sprang from the need to make conversations unintelligible to unintended 
parties. Consequently, privacy enhancement technologies have continued to evolve in an 
attempt to protect computer and networks, and provide support for preventing undesirable use 
of the PII. This chapter has demonstrated the availability of rich standard tools, which could 
provide support for addressing information security related problems. It provides insight into 
the evolution of important security developments such as cryptography, digital signature and 
their significance for privacy technologies.
More importantly, cryptography addresses four key information security concerns:
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  Confidentiality i.e. ensuring that only an authorized recipient can make sense of the 
information,
  Authenticity i.e. ensuring that parties can ascertain the origin of information,
Integrity i.e. ensuring that information exchanged between parties is not altered in 
transit and,
  Non-repudiation i.e. ensuring that parties are unable to deny their actions associated 
with an exchange of information.
In sum, this chapter highlights the diversity of these different technologies, and how they 
address common and sometimes distinct security concerns.
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Chapter 6. Relevant Security and Access Control Standards
6.1 Introduction
Security standards provide the platforms for promoting application service interoperability, and 
they are crucial for ubiquitous computing environments. Utilizing standardized security 
constructs implies using concepts that have been reviewed by a large community of experts and 
users. Standards, when widely accepted, can make it easier for users to develop applications 
that can interoperate with one another. The use of standard security mechanisms is important in 
order to ensure that the resultant utility [52] of this work can be adapted to real-world 
applications with minimal effort.
A number of security and access control standards have emerged as guidelines for the design 
and implementation of infrastructures that could support the prevention of unauthorized access 
to enterprise resources. These include XML-based security cryptographic services, the 
extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML), the Security Assertion Markup 
Language (SAML), etc. Many of these standards are generic, that is, they can support access 
control requirements in many environments. Consequently, utilizing them in a particular 
problem domain entails examining them in the context of the identified problems.
This chapter explains the basic concepts and key features of the specific standards, components 
and architectures that are used in this work. In particular, the chapter gives an overview of 
extensible Markup Language (XML) and its security services, as well as detailed discussion on 
the XACML and SAML, which play significant roles in the design and development of the 
infrastructure described by this thesis.
6.2 extensible Markup Language (XML)
XML, defined in [147], is an industry standard derived from SGML (ISO 8879), specifically 
designed to meet the requirements of large-scale electronic publishing. XML is based on a 
simply structured flexible text format which plays an increasingly important role in the wide 
range of exchange of data on the Internet. The XML describes a class of data objects called 
XML documents as well as the mechanism that enables the processing of the XML document. 
In their normative form XML documents consist of storage units named entities containing
either parsed or unparsed data. Typically, parsed data comprises characters in the form of
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character data, and form Markup which encodes a description of the document's logical 
structure and storage layout. The XML document is designed to work with a schema or 
Document Type Definition (DTD), which imposes constraints on the XML document 
processing and operations. XML has recently received a more widespread acceptance and 
implementation for the exchange of structured data over electronic networks, particularly 
among disparate systems. It provides the foundation for XACML and SAML constructs, as 
well as the new web service framework, which is transforming the dynamic provisioning of 
distributed Internet services.
6.3 XML Security Schemes
W3C specify two related standards: XML Signatures and XML encryption for creating and 
processing of digital signatures, and encryption of any digital content (data objects).
6.3.1 XML Signature Scheme
The standard defines a schema for representing the results of digital signature operations 
applied to any part of an XML document. XML signatures can be used to provide 
authentication, data integrity and non-repudiation. The core benefits of the XML signature 
scheme are the ability to sign particular portions of the XML tree; it can also be enveloped, i.e. 
the signature is over the XML portion of the content containing the signature as an element; 
and can be detached i.e. the signature is "detached" from the portion of the XML content it 
signs. Figure 6.1 shows the elements of XML digital signature in a tree format. The root node 
is the Signature elements, which contain the Signedlnfo element, SignatureValue element, 
Keylnfo and Object extension elements. The Signedlnfo node contains 
CanonicalizationMethod, SignatureMethod and Reference elements. The Reference element 
identifies each portion to be signed by a URI attribute, and contains a Transform element that 
specifies an ordered list of processing steps that were applied to the Reference portion before 
applying the digest; the DigestMethod refers to the Hash function algorithm; while the 
DigestValue contains the value of encrypted digest of the Signedlnfo element.
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Figure 6.1 Structure of XML Digital Signature scheme
6.3.2 XML Encryption
XML Encryption provides end-to-end message layer security for applications that have a 
requirement for secure exchange of structured data. The message layer security characterizes 
an approach where all the information which is related to security is encapsulated in the 
message. The XML encryption provides the natural way to handle complex requirements for 
security in most data exchange applications. Figure 6.2 depicts the simplest structure of the 
XML encryption scheme which can appear anywhere within the XML document structure. The 
EncryptedData element is the root and contains Cipher Data and CipherValue elements. The
Figure 6.2 The XML Security Service Architecture Scheme
XML encryption syntax provides a standard way for compliance systems to interpret the XML 
encrypted payload unambiguously. The CipherData and CipherValue nodes signify that any 
data within the container have been subject to an XML encryption transformation, and it can
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contain other information that can facilitate the transformation of the data back to its primitive 
XML structure.
Generally, XML security schemes provide message layer security that is impossible to achieve 
with traditional transport layer security i.e. TLS. Dynamic exchange of business information 
requires some sort of flexibility and robustness in handling structured and complex 
transactions, whereby secure intermediary processing and extension of messages may be 
desirable. These security schemes provide the machinery for combining secure and insecure 
data in the same message payload, which offers mechanisms for supporting the treatment of 
complex documents dynamically and in trustworthy manner. Outlined below are some of the 
exceptional message layer security features it can offer.
Partial Encryption of Data: In some application scenarios, it may be undesirable to encrypt all 
parts of the information; XML security provides a mechanism to encrypt a part of the data and 
leave other parts unencrypted. It can also handle a complex secure exchange in which several 
parts of the message can be encrypted uniquely by different entities using different encryption 
keys. This flexibility also makes it possible to have secure and non-secure data in the same 
message payload.
Multiparty Encryption: This provides a means to secure sessions between two or more 
communicating parties simultaneously, i.e. a document can partially be encrypted for multiple 
users concurrently without compromising security in a more flexible manner.
In summary, the XML and its security services offer significant benefits in addressing security 
problems in the message layer, and they are the backbone for making the new web services 
framework secure. In particular, with XML security services, structured data can be selectively 
signed, or encrypted for those XML elements that essentially require it. These security services 
are considered relevant to the general development of the framework proposed by this work.
6.4 The Website Privacy Policy and P3P Initiative
It is common nowadays to see a display of privacy statements on websites on how they collect 
and make use of PII. These statements are usually lengthy legal worded documents [35], often 
compiled by lawyers, and written in special legal terms [148]. The problem with these policy 
statements is that most users hardly read and/or understand them. It is not only that they
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contain legal jargon; an average website user will not spend time reading the document before 
exploring a site. The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [148] is an attempt to address the 
above human limitations by a standardized policy format allowing a website's privacy 
statements to be uniformly represented and transmitted to user-agents at the instant of service 
invocation.
The expectation is that compliant user-agents (i.e. web browsers) can automatically retrieve 
and interpret the service provider's privacy policy statements and match them against the 
user's published privacy preferences. It is expected that these compliant user agents will help 
users become more familiar with the service providers' privacy practices, when published in 
both machine and human-readable formats. Furthermore, it is imagined that it can facilitate the 
automation of web browser agents in making decisions regarding users' privacy, based on their 
privacy preferences.
The overall benefit is to lessen the burden of users having to read lengthy privacy policy 
statements themselves at every site they visit. The P3P privacy statement is based on XML 
constructs, which describe data collection, purpose of collection, retention period as well as 
whether information is shared by third parties, etc. The P3P is developed around fair 
information practice statements [14]. The projection is that in the near future, smart user-agents 
will be able to predict the behaviour of service providers through an analysis of their privacy 
statements and adequately inform users. The consequence is that users through their user-agent 
will have more control over the use of their personal data in an automated fashion. Outlined 
below are some of the often-stated benefits of the P3P privacy model:
  To promote fair information practices so that commercial sites can imprint trust and 
confidence in their customers by being transparent in the collection and usage of 
information.
  P3P based on industry standards can promote openness and improve significantly 
the level of communication between consumers and websites.
  By being open and making their privacy practices visible, organizations can attempt 
to take appropriate care of how to collect information that is relevant to them.
85
  P3P can enable organizations to communicate their privacy enforcement promises 
to customers.
It is worthwhile mentioning that the P3P platform has created privacy awareness within the 
community of Internet users and industry stakeholders. In chapter 7, drawn from [149], the 
applicability of the P3P policy is illustrated in the context of this work. The P3P initiative is the 
primary Internet privacy framework targeted at addressing a website's handling of privacy in 
the aspects of collection, storage and dissemination of PII. It has provided some degree of 
privacy awareness, and become the vehicle for the regulation of online privacy statements 
through specifications and guidelines. It is apparent that P3P helps service provider websites to 
convey their privacy statements in machine readable format so that compliant user-agents can 
compare a site's privacy statement with a user privacy preference.
The P3P framework is more of a guideline than enforcement machinery; it has no apparatus for 
the monitoring of privacy compliance, i.e. whether service providers actually adhere to their 
own privacy statements or not. In most cases, the privacy statements have no strong binding to 
the providing sites, and this implies imposing the user-agent to 'rely 5 on it or abandon the 
service access. The lack of strong binding to the providing party makes it vulnerable to abuse 
and misuse. For example, in a site scripting attack, an attacker can fool the browser by using 
the right P3P policy, which is genuinely downloaded from the impersonated provider's site. 
The repercussion is that, since the user has no mechanism to verify and validate the 
authenticity of the P3P policy statement, the user-agent can easily be fooled. Although it does 
describe "disputes" and "redress" mechanisms in the event of violations, the fact that there is 
no verifiable strong binding between the policy and site, can invalidate its use in any privacy 
dispute. However, although the P3P has not yet been explored to address privacy in access 
control systems, it is one of the possibilities explored in this work.
6.5 Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL)
The Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) [150] is an XML based enterprise 
privacy language developed by IBM to help organizations' privacy policy writers to define 
terms, conditions and rules that protect users' PII in compliance with organizational statements 
on privacy and procedures [151]. Whilst EPAL is not used directly in this work, it is included
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here for completeness. EPAL has two top-level components that must work together in EPAL 
compliance systems:
EPAL-Vocabulary that defines the terms that aids the system in interpreting organization- 
specific privacy elements as well as data that may be required for evaluating other conditions 
contained in the policy.
EPAL-Policy that defines privacy policy rules that contextualizes what is allowed and what is 
denied based on a given vocabulary.
The EPAL defines structural elements and hierarchies of data-categories, user-categories, and 
purposes, sets of privacy actions, obligations and conditions. The user-categories element 
describes the aspects of entities i.e. users/groups that collect data (e.g. administration 
department of finance officer). The data-categories element defines different categories of 
collected data that have diverse privacy characteristics, i.e. medical records, personal details, 
etc. The purposes element specifies the intended purposes, i.e. administrative purpose (e.g. data 
is collected for admin purposes), data collected for the processing of annual returns, etc. The 
actions element indicates how data is used, i.e. disclose versus read. The obligations element 
defines actions that must be taken in subsequent operations. Figure 6.3 shows the UML 
representation of the EPAL policy model and the relationships that exist among its various 
elements. Although the EPAL is a well-defined structural XML-based privacy language, 
which specializes in data handling at enterprise level privacy concerns, it lacks the flexibility 
and extendibility to support wide range of use-cases in protecting privacy and confidentiality in 
distributed environments. In particular, its functionality cannot simultaneously provide support 
for privacy and confidentiality protection of enterprise-wide access control requirements (i.e. 
using the same framework for the protection of personal data as well as traditional enterprise 
resources).
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Figure 6.3 EPAL Policy Structure [150]
6.6 extensible Access Control Markup Language(XACML) Model
The XACML standard developed by the Organization for the Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards (OASIS) is an XML-based model that provides generalized 
functionality for the wider range of access control problems [37]. It is an extensive access 
control policy language that not only defines the formats and encoding of access control rules, 
but provides message level request-response mechanisms which allow its distributed 
components to cooperate in access control operations. Figure 6.4 adapted from [37], depicts the 
abstract view of the model showing core components and dataflow. It represents a modularized 
architecture that decouples its subcomponents, based on functionality, in a manner that allows 
them to be distributed. The following section describes the XACML model actors.
Policy Administration Point (PAP): The entity provides the relevant rules that govern access to 
protected resources in the form of policy or PolicySet.
Access Requester: The entity that initiates the access control request context that triggers 
access control operation.
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): The entity intercepts access requests and enforces appropriate
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access control decisions. It sends a request to the Policy Decision Point (POP) through the 
Context Handler containing the attributes of subjects, resources, action and the environment 
that describes the ADI of the Target scope.
Context Handler: The component converts the primitive inputs from the PEP to a format 
consumable by the POP (request context) and outputs (response context) consumable by the 
PEP.
Policy Decision Point (POP): The component makes a decision based on the attributes 
contained in the request context, against the local policy that governs access to the protected 
resources.
Policy Information Point (PIP) is the entity that supplies the attribute values required by the 
POP including that of the access requester.
Obligation Service: The entity enforces any obligations returned by the PDP after the access 
control decision.
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Figure 6.4 XACML Policy Components and Dataflow [37]
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6.6.1 The XACML Context
The XACML architecture separates the core access control policy language from the 
application specific environment, to allow its elements to cooperate even in disparate 
environments. This contextual abstraction fragments the core XACML and defines an XML 
schema instance, which specifies the canonical representation of the various access control 
inputs and outputs. The constructs provide the means that allow XACML attribute-types to be 
referenced by an instance type, i.e. an attribute can be accessed as an XPath expression using 
the notion of AttributeDesignator type defined in the XACML schema, which is an explicit 
identifier of that attribute. Each XACML primitive attribute type such as subject, resource, 
action and environment, together with other optional identifiers, is strongly mapped to a named 
XACML Data-type. The application specific environment takes the responsibility for 
converting its native attribute representation into a XACML compatible context. This particular 
functionality makes possible the seamless integration of XACML actors in distributed systems 
using common semantics and vocabularies. XACML specified two types in its context schema 
[152] namely:
  XACML Request Context: This describes the attributes of XACML request context 
actors relative to a given policy in which evaluation will take place. In particular, it 
specifies information about subjects, resources, actions and environment with 
respect to a particular access decision request consumable by a XACML PDF.
  XACML Response Context: It defines elements of the response context, usually 
from a XACML PDF that is consumable by a XACML PEP. The response context 
characterises the access evaluation decision result reached by the XACML PDF, 
and it is represented at top level in the forms of Decision, Status, and Obligations.
A classical example, is a mobile device constrained in terms of computing resources to run a 
PDF engine, which may rely on a trusted third party PDF to provide an authorization service 
[149]. The PEP component residing in a Mobile device can send a trusted XACML request 
context to this third party POP and expects to get back a trusted XACML response context to 
determine access to its protected resources.
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6.6.2 XACML Policy Language Model
XACML offers a wider range of access control policy language in several application domains 
providing the mechanism for a finer access control granularity. At the top-level, it contains 
three main structural elements considered as a tree: Rule, Policy, and PolicySet, implying a 
hierarchical relationship. These elements contain other subcomponents, structured in a style 
that further describes the detailed properties and scopes of the Target. Figure 6.5 shows the 
various components and typical relationships that exist among them. In the following a brief 
description of the various elements is provided.
Rule element: This is the innermost element of the three top-level nodes in the XACML 
language model, and a direct child of a Policy element. According to XACML schema [37], 
multiple rules can be encapsulated in a single policy, provided that they are uniquely identified. 
The Rule element consists of three other child elements described below:
Condition element: This node describes conditional constraints, which further refine the 
evaluation of an access control context. The XACML standard defined extensive 
functions and data-types used in evaluating conditional elements and the outcomes are 
usually TRUE or FALSE. This functionality, in addition to the target scope, provides a 
fine-grained processing of applicable request context in access control decision 
procedures. It contains Apply element, a native XACML predicate that facilitates the use 
of extensible mathematical functions to refine the matching and evaluation of a policy 
context. Figure 6.8 shows structurally, the main policy elements and their hierarchical 
relationships, which are critical to the processing of a XACML request context. For 
simplicity, some sub-elements and attributes are omitted in the diagram, but are 
discussed later in this section.
Effect: The element that describes the intended decision of a policy rule and defines two 
attribute values: Permit or Deny.
Target element: Defines the Target scope of the policy in terms of resources, subjects, actions 
and environments that is applicable to an instance of a Rule node. It is important to note that 
the Target in the Rule node has a hierarchical relationship with the Target in the parent Policy 
node.
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Resources element: This element contains a disjunctive sequence of Resource elements, 
which describes a set of resource-related entities that can be matched against attribute 
values in the XACML context request element Resource with the embedded attribute 
values.
Subjects element: This element contains a disjunctive sequence of Subject elements, 
which describes a set of subject-related entities that can be matched against attribute 
values in the XACML context request element Subject with the embedded attribute 
values.
Actions element: This element contains a disjunctive sequence of Action elements, 
which describes a set of action-related properties that can be matched against attribute 
values in the XACML context request element Action with the embedded attribute 
values.
Environments element: This element contains a disjunctive sequence of Environment 
elements, which describes a set of environment-related entities that can be matched 
against attribute values in the XACML context request element Environment with the 
embedded attribute values.
Policy Element: This node can contain any number of Rule nodes, and its Target node is a filter 
to the Rule elements. In addition, it contains a unique identifier called Policyld, rule-combiner 
algorithm identifier, set of obligations and Target instance. The Target in the policy container 
defines the semantics of sets of allowable attributes of resources, subjects, actions and 
environments within the Policy scope. In practice, this feature provides the means of filtering 
allowable Target domains that the Rule container can provide. The idea of Target at each 
branch of the XACML tree is for performance enhancement designed to speed up access 
decision operations.
Rule-combining Identifier: A Policy can contain any number of Rule elements. To 
avoid conflicting results, a rule-combining scheme provides the mechanism to deal with 
and resolve any conflicting evaluation result when multiple Rules must combine to a 
single deterministic result. In this regard, only one instance of a rule-combining 
algorithm referenced by its identifier is allowed in a Policy container.
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Obligation: The node that describes further constraints that must be enforced by the 
PEP entity in addition to the deterministic access decision outcome.
PolicySet Element: This is the outermost node in the XACML Policy tree, which can contain 
any number of PolicySet or Policy elements. It contains other attributes such as unique 
identifier, combiner algorithm identifier and annotations. The idea of PolicySet is to 
accommodate enterprise wide policy sets, which can be defined by different security policy 
administrators, but can be combined into one effective applicable policy.
6.6.3 Combining Algorithms and Policy Evaluation
The combining algorithm is fundamental to the processing and evaluation of a XACML 
request context. The idea is that individual Rules, and/or Policies can be combined 
unambiguously into a single applicable policy in a given access control request context. That 
is, a combining algorithm defines procedures that allow the evaluation of set of Rules and/or 
Policies to obtain a deterministic authorization decision. Figure 6.6 depicts the logical
Target 1 1 0 1 Obligation
Condfoon 0 1 1 ^
1 '~
Effect
Figure 6.5 XACML Policy Language Model 
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PolicySet combining model demonstrating how two Policy elements that are contained in a 
PolicySet can be combined into a logical applicable policy. Similarly, figure 6.7 demonstrates 
the logical combination of two Rules elements contained in a Policy into effective policy that 
can be evaluated to obtain a single deterministic decision. Outlined below are some of the 
native combining algorithms supported out of box by the XACML model:
Deny-Overrides: Where multiple rules or policies are evaluated, if there is a Deny Effect on 
any of the results, then the final authorization decision defaults to Deny. Contrary, where any 
rule or policy evaluates to Permit, and "all other rules evaluates to Not Applicable" then the 
authorization decision shall be Permit.
Ordered-Deny-Overrides: In the case of Deny Effect attribute, a pre-defined order of 
precedence defined in the rules or policies must be followed to arrive at a final authorization 
decision when multiple rules or policies are evaluated.
Permit-Overrides: Where multiple rules or policies are the case, if any rule or policy in the set 
results in Permit, the final authorization decision defaults to Permit.
Ordered-Permit-Overrides: Similar to the ordered-deny-overrides, the order in which the
Logical Effective Policy
Figure 6.6 PolicySet Combining Logical Architecture
Figure 6.7 Policy Combining Logical Architecture
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policies or rules apply is pre-defined in order of precedence within the rules or policies.
First-Applicable: This scheme defines the order of applicable precedence; the result of the first 
relevant rule or policy determines the final authorization decision regardless of whether it is 
Deny or Permit effect.
The combining algorithms mechanisms offer significant benefits and conveniences in the 
combined treatment of privacy and confidentiality in a large scale deployment.
6.6.4 Policy Indexing
In a typical enterprise access control environment, it is likely that multiple independent policies 
can be specified to govern access to specific resources. To speed up the retrieval of the 
applicable policy and verification of its validity, the Target element has native support for two 
main indexing mechanisms. The first approach is to configure the PDF engine to search for 
applicable policies in a database system at runtime. An alternative approach is to initialize the 
system to load policy instances at the PDF start up time. The choice of a particular technique 
depends on performance requirements and application environment.
6.6.5 XACML Data Types
The XACML standard specifies a wide range of data types as the basis for creating the 
predicates for conditions and target matching. It consists of derivatives from pure XML data 
types usually represented as string and the XACML object defined strong typed data types. The 
data types are fundamental to the PDF decision making as it converts various string 
representations into primitive data-types for the purpose of matching and evaluation. For 
example, X.500 directory name, an ITU-Rec.X.520 Distinguished Name described in IETF 
RFC 2253 "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol version 3 is represented as 
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:x500Name in the Attribute DataType scope. In the case 
of the RFC822 name, an electronic mail descriptor is represented as urn: oasis: names: tc: 
xacml: 1.0: data-type: rfc822Name Attribute DataType. Similarly, IP address is represented as 
urn: oasis: names: tc: xacml: 2.0: data-type: ipAddress which depicts an IPv4 or IPv6 network 
address and optionally may include the port number. More detailed XACML data types can be 
found in [37]
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6.6.6 XACML Functions
The XACML standard describes standardized native functions for the various matching and 
evaluation operations within the XACML context environment and is critical to the way PDF 
performs its primary operations. These functions are identified by unique identifiers which 
enable the PDF to understand and select applicable data-types. For example, the language 
specifies a set of equality functions that apply to a range of domains including Boolean-equal, 
String-equal, Integer-equal, Date-equal specifically designed for the processing of XACML 
native predicates.
6.6.7 Analysis of XACML Policy Workflow
The XACML model is designed to cover a wide range of access control domains, but provides 
the techniques that make it easy to solve specific access control requirements. It offers 
significant flexibility in terms of access rule expressions as well as in policy writing, and this is 
fundamental in solving complex access control problems [30]. A thorough understanding of the 
policy structure, syntax, and the underlying schema is critical in analyzing a number of ways it 
can be applied to address complex security problems. As shown in figure 6.8, the PolicySet 
node is considered as a tree containing one or more children: PolicySet or Policy and a Target.
PolicySet
- Target
\ Target
PolicySet: first 
applicable 
provides topmost 
level filter.
Policy: second 
applicable 
provides top 
level filter
Rule: applicable 
target scope, 
evaluated
Condition: final 
filter provides 
finer granulanty.
Figure 6.8 XACML Target Scope Workflow
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Similarly, a Policy contains one or more child elements: Rule, and a Target. The Rule contains 
the Target and Condition elements that filter the policy context and provide a finer granularity.
In the XACML schema, each element <Target> contains a description of four core elements 
which are subjects, resources, actions and environments. In the Target scope, a conjunctive 
sequence of <Subjects>, <Resources>, <Actions> and <Environments> can possibly be 
expressed within the extent of <Target> applicability to a request context. The implication is 
that in processing, there MUST be at least one positive match between each section of the 
<Target> element and the corresponding section of the <xacml-context: Request> instance. 
The outcome is that each Target at any node of the tree is an intersection of Targets in the path 
that leads to that branch of the tree. In processing an access request, if the Target at any top 
level evaluates to FALSE, evaluating that branch of the tree becomes needless. However, the 
cascading of Target is a performance enhancement tool essentially for filtering a request at any 
node before advancing to the branches. The effectiveness is actually in the ability of the policy 
writer to intuitively describe the Target scope in each node appropriately to filter out 
undesirable requests. Further descriptions of inner elements of Target child elements are 
detailed next.
The <Subjects> tag contains a disjunctive sequence of <Subject> elements, which contain a 
conjunctive sequence of <SubjectMatch> elements. The <SubjectMatch> is used to cover the 
applicable identifying set of subject attributes that describe the entities permissible within the 
<xacml-context: subject> element of the request context.
The <Resources> tag contains a disjunctive sequence of <Resource> elements, which contain a 
conjunctive sequence of <ResourceMatch> elements. The <ResourceMatch> identifies 
applicable resource attribute types that can be matched against the attribute values contained in 
a <xacml-context: resource> element of a request context containing relevant attribute values.
The <Actions> tag contains a disjunctive sequence of <Action> elements, which contain a 
conjunctive sequence of <ActionMatch> elements. The <ActionMatch> is used to cover an 
applicable set of action-related attribute types that can be matched against attribute values 
contained within the <xacml-context: action> element of a request context.
The <Environments> tag contains a disjunctive sequence of <Environment> elements, which 
contain a conjunctive sequence of <EnvironmentMatch> elements. The <EnvironmentMatch>
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describes environmental rules which can be used to filter out subject entities within the 
<xacml-context: environment element of the request context.
Additionally, each of the above designated Match elements may contain the following sub 
elements:
The Matchld attribute element that describes the applicable matching function and its type and 
is often represented as anyURI type.
The <xacml: AttributeValue> tag contains the embedded attribute value of a particular Target 
child entity such as the Subject.
The <AttributeDesignatorType> tag contains the necessary information that identifies one or 
more applicable attribute value types in the Target scope of a request context. This primitively 
permits the use of named attributes in which respective Attributeld, DataType and Issuer 
properties can be matched against those of the request context using defined URI equality 
functions. The <AttributeDesignatorType> contains Attributeld (required), DataType 
(required), Issuer (optional) and MustBePresent (optional) attribute elements.
The <AttributeSelectorType> tag identifies one or more attribute value types in the Target 
scope based on an x-path expression.
The <Condition> tag plus its child element <Apply> provide the mechanism for finer 
processing of the access request context; the idea is to filter undefined subject attributes in the 
Target section, by expressing additional environmental constraints that further refine the access 
evaluation, which must take place before the final access decision takes effect.
6.6.8 Request Context Evaluation
Generally, in processing an access request, the PDF evaluates the local policy based on the 
properties of the Rule element against the incoming request context attribute properties. 
Critical to the processing operations are three components: Target, Effect and Condition 
components within a local policy domain. The processing of the <Target> at the parent (outer) 
node and the <Target> at the inner or child node is done in two ways. In one approach, the 
<Target> element of the outer node <PolicySet> or <Policy> is processed as the union of all 
the <Target> elements of the referenced <PolicySet>, <Policy> or <Rule> elements of the 
inner node. In the second approach, the <Target> element of the outer node is processed as the
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intersection of all the <Target> elements of the inner nodes. The outcomes of the two 
approaches are different; in the first approach, the <Target> element of the outer node is only 
applicable to any decision request that matches the <Target> element of at least one of the 
inner node components.
In the second approach, the <Target> element of the outer node is only applicable to the 
decision requests that match the <Target> elements of every child component. This unique 
functionality can intuitively be employed to address complex access security decisions 
involving different policy administration points within an enterprise. For example, a privacy 
framework should make space for the unhindered free flow of information for legitimate 
purposes. Whilst the domain administrator can express a generic rule governing access to 
information flow, the individuals can in addition specify their privacy access policy; at runtime 
these two policies can be combined in a PolicySet, and using an appropriate combiner 
algorithm, access operations can reach a deterministic decision without conflicts.
6.7 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) Standard
SAML is an Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) 
specification developed around XML constructs to provide message level security, essentially 
for communicating identity and access management information across autonomous 
boundaries [107]. It provides standardized generic syntax and processing semantics to 
represent the client authentication, claims, entitlements, and attribute properties in a well- 
structured xml format. That is, assertions made about a network entity by another entity, called 
the SAML Authority, or attesting party to a consuming (or requesting) entity, called the relying 
party. It describes both the assertion structure, set of request - response protocol messages, 
processing rules, and various profiles for practical implementation to support other XML based 
technical security standards.
The model plays an important role in message layer security and is central to the rising 
Federated Identity and Access Management, an emerging platform for the promotion of 
interoperability among business parties. It offers robust security architecture for seamless inter- 
domain business interactions offering an insulating buffer for disparate systems to share 
identity attribute-information. Behind the SAML components is the schema which defines the 
structural elements and types that make up the assertion block.
99
6.7.1 SAML Components
Figure 6.9 depicts the architecture of the SAML model showing the various components 
described in the following section.
SAML Assertion: An assertion makes a statement about a named principal or attributes of an 
entity, confirming that the establishment of security context about an entity has been done by a 
particular means, at a set time, and this is uniquely attested by a SAML Authority or the issuer. 
The SAML Assertion can contain any of the three components explained below:
Authentication Statement that is created by an asserting party about a SAML event,
which makes the statement of fact that an entity has authenticated successfully, and
includes the means of authentication, time, and other processing information.
Attribute Statement that contains specific identifying attributes about the principal or the
holder of the assertion.
Authorization decision statement that describes what the authenticated entity is allowed
to do, plus the privileges, entitlements or capabilities, which can attest to the claim.
SAML Protocols: The SAML request-response protocols define the XML construct for the 
exchange of assertions, and include the following:
Authentication Request Protocol that describes a means to allow a relying party to
request assertions containing authentication information and optional attribute
statements.
Single Logout Protocol that specifies the means that allows simultaneous logout of active
SAML sessions of a particular entity across relying domains (i.e. service providers that
made use of the assertions).
Assertion Query and Response Protocol that defines a set of query and response protocol
messages, particularly how a relying party can ask for assertions of an authenticated
subject.
Artifact Resolution Protocol that provides a way to pass protocol messages by a reference
using a small, fix-length value, called an artifact. The relying party uses the Artifact
Resolution Protocol to ask the providing party to dereference 10 the artifact and return the
' In programming parlance, accessing a value referred to by a reference is called dereferencing it.
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message value. Two channels are used here: the resolution request takes place over 
SAML HTTP binding, and the response over synchronous SAML SOAP binding. 
Name Identifier Management Protocol that provides mechanisms to manage the 
principals name identifier or value, and terminates a name identifier between the identity 
provider and service provider.
Name Identifier Mapping Protocol that provides a means to programmatically map one 
SAML name identifier into another provided it is compatible with predefined rules.
SAML Bindings explain in detail how SAML protocol messages can be conveyed using 
existing application layer protocols.
HTTP Redirect Binding that describes the use of the HTTP Redirect mechanism to 
communicate SAML messages.
HTTP POST Binding that explains how SAML messages can be used within the 
encoded base64 content of an HTML form control.
SAML Model Architecture
SAML Assertion
Authentication, Authorization, Attribute and Entitlement Information
SAML Protocols
Requests and responses messages in SAML interactions
SAML Bindings
SOAP, HTTP Redirect, HTTP POST, URL
SAML Metadata
Configuration information for identity and service providers
SAML Profiles
Use of SAML components to support use cases
Figure 6.9 SAML Model Architecture
HTTP Artifact Binding which defines how the message sender and receiver can use 
either HTML form or URL query string to convey an artifact.
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SAML SOAP Binding that describes how to use SAML messages within SOAP over 
HTTP.
Reverse SOAP (PAOS) Binding which defines the Enhanced Client and Proxy 
mechanisms that allows an HTTP client to act as a SOAP responder.
SAML URL Binding that defines how to resolve and retrieve an existing SAML 
assertion based on a uniform resource identifier (URI).
SAML Profiles: This mechanism defines how SAML components achieve interoperability by 
combining with other existing standards such as XACML, X.509, etc.
Web Browser SSO profile which describes how the Authentication Request Protocol, 
SAML Response Messages and Assertions combine to provide a single sign-on with 
standard web browsers using HTTP Redirect, HTTP POST and HTTP Artifact bindings 
described above.
Enhanced Client and Proxy (ECP) profile that defines how specialized clients or 
gateway proxies can use a particular profile with PAOS and SOAP bindings explained 
above.
Identity Provider Discovery Profile that describes one convenient way for allowing a 
relying party to find out the identity providers a user has already visited.
Single Logout Profile that defines how the SAML Single Logout Protocol is executed by 
the use of SOAP, HTTP Redirect, HTTP POST, and HTTP Artifact bindings.
Assertion Query/Request Profile that describes how SAML entities can leverage the 
SAML Query and Request Protocol to retrieve SAML Assertions over a synchronous 
binding, e.g. SOAP.
Artifact Resolution Profile defines how SAML entities can leverage the Artifact 
Resolution Protocol over a synchronous binding, i.e. SOAP to get the 
protocol\messages referred to by an artifact.
Name Identifier Management Profile that explains how the Name Identifier 
Management Protocol could be used with SOAP, HTTP Redirect, HTTP POST, and
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HTTP Artifact bindings.
Name Identifier Mapping Profile defines how the Name Identifier Mapping Protocol 
leverages a synchronous binding, i.e. SOAP binding.
6.7.2 The SAML Assertion Structure
SAML Assertion structure [107] is a purely a XML-based encoding scheme that represents one 
or more statements made by a SAML issuer or SAML authority. The high-level outer structure 
is depicted in figure 6.10 showing that of an Assertion Statement. In figure 6.10, the Issuer 
element indicates the name of the asserting party or SAML authority; the Signature element 
indicates the signature block which contains information including the public key, algorithms 
and transforms, digital signature, etc; the Subject element indicates the identity of the holder; 
the Condition element indicates constraining conditions, and the Assertion Statement can 
indicate any of the assertion instances including authentication, attribute, authorization 
decision, or other user-defined specifics.
6.7.3 SAML Notion of Privacy
SAML v2.0 defines a generic privacy mechanism anticipated to provide communicating party 
privacy protection. It primarily uses an opaque pseudo-random identifier to shield an assertion 
holder from being explicitly identified by a relying party. Additionally, the pseudo-random 
identifier is designed to inhibit collusion between multiple SAML providers in an assertion 
session. Furthermore, SAML specified other security mechanisms, i.e. metadata for sharing 
federation meta-information; encryptions formats, and attribute profiles, etc. The SAML 
components, messages protocols and profiles provide the essential services which business
SAML Assertion
Issuer
Signature j
Subject
Conditions
Assertion Statement
Figure 6.10 The SAML Assertion Structure 
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partners in distributed environments can leverage to secure their messages. More information 
regarding SAML can be found in [153].
6.8 Web Services Security Standards (WSSS)
The WS-Security standards [154] also defined by the OASIS, aim to address security 
enhancement in SOAP message contexts, and a variety of extensible message level protocols 
are defined. They describe approaches that autonomous business partners with different 
security requirements can leverage to secure web services interactions in terms of message 
content integrity and confidentiality. These allow web services actors to associate and broker 
trust establishment, identities and claims for the purposes of authentication and authorization. 
These standards mainly focus on the following:
  Support suitable sharing of identity, claims, tokens, privileges, etc., and multiple 
security tokens formats.
  Communication of authentication and authorization information using similar or 
distinct mechanisms, but abstracted at a high level to provide a common platform 
for interoperability.
  Brokering of trust and security token exchanges: use of intermediaries to broker 
authentication and authorization wherever desirable whilst maintaining high quality 
security, and support for multiple trust domains.
  Optional obscuring of identity information and other attributes to enable privacy.
WS-Security provides mechanical approaches to ensure that business partners using web 
services in unsecured public networks can interact without the ability of a third party to view 
the messages, and are able to determine the originality of the messages as well as ensuring that 
the messages were intact whilst in transit. In addition, OASIS defines WS-Trust models that 
describe various trust establishment approaches and infrastructure as further necessary 
components in securing web services interactions.
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6.9 The Liberty Alliance
The Liberty Alliance is a consortium of major IT stakeholders that develop guidelines and 
specifications expected to assist in the development of interoperable Federated Identity aware 
systems [99] to solve non-functional business process problems. The goal is to develop 
effective and efficient frameworks that will govern how identity related information is shared 
among communicating business partners. Federated identity is about linking users' digital 
attribute accounts issued by identity providers with service providers who consume the identity 
information. This particular account linkage underlies the service advocated by this institution. 
It facilitates users' experience in the use of SSO to move around the federated sites or services 
without the requirements to sign on each site again. It specified a suite of standards, 
specifications, recommendations and guidelines that core Liberty compliant systems should 
comply with.
The Circle of Trust (CoT) specification deals with contractual aspects of "rules, policies, 
obligations, procedures, risk and remedies" that will oversee the Federated participants 
including individual users [155]. Its privacy and security best practices describe the guidelines 
and recommendations in terms of privacy and security which it expects Liberty enabled 
applications to comply with [93]. In spite of these extensive guidelines, it recognized that 
compliance is the responsibility of application providers, as it has no mechanism to monitor, 
audit or enforce compliance.
6.10 Conclusion
The XML is an emerging important business tool revolutionizing the exchange of information 
across disparate systems. It is the foundation for many new internet security standards, which 
include the XACML, SAML, P3P, EPAL, etc. The XACML and SAML are two important 
models underlying the development of the infrastructure proposed in this thesis for supporting 
privacy and confidentiality protection. This chapter described the essentials of these security 
standards, their encoding schemes and capabilities. More importantly, the analysis of the 
XACML policy instances is given in the context of this work, describing the various alternative 
approaches in the evaluation of XACML policy rules. Overall, these standards form significant 
input to chapters 7 and 8.
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Chapter 7. Building Privacy and Trust into an Access Control Framework
7.1 Introduction
The web technology has somewhat changed the way Information Systems (IS) interact today; 
as a consequence, traditional approaches to system development [57] have altered as well. 
Driven by these new business environments, organizations have a need to expose some part of 
their enterprise services to the outside world. This implies greater demand to allow access to 
enterprise computing operations whilst ensuring security and privacy. Addressing privacy and 
security issues in this context necessitates a requirements gathering for the application 
development phase. Given the multiple level of interactions between participating parties in 
distributed electronic transactions, requirements analysis is a critical phase, which covers the 
complex tasks of deconstructing how a system should behave, as well as helping to expose the 
system properties, or attributes. Thus, the need for a thorough system requirements gathering to 
guide the software development life cycle phases is imperative.
This chapter examines the generalized view of distributed access control, and briefly reviews 
authentication, authorization and trust in the context of the distributed XACML model. It 
describes a security threat model based on a typical e-procurement use-case in an attempt to 
define the scope of the applicable privacy and security requirements. This systematic approach 
is expected to aid in identifying the principal actors, and their relationships in distributed 
access control interactions. Furthermore, the chapter will also appraise trust models and various 
options for establishing trust relationships in distributed environments. Additionally, the 
chapter deals with the policy framework, detailed description of the WS-XACML profile, 
architecture and usage. Lastly, a conceptual design supporting this work resulting from the 
inputs made in previous chapters, and the analyses carried out in this chapter is presented.
7.2 Generalized Access Control Context
Conceptually, the stages in distributed access control are performed in two steps: 
authentication and authorization. Some assumptions are necessary to model this scenario. It 
will be assumed that in typical distributed environments, authentication should be handled as a 
separate service at the clients' security domain and authorization at the service provider's 
domain. A typical access control flow is shown in figure 7.1, demonstrating how an application
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specific access filter, say PEP, can interact in support of authentication and authorization 
processes. The access filter in this sense can be seen as a service request filter, which 
determines which resources need access control, and whether authentication and/or 
authorization are required before access is granted or denied. In order to avoid unnecessary 
authentication and/or authorization, the access filter can use subcomponents such as 
AuthnProxy (Authentication Session management) and AuthzProxy (Authorization Session 
Management) respectively as shown in the diagram to ensure that authenticated and/or 
authorized requests are not asked to perform these operations again in the same session.
Figure 7.1 shows that authentication and authorization services are operated in different 
autonomous security domains, entailing requirements for trust establishment that may 
inherently be complicated. In order to ensure privacy protection, the initiating client may be 
unwilling to supply to the PEP all the required subject attributes before service invocation. 
Additionally, the authentication phase validates the client's origin, providing the PEP some 
attribute information that is passed to the PDP; meaning that to complete the access decision 
operation, the PDP must have access to the remainder of subject's attributes to complete the 
decision process. But since the PDP makes the request through its Context Handler to an 
external entity, trust must be established. This additional request for attribute information from 
an external entity triggers privacy because the external entity must ensure that the requestor 
will treat the attribute information with some regard to privacy. Figure 7.1 clearly shows the 
complete data flow from the client initiating a service request to filtering of the request by both 
the authentication and authorization services when required. The next section attempts to put 
the developed understanding into a distributed XACML interactions context.
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Figure 7.1 Conceptual Access Control Flow 
7.3 Trust Context
In the section that follows, trust establishment is examined to further deconstruct and clarify 
the trust boundaries. Trust is fundamental, in distributed transactions, trust can be established 
between people and people, people and services, and services and services, and may demand 
handling the trust relationships dynamically [46]. Figure 7.2 depicts a simple dialogue between 
two parties: Alice and Bob in a typical trust context and is described as follows:
B Alice approached Bob's door and knocked;
  Bob asked 'who are you';
  Alice responded 'I am Alice;
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  Bob said come in, because he recognised that was the voice of Alice and expected 
to see her.
Analyzing the above scenario, there is a high probability that Bob may open the door and see 
instead of Alice, an impostor, who mimicked Alice's voice. This naive example can be the 
basis to justify the two variables associated with trust namely: behaviour and expectations. The 
illustration implies an innate issue of risk elements in the general concept of trust; buttressing 
the need to build systems that will allow communicating parties to negotiate trust based more 
on other properties than the PKI relationships can provide.
In the digital world, trust models are the basis of verifying and validating trust relationships, 
claims, privileges, properties, identity-information, etc. giving the relying party the choice of 
whether to trust a providing party or not based on certain defined rule constraints. 
Traditionally, the certainty to trust an entity can be based on the characteristics of the trust 
model in place.
Figure 7.2 Typical Trust Dialogue
7.3.1 Direct vs. Indirect Trust
There are two basic trust relationships: direct and indirect (sometimes referred to as transitive 
trust). In a typical access control operation, the service gatekeeper needs to verify and validate 
the claims made by a client; these operations require some sort of trust relationship. Direct trust 
is based on shared knowledge or a shared secret, such as username/password pair, PKI 
certificate, etc. which is usually established out-of-band between parties prior to 
communication interaction. In the case of indirect trust, a party needs to validate the claims 
made by another party but there is no direct trust relationship between them. In other words,
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the parties require a trust broker, or trusted third party that both of them can trust, in order to 
communicate and share sensitive information. Figure 7.3 depicts two basic primary trust 
models showing direct and indirect trust relationships.
Figure 7.3 (i) depicts the idea of direct trust between a service client (SC) and a service 
provider (SP) that requires a proof-of-possession to establish trust. In contrast, in indirect trust 
models, a third party has to vouch for the identity or attribute claims, privileges, properties etc. 
of a party. This is illustrated in figure 7.3 (ii).
sc Usemame/password or PKC 
Direct Trust
,
*
SP
Figure 7.3 Basic Trust Model
In figure 7.4 (i), a more sophisticated trust model is depicted showing boundaries of security 
domains, as well as some kinds of possible trust relationship. Figure 7.4(ii) demonstrates the 
steps and interactions that a SC can use to request a service from an SP, when they do not have 
direct trust relationships. In this mode, the assumption is that direct trust between the providing 
party and relying party is impractical, so intermediaries, trusted by both parties must 
intervene.
1. The SC authenticates and obtains a signed token from its local Identity Provider 
(IdP) /Security Token Service (STS).
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The SC initializes and constructs another authentication request using the token 
from step 1 to an IdP/STS trusted by the SP. The SC's IdP/STS and SP's IdP/STS 
need to have prior trust relationships for this protocol to succeed. The SP's IdP/STS 
validates and processes the token request, issues a fresh token or cross certifies the 
token issued by the SC's IdP/STS, and returns it to the SC.
The SC constructs a web services message with the token and requests a service 
from the SP. The SP validates and processes the request and sends the appropriate 
response to the SC.
Direct Trust
, Indirect Trust .N    i/1
Service Client 
Domain
Service Provider 
Domain
Figure 7.4 Brokering of Trust via Two TTPs
It can be seen that the basis of trust between the SC and the SP can be analyzed as follows. The 
direct trust between the SC and its IdP/STS exists in the form of a username/password pair. In 
contrast, the SC has no direct trust with either the SP or its IdP/STS. Thus, trust between the SP 
and SC, which has no direct path, is provided by the trust between the two IdP/STS 
respectively. It can be seen that from the SP's viewpoint, the SC's IdP/STS has no direct trust 
relationship with it, but it can trust the assertion claims based on its relationship with its
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IdP/STS. This trust model exposes some inherent security flaws, which can be exploited by a 
greedy participant in high risk business transactions. The recipient party merely trusts the 
assertion claims made by a third party on the identity of the holding party, which are unlikely 
to reveal all the intentions of that party (i.e. behaviour). Arguably, this trust establishment 
cannot solely be relied upon to create confidence in an entity, but can provide the foundation 
upon which parties can negotiate and build more trust, through the mutual exchange of what 
they expect from the other patty, and what they are willing and able to do for that party.
On the basis of the above understanding, it can be concluded that in distributed environments 
where multiple actors exist in multiple domains, it is essential that brokered trust establishment 
be utilized as an 'introductory trust', upon which a higher threshold of trust can be built by the 
parties themselves. Having said this, it is equally vital to point out that what will determine the 
trust ascribed to a party might be based on some measurable risk metrics, which are outside the 
scope of the present work. To sum up, it can be concluded that privacy assurance cannot 
sufficiently be based on the provision of PKI relationships only, but requires more dynamic 
exchange of obligating and binding constraints between the parties themselves as the basis for 
building a higher level of privacy trust. Nevertheless, PKI still has an important role to play.
7.4 XACML in a Distributed Context
The XACML overviewed in chapter 6 confined its scope to access control model and language 
constructs, and intentionally overlooked how XACML actors in distributed environments can 
collaborate in a mutual access control interactions. The assumption is that it can utilize other 
complementary standard models to describe assertions, protocols or transport mechanisms that 
will enable its distributed actors to converse in secure trusted manner. In practice, the PEP 
entity is responsible for protecting access to the resources. The PEP filters every access request 
and applies appropriate enforcement, which may include establishing the authenticity of the 
request or sending the description of the request to the POP entity in the form of XACML 
context request. Two things can be established here. First, in the case of authenticity, it may 
require a formal authentication of the initiator by any available means. Second, the POP needs 
to evaluate the request against its available policies and attributes to make an authorization 
decision, which has to be passed back to the PEP
Traditionally, XACML PEP obtains a description of the request context from a range of
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possibilities including distributed (perhaps on-line) Attribute Authorities (AA) or Attribute 
Repositories (AR) for the subject designator attributes. Similarly, the PDF may interact in 
distributed manner to obtain the policies from PAP or from Policy Repositories. Furthermore, 
the PEP may not necessarily supply all the subject's attributes at the instance of making a 
request context from the PDF. In this case, the PDF through its Context Handler component 
will attempt to augment the subject attributes by asking a designated AA or AR for other 
attributes. This particular convenience is what makes XACML a candidate for protecting 
privacy and confidentiality in distributed environments. Of course, this raises the issue of trust; 
the distributed components must trust each other. Where the components exist in autonomous 
security domains, the level of trust required may vary, and even become complex. It is 
therefore important to examine how XACML actors can interact in distributed environments 
which will help in understanding the rest of the sections.
7.4.1 Distributed XACML Context Interaction
Figure 7.5 shows XACML actors in a distributed environment and their interactions which are 
described below: (It is assumed that the client has successfully authenticated with its local 
authentication service and token(s) issued in that respect in the form of assertion)
1. The client constructs a service request with the token containing the information 
about the subject and sends it to the PEP; it is important to note that because of 
privacy concerns, not all the subject information is included in this phase.
2. The PEP constructs a request context containing the token as the subject descriptor, 
and obtains other information, i.e. properties of the resources, time constraint, etc, 
and presents it to the Context Handler;
3. The Context Handler formats the request context appropriately and presents it to the 
PDF to decide whether access should be allowed;
4. The PDF obtains all applicable policies and evaluates them against the request 
context. If the PDF cannot complete its operation because of missing subject 
attributes, it requests the missing attributes from the Context Handler;
5. In turn, the Context Handler requests the missing attributes from the client's PIP (It 
is assumed that the client performed authentication with its PIP before service 
invocation). The dotted line indicates this external conversation;
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6. The client's PIP returns the missing client's attributes to the Context Handler;
7. The Context Handler sends the returned attribute information on to the POP;
8. The PDF completes the evaluation process and passes decision results to the 
Context Handler;
9. The Context Handler formats the decision results into a response context and sends 
it to the PEP;
10. The PEP interprets the response context and enforces a decision by either allowing 
the requested resources or indicating that access is denied to the client.
Figure 7.5 XACML Components Interaction Context
Analyzing the above interactions, it becomes apparent that the steps in the dotted lines require 
some form of trust to be established, to ensure privacy and confidentiality. In the scenario 
where the client has to reveal more attribute-information to a remote party before the access 
control decision is taken, privacy becomes a serious issue. The interactions above involve 
communication between external entities in different security domains, increasing the need for 
privacy, confidentiality and trust in distributed environments. This implies that for adequate 
privacy protection, negotiations between the external entities are desirable. This is necessary to 
allow both parties to determine how, where and when to reveal resources and attribute 
information, and apply desirable obligating constraints on the other party to guarantee privacy 
and confidentiality. In this regard, it is important to mention that trust is the vehicle for
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achieving these goals. Based on the above assessment and knowledge, the following necessary 
assumptions are made 11 :
  No access is allowed to a protected resource by default. The access rules for a 
protected resource must require attribute information of the client making the 
request before access is allowed, otherwise access is denied. Where more than one 
attribute is required by the access control operation, the rules shall be expressed in a 
manner such that one of the subject descriptors provides the initial mechanism to 
establish the first degree of trust context.
  The client may not be willing to disclosure applicable attributes of privacy concern 
at the first stage of the access request. In this regard, the authentication phase 
between the client and its local authentication provider, in which a token is issued, 
partially reveals information (i.e. origin authenticity) about the client, to serve the 
above-mentioned first degree of trust context.
  The initial information provided by the client is not sufficient to breach the client's 
privacy or the confidentiality of the protected resources. This potentially defeats any 
attempt by a bogus participant to mount probing attacks, often associated with trust 
negotiation [8, 123]. The underlying theoretical assumption is that if the interacting 
parties decide to withdraw from the transaction at this stage, they are not overtly 
exposed to privacy and confidentiality risks. Moreover, if any of the participants is 
an imposter, then the initial access rule filter will screen out the request, and the 
imposter will not succeed in any subsequent interactions. Although it can be argued 
that having a clue about the origin of a party is a privacy risk, what is important is 
the privacy risk impact factor and its actual consequences, which are outside the 
scope of this thesis.
  Where the first degree of trust establishment described above is insufficient to gain 
access to protected resources, both parties require other levels of trust establishment 
to reach their various goals. In this scenario, any attempt by the service to request
11 Authentication is not the primary focus of this work as most of the existing authentication approaches can be 
integrated with the described framework.
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more of the client's attributes will trigger mutual trust negotiations before sensitive 
information is exchanged.
  To make this negotiation phase privacy compatible, the service simply sends its 
access control policy as requirements across to the client [149]. The client, 
uncertain whether the service will respect its security preferences, cannot reveal 
sensitive information, but can respond with a similar counter policy. This iterative 
process triggers privacy trust negotiation and exchange of relevant attribute 
information, which can take a number of rounds until both parties are satisfied to 
release their various sensitive resources.
  It is assumed that the above scenarios do not guarantee assurance that the parties 
will respect each other's privacy, so additional steps are needed; this prompted a 
strong consideration of a workable protocol that will enable communicating parties 
to generate and exchange difficult-to-repudiate tenable evidence about their 
contextual information, in order to provide end-to-end privacy and confidentiality.
To further the above suppositions and substantiate them in the proper context, a security threat 
modelling technique is utilized to critically survey and scope the privacy problems in an 
application environment [87]. The benefit of security modelling is to ascertain the extent of 
security to apply in a given application domain, through a proper analysis of inherent and 
foreseeable security vulnerabilities and threats, and determine suitable mitigations. In the next 
section, this approach is used to investigate the casual effects of privacy and confidentiality in 
an access control environmental context in an attempt to validate the earlier assumptions made 
about privacy and confidentiality.
7.5 Security Threat Modelling and Analysis
Threat modelling is a formal approach that attempts to uncover application level security 
threats and vulnerabilities to determine the possibility of risk thresholds [59]. In the 
investigation, three factual elements, (i.e. privacy, confidentiality and trust) are the variables 
central to the study. It is important to deconstruct them subjectively to distinguish their 
characteristics, and further put their relationships in the proper context. For this purpose, the 
following definitions are assumed.
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  Confidentiality is that notion concerned with making sure that only an entity with 
the right privileges gains access to protected resources.
  Privacy is that notion of ensuring that the legitimate entity that has gained access to 
protected PII treats the PII trusted to it with respect to the providing party's security 
preferences.
  Trust is that means to establish the confidence that a resource consuming entity will 
act in a predictable and/or expected way.
Analyzing the above definitions, prevailing causal assumptions underscore the probability that 
a legitimate entity may have access to controlled resources, but abuse them by using the 
resources for other purposes than those originally stated. This phenomenon could be intentional 
or unintentional; whichever is the case, the potential exists for a privacy violation, bringing 
anticipated threats into focus. In retrospect, it can be deduced that confidentiality ensures that 
parties with the appropriate level of access privileges can gain access to restricted resources; 
but after the access, what they do with the resources has to be addressed by privacy 
mechanisms. In the privacy context, no subsequent use of attribute information other than for 
the originally stated purposes is a contractual obligation that must be respected by parties.
Trust on the other hand is the element that focuses on expected behaviour, i.e. the expectation 
that the communicating parties will act mutually and compatibly without incurring risks to 
each other based on the trust threshold provided by their properties or attribute-information. 
Furthermore, this brings the requirement that in distributed transactions involving two or more 
autonomous security domains, more security constraints are necessary for effective resource 
control, since requirements can rarely be static. This suggests that authorization and trust 
establishment have to be treated dynamically, as remote enforcement of obligating constraints 
is more exigent. To validate the above empirical assumptions, a use-case based on a classic e- 
procurement service within the construction industry is modelled. The objective is to capture 
the variables from various interactive steps and deduce successive message flows in order to 
determine the likely threats to privacy and confidentiality.
7.5.1 The e-Procurement Use-case
During the procurement phase of a construction project, the main contractor initiates a process
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aimed at ordering the products, materials and components essential for the construction of the 
building project. The contractor defines his product needs and publishes a call for tender at a 
dedicated web service portal aimed at potential product suppliers. The establishment of the call 
triggers a bidding process, and product suppliers can access the portal to search for calls 
appropriate to them and make offers, based on the publisher's requirements and other security 
constraints. Subsequently, the contractor can retrieve all the offers, analyze and rank them 
accordingly to determine suitable offer(s) before placing a purchase order.
Shown in figure 7.6 is the basic architecture illustrating the three main participants, possible 
trust relationship boundaries and typical flows of messages. In the above procurement scenario, 
certain transactional and security characteristics have to be identified to facilitate the modelling 
and analysis of the security threats. From the architectural point of view, the following 
assumptions can be made:
TRUST
Multiple
STS/Attribute
Provider*
Figure 7.6 Roles in e-Procurement Use-Case Architecture
Three types of actors exist, namely; the contractor or supplier, the Security Token 
Service/Attribute Authority (STS/AA) and the portal services-Tender Call Broker 
(TCB), with each playing a distinctive but sometimes similar role in separate 
interactions.
The contractors and suppliers can act as service clients, and in some instances 
implicitly as service providers, and have similar characteristics in terms of service 
interactions.
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  The TCB and STS are trusted third parties, and can belong to a particular 
construction consortium and/or geographical area, but can be multiple and/or 
federated. The TCB is an intermediary or service discovery broker, which provides 
a service interface on behalf of the suppliers and contractors, and is governed by a 
set of defined rules and procedures. This is to facilitate administration of tenders 
and biddings. Additionally, the TCB is a platform that provides the federation for 
trust establishment among participants.
  Contractors and suppliers may not necessarily have a previous trust context before 
the invocation of services or belong to the same TCB and/or STS.
  The participants can exist in multiples with or without the existence of direct trust 
relationships, but mutual trust should be established before they can exchange 
sensitive resources.
  The various participants may have properties and/or identity-information that 
requires privacy and confidentiality protection.
  Either a human user or a software entity, can initiate the process, and has similar 
properties and/ or identity-information.
In figure 7.7 the basic architecture is shown plus the underlying steps involved.
1 The client prepares a service request message with a suitable software application. It 
initializes and presents an authentication request to its local authentication provider - 
STS/AA. The client presents an identifier or proof-of-possession in the form of a 
username/password pair to perform this phase.
2 The STS/AA authenticates the client's claim(s), to verify and validate its identity or 
confirmation that the client has successfully authenticated with another trusted broker (if 
in a federation). The STS/AA can determine whether to issue a security token based on 
the local policy, and if the client belongs to a particular role i.e. membership role, the 
STS/AA issues a security token and passes it to the client.
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3 The client packages the web service message with the token and makes a service request 
to the TCB portal. In the case of a contractor, it is attempting to publish a call-to-tender, 
whereas the supplier would be attempting to retrieve some tender calls.
4 The TCB portal through its security handler sends a validation request or asks for more 
attributes of the client, to determine the access rights of the requesting client.
5 The STS/AA processes the validation request or attributes request and presents an 
appropriate response to the TCB.
6 The TCB validates the STS/AA response, completes the client's request and sends an 
appropriate response to the client. For example, in the case of a supplier attempting to 
retrieve calls, it needs to match the request against the advertised policy of the contractor 
that placed the call, and determine whether this supplier can be allowed. A contractor may 
place certain constraints on potential suppliers, which can act as initial filter, i.e. the 
supplier must possess membership of certain consortium and a proof of annual turnover 
of a certain amount. On the other hand, a supplier may place similar obligating constraints 
on the contractors, i.e. validity period of bids (in privacy terms: maximum retention 
period). Some or a subset of these contractual obligating constraints can be advertised in 
the web service policy, if desirable.
r-
Service 
Request 
•^ +Token__
Figure 7.7 Use-case actors' Interactions
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In practice, a contractor client retrieves the bids, analyzes and selects the one that best suits its 
criteria and places an order for the goods. It is expected that the above steps would be followed 
by either the contractor or supplier, and the TCB must ensure that the contractor retrieves only 
the call-to-tender it has advertised.
The above interactions give rise to some empirical deductions and understanding, which can be 
summarized as follows:
1. The interactions involve client initiators making a service request to protected 
services that require access control measures. The resource release is governed by 
access control rules that determine who does what and when. The owners of the 
resources may advertise their complete policies or subset of their policies and other 
obligating constraints.
2. Several assets of the actors are involved and may require privacy and 
confidentiality. These include conventional resources; participants' attribute 
information; meta-information; and contractual business level information.
3. The actors may not all share a common security domain, so trust establishment is a 
critical factor in the overall interactions, and is paramount to the security of the web 
services conversations.
4. An actor can place obligating constraints on a participating party, and should be 
able to say what it is able and willing to do for the other party.
5. The TCB is a service broker governed by an enforceable set of rules and 
procedures.
Figure 7.8 shows a simple Data-Flow Diagram (DFD) in the context of XACML distributed 
actors, and gives a detailed description of the flow of messages from one XACML actor to 
another. Here, the STS/AA replaces the PIP. The above understanding exposes the fact that the 
client initiator is scared to submit all attribute information pertaining to the request at one go, 
so it considers leaving out sensitive attribute information in the initial service invocation. In 
contrast, the service is unable to allow access to the initiator without the complete set of
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Figure 7.8 Data-Flow Diagram (XACML Distributed Context)
attributes that will satisfy the access rules. Decomposing the DFD, security vulnerabilities 12 
and threats can be identified particularly within the untrusted interactions. Outlined below is a 
summary of identified threats in the context of the use-case with respect to privacy and 
confidentiality.
Undesirable Information Disclosure: It may be desirable to restrict some calls-to-tender to 
certain groups of suppliers or consortia. The bids need to be kept secret until the close of the 
call; in this case, the suppliers' offers are vulnerable to undesirable exposure i.e. a supplier 
entity may require that its bid be handled with utmost confidentiality, and not disclosed to 
competitors before the close of the call. For example, a malicious contractor can retrieve a call- 
to-tender it did not publish, or a supplier may gain access to a competitor's offer. From the 
viewpoint of privacy principles, requirements that can be deduced from these scenarios include 
the notions of use limitation, choice/consent, etc.
Tampering: The tendering process may be vulnerable to unwarranted manipulation by 
malicious participants. A malicious contractor or supplier gains access to the published call-to- 
tender or bids and modifies them. In privacy terms, this is simply a data security issue.
12 Here, security vulnerabilities are considered purely in the context of the thesis; other inherent security 
vulnerabilities are assumed to have been dealt with in other related work.
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Repudiation: A malicious contractor or supplier performs an action that cannot be traced back 
to them i.e. a supplier makes a lower offer in order to win a bid, and later denies making the 
offer. Furthermore, a party obtains PII and discloses it to a third party which cannot be 
accounted for in the case of privacy breaches. From a privacy perspective, accountability 
principles relate to the repudiation security property, which implies or supports the earlier 
assumption of the need for remote enforcement of privacy obligations.
Elevation of Privileges: A malicious contractor or supplier performs actions it has no privilege 
to do, i.e. a contractor retrieves bids for a call it did not publish, or a supplier makes a bid that 
it is not qualified by default to bid for.
Privacy Support: A participant's attribute identity information or meta-information or business 
information, i.e. memberships of a consortium, price of goods, may be vulnerable to 
undesirable privacy threats. For example, a malicious party who has access to a supplier's 
profile can place unjustifiable restrictions on the supplier, which potentially excludes the 
supplier from making bids (discrimination threat mentioned in chapter 3). Information obtained 
legitimately by parties can be vulnerable to unwanted disclosure, misuse or abuse. The 
underlying privacy consequences have been dealt with in chapter 3.
Trust Context: The various participants require some sort of trust relationship to be established. 
The reliability of the different interactions depends on the form of the trust established and the 
ability of a recipient party to accept the claims made by a providing party. Since the process is 
brokered by a third party, it is potentially vulnerable to trust relationship breaches. The 
participants may have to rely on the assertions of a third party STS/AA on one hand, and a 
TCB on the other, as the basis of the trust. The degree of trust establishment that may be 
satisfactory in certain high-value transactions depends on the form of trust mechanisms 
available. The assurance that it will all happen within mutually and acceptable practices, is a 
major trust concern.
The analysis of the above in terms of security requirements exposes the fact that privacy 
protection is tightly associated with confidentiality and trust, and as such, requires that they be 
treated simultaneously. The causal findings complement the assumptions previously made 
concerning privacy and confidentiality. Often, confidentiality is used as a substitute for 
privacy, but it has been established that they are not identical, and it is important to accurately
differentiate them in order to identify the associated challenges and risks. Arguably, unlike
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confidentiality, privacy has contractual properties and obligations that are backed up by legal 
framework as well as FIPs. Moreover, this emphasises the need for privacy guarantees and 
enforcement of the guarantees when transactions span across autonomous security domains. 
This is supported by the earlier argument that a party that may have legitimate reasons for the 
possession of PII, and may as well store and use it subsequently without owner's knowledge 
and consent. This means that where there are no strong binding obligating constraints between 
communicating parties, privacy may be overly violated. Based on the above critical appraisal, 
outlined below are security requirements that can be deduced:
  The TCB should have a fine-grained access control to clear or screen requestors for 
security or reliability. The TCB must enforce appropriate policy rules and a 
statement of practices to be followed to ensure compliance with relevant security 
requirements. Doing this may require the combination of a TCB's site policy with 
the service owner's policies, i.e. a contractor's policy, to ensure that appropriate 
security preferences are enforced at runtime, whilst ensuring that the policy does 
not contradict or hinder the legitimate free flow of information.
  Participants may want confidentiality of their information. For example, a 
contractor entity may specify a pre-qualification a potential supplier must meet, in 
order to screen out some categories of acceptable suppliers by defining certain cut 
off criteria.
  Participants' privacy: the various participants' information requires privacy 
preservations. The supplier entity may place restrictions on what the contractor can 
do with its bids, e.g. validity of bids has the privacy characteristics of 'maximum 
retention period', such as the number of days a bid is valid for. Participants may 
have various service level agreements that require strong privacy bindings, i.e. 
disclosure to third parties, choice/consent before information can be used other than 
for the originally stated purpose.
Given the above security requirements, the exchange of some of this service meta-information 
between parties needs to be handled dynamically as business requirements are expected to 
change regularly. This strengthens the earlier argument that the trust provided by PKI may not 
be sufficient to guarantee the remote enforcement of privacy.
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7.6 Overview of Proposed Infrastructure
In traditional access control, the main actors can be described as the Initiator, the Gatekeeper, 
and the Target. Figure 7.9 depicts the symmetrical infrastructure showing the systems 
distributed components. The XACML Trust Management Infrastructure (XTMAI) in the 
diagram acts as the protected resource's gatekeeper; being symmetrical, each XTMAI can 
function at both ends whether in IdP or SP, to enable mutual interaction between them. The 
XTMAI component provides unified security in a common model allowing the XTMAI aware 
services to treat both privacy and confidentiality in a well understood manner. As earlier 
mentioned in this chapter, the authentication phase between the initiator and its local 
authentication service provides the initial trust context upon which higher level of trust can be 
built.
However, the means by which the initiator performs authentication at the local provider is 
outside the boundary of the present work, as existing authentication methods can be used. 
Nevertheless, from the trust establishment perspective, the authentication service must have an 
existing trust relationship or operate in the same runtime environment as the client's attribute 
provider. The initiator must use this as an entry point where privacy negotiation is an important
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Figure 7.9 The XTMAI Symmetric Infrastructure
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security requirement. Following this, an overview of the participants in the architecture is 
presented. The details of this XTMAI architecture are given in chapter 8.
7.6.1 Initiator
The initiator is an entity that kicks off the interaction, such as a human user or a software 
component; whichever is the case, the properties remain the same. The primary factor is that 
the initiator must obtain a trusted provable identity, or possess certain privileges or properties 
that form part of the access control decision information. The Initiator in this infrastructure can 
be seen from two entry modes: service request-response mode and trust negotiation request- 
response mode. The link between the two modes is the initial trust context used by the initiator 
in the service request-response entry mode. In practice, the service initiator has to provide an 
authentic trust context; as mentioned earlier, this may be obtained by authenticating with an 
appropriate authentication service trusted by the other entity.
7.6.2 The XTMAI
This is the gatekeeper entity that guards the Target based on the policy constraints made 
available to it. It handles all trust access control operations on behalf of the Target, using the 
available policy rules and other environment conditions. It has two modes, the service mode for 
service request-response, and a trust negotiation mode for privacy trust negotiation 
interactions. A trust context established in service request-response mode couples and 
synchronizes the two interactions.
7.6.3 Target
The Target is the assets and/or resources under guard. In figure 7.9, the Target in party A 
domain refers to the clients' attribute information, whilst in the party B domain, it refers to 
traditional resources plus other privacy sensitive business information.
Given the overview of the proposed infrastructure, it is crucial to take a look at the policy 
framework that will ultimately drive the privacy trust access control systems described by this 
thesis. The next section discusses such a policy framework.
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7.7 Access Control Policy Framework
The essence of access control management systems is to restrict access to a Target based on 
pre-defmed rules or policies. In effect, the policies guard the systems against unauthorized 
access and modifications, whilst ensuring their availability to users with provable claims. 
Enforcement of access control requires that all access to a system and its resources be governed 
by well defined rules, which describe the characteristics of the native actors, such as subjects, 
objects, and actions involved in the access control operations. Already there are a number of 
policy and meta languages, which can be utilized to specify access control rules [37, 151, 156, 
157].
In practice, there are two main parts fundamental to describing access control rules: separation 
of duties and least privilege principles. Whilst separation of duties deals with the notion of the 
distribution of tasks and associated privileges for particular business operations among 
multiple roles or users, least privilege principles address the aspect of granting no entity 
greater access to a Target than its job function demands. It is important that the access control 
language model provides a normative way to support the basic principles of privacy and 
confidentiality. Based on the threat model covered in this chapter, listed below are factors that 
rationalized the choice of a policy framework.
  Expressiveness: Support for privacy and confidentiality in one suite is a primary 
requirement considered by the thesis. Overviewed in chapter 4, existing access 
control systems overlook the simultaneous treatment of privacy and confidentiality. 
Thus, a language that naturally provides finer-grained access control rules to 
capture both privacy and confidentiality requirements is desirable.
  Extensibility: Business requirements can change as well as associated security 
requirements. A language that has several extensibility points, which can address a 
range of different use-cases, is advantageous.
  Semantics: To support interoperability across multiple independent platforms, a 
language that is rich in semantics is required for mutual understanding of a package 
of vocabularies. In access control operations that span autonomous security 
domains, it is important that what party A thinks party B will give to satisfy its
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requirements is indeed what party B released, and that party A will rightly interpret 
what party B released and vice-versa.
  Monotonicity: Monotonicity is an important characteristic of a trust negotiation 
policy language [158]. It is important that the language provides a normative way to 
enable incremental exchange of policies and credentials that satisfy them, in a 
manner that granting of additional privileges, if possible, should progress until 
negotiation succeeds or fails.
7.7.1 The Rationale for Choosing XACML
The factors considered in choosing a policy language are discussed above, and XACML 
happens to satisfy the essential requirements. The XACML policy model is generic, yet can be 
tailored to address many complex security rules through its broad capabilities and the ability to 
extend them. Outlined below is a summary of XACML's appropriateness:
  Distributed policy administration: The concept of PolicySet in which a set of 
policies can be combined at runtime into an effective applicable policy by using a 
suite of available combining algorithms is excellent for privacy and confidentiality. 
This empowers departmental policy authors with an organization to express policies 
for different applications, and at the same time have one super policy that controls 
all these other policies. As mentioned in chapter 1, there is a need to balance users' 
privacy preferences against the legitimate free flow of information. For instance, an 
enterprise or government can set an overriding policy to enforce the unhindered 
legitimate flow of information.
  Extensibility: As mentioned in chapter 4, in open and dynamic environments, 
security requirements can change significantly. XACML provides scalable points of 
extensibility, and has been extended in many instances [38, 149, 159].
  Interoperability: XACML is a powerful and flexible language, and has since been 
deployed in a wide range of application environments [128, 159, 160].
  Expressiveness: XACML is generic, yet can be used to express many kinds of 
security policies i.e. an administrative policy, privacy policy, a role-based policy, 
simple XML predicates, etc. It is a policy language that describes subjects,
128
resources, actions, and other environmental conditions using identifiers that can be 
mapped directly to primitive access control actors, allowing automated processing 
and enforcement of authorization decisions. It provides far-reaching support for 
defining variables, which can permit grouping of attributes, multiple roles, etc.
Taken together, the motivation for choosing this industry standardized model is an attempt to 
make this work adaptable in real-world applications with minimal effort. Moreover, its 
significant support for simultaneous treatment of privacy and confidentiality across 
autonomous security domains is essential and a critical success factor. The XACML model was 
exhaustively described and analyzed in chapter 6, but to make the proposed policy framework 
complete in context, the WS-XACML profile [149] will be discussed in the next section.
7.8 The WS-XACML Policy Profile
In a web service environment, a range of specifications have been defined for many aspects of 
Quality of Service (QoS) including WS-Reliability, Metadata, Transaction, Resource, 
Security, for the efficient deployment of web services. One such standard is Web Services 
Security [161], which is yet to address authorization and privacy issues to cover a wider scope 
of application environments. The WS-XACML profile draft [149] describes a formal way to 
utilize the XACML model between communication endpoints in web services environments. It 
specifies formats for four information message types:
  an authorization token or credential for carrying an authorization decision across 
realms,
  a policy assertion type that is based on XACML elements which can embed WS- 
Policy or other XML constructs,
  ways to wrap P3P policy preferences and match them using standard XACML 
evaluation engines, and
  XACML Attributes conveyed in SOAP Message Headers in such a way that they 
are provable and valid having been issued by a trusted authority.
In some cases, SPs will want potential requestors to know exactly what access requirements are 
needed in order to invoke their services. In other cases, a web service is unlikely to advertise
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the full access requirements, where such requirements could reveal important business 
information if given to arbitrary strangers. In a situation where privacy and confidentiality are 
security concerns, parties are unlikely to disclose their sensitive resources, without the 
assurance that their resources will be accorded security protection. But WS-XACML does not 
indicate how the assertion policies can be used in privacy negotiations or the means to strongly 
bind the assertions to the providing party. In chapter 8, the problem is addressed, using the 
Obligation of Trust protocol, which utilizes the capabilities of WS-XACML.
The WS-XACML profile only provides encoding schemes to describe the privacy and 
confidentiality concerns of enterprise resources and personal information in a symmetrical 
mutual manner. For example, a service that supports P3P policy can specify the privacy 
requirements associated with a given resource. A potential requestor may also have various 
privacy preferences. The requestor may need to ascertain whether the service is able to satisfy 
its security preferences with respect to a particular interaction, and if so, how the service 
intends to fulfill any obligating constraints. The profile describes a formal way for carrying 
XACML policies and/or other XML based security profiles between communicating parties.
7.9 WS-XACML Context
In many situations, a web service will not want to publish the full access requirements, but a 
subset, which can act as a first-level filter to minimize undesirable disclosure of sensitive 
information to arbitrary strangers. This fits into scenarios where an SP considers releasing the 
full access requirements in one-shot to unknown clients to be a business risk, but could 
incrementally make the access requirements known as more and more trust-levels are gained 
between it and the client. In fact in some situations, knowing the type of access control 
policies, and obligating constraints prior to service invocation, can allow parties to carefully 
calculate the risks associated with such interactions. A mutual agreement on acceptable policy 
variables or alternatives, and conveying that to a party in a tamper proof manner, can be an 
assurance that the other party's obligations are understood and can be respected.
In most of these situations, some web services may not have access to the authorization 
decision policies within the domain, or may simply be running within constrained 
environments (i.e. a mobile service provider may have less computing resources) where they 
are unable to run a Policy Decision Point (POP) engine. In such cases, the devices would rely
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on some trusted third party PDF to provide a signed authorization token to a requesting party, 
which indicates that the TTP has evaluated the requester's request against some access policies 
and certified that the request can be allowed. Additionally, in other cases, it could be that a web 
service or client would require a potential interacting party to activate a particular role, i.e. 
'Liberty Consortium Membership', 'certified ACCA accountant', etc. in order to interact. The 
client or service with the right privilege can request activation from the particular Role 
Activation Authority (RAA) prior to service interactions, and the relying party can then query 
the RAA to determine whether the role holder actually activated such a role. Where Privacy 
and confidentiality are considered highly important, parties may rely on the facilities of WS- 
XACL's Requirements and Capabilities to advertise their security preferences.
The WS-XACML Assertion Type is an abstract framework that describes an entity's Web 
Service's access control policy in the context of different policy domains, such as authorization 
or privacy domains. The name of the Assertion's element indicates the domain to which it 
applies, such as XACMLPrivacyAssertions for the privacy domain and XACMLAuthzAssertion 
for the authorization domain. The XACMLPrivacyAssertion deals with privacy specific 
Assertions, which can carry Requirements i.e. what the asserter requires of the other party, and 
Capabilities i.e. what the asserter is willing and able to do for the other party if its 
Requirements are satisfied. Figure 7.10 shows the WS-XACML model, which defines a 
XACMLAssertionAbstractType. This allows constraints on a policy vocabulary to be expressed 
as XACML Apply functions. The XACMLAssertionAbstractType contains two sets of 
constraints, as shown in figure 7.11. One instance of this type is the XACMLPrivacyAssertion, 
whose Capabilities element describes the Obligations that are being accepted and the 
information that will be provided. The Requirements element specifies the Obligations that the 
sender requires of the other party in order to proceed. In figure 7.10 the complete architecture 
of the profile and its subtypes are shown. Next, the descriptions of WS-XACML components 
are given below:
WS-XACML: Requirements
The Requirements node describes the information or behaviour that the policy owner requires 
from the other party in terms of a policy vocabulary. The XACMLAsserttionType that contains 
no Requirements element indicates that the entity advertising the assertion has no requirements
131
on the other party that it is willing to publish. This node contains other elements described as 
follows:
Vocabulary: The vocabulary node contains the identifier of a policy vocabulary: a set of policy 
variables or document schema containing policy related information. There may be more than 
one vocabulary instance in a Requirements node.
XACML Policy: This element describes a native XACML policy instance, which can specify 
requirements with respect to a policy target.
XACML Predicates: The element is a native XACML variable reference, usually expressed in 
terms of the Apply function. There may be any number of such Apply elements in a 
Requirements section.
WS-XACML: Capabilities
The Capabilities node describes the information or behaviour that the policy owner is willing 
and able to provide to the other party in terms of a policy vocabulary. In effect, it represents 
information the publishing entity is willing to release, or obligations the entity is able and 
willing to fulfill in typical web services interactions.
Vocabulary: The vocabulary node contains the identifier of a policy vocabulary, a set of policy 
variables or document schema containing policy related information.
7.10 XACMLAssertionType Scope
The WS-XACML assertion instance can be viewed from three dimensions as follows:
1 The XACMLAssertionAbstractType is defined with respect to policy vocabularies that are 
specified in the Requirements and Capabilities sections of the 
XACMLAssertionAbstractType. In processing the assertions, XACMLAssertionType 
SHALL apply only to those specified vocabularies.
2 The XACMLAssertionType is defined with respect to one or more specific policy targets. 
A XACMLAssertionType, when included in a WS-Policy instance, represents 
Requirements and Capabilities that apply to the targets of the WSP-Policy instance in
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which it appears. Other contexts in which a XACMLAssertionType is used shall specify 
how the policy targets associated with the XACMLAssertionType are determined.
3 The Capabilities expressed in a XACMLAssertionType are defined in conjunction with the 
Requirements in the same XACMLAssertionType.
The underlying scope that defines the vocabulary is significant in the processing of 
XACMLAssertionType, and two assertions must be of the same type before they can be 
compared and evaluated.
XACMLAbstractAssertionType
Requirements
Vocabulary
XACML Policy
XACML Predicates
Or
Capabilities
Vocabulary
Request Context
XACML Predicates 
XML document
> Or
Figure 7.11 XACMLAssertion Policy Structure
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Figure 7.10 WS-XACML XACMLAssertionAbstractType
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7.11 The P3P XACML Mapping
Section 5.8 described a P3P policy framework without mention of how it can be integrated 
with XACML, to extend its use in access control systems. The WS-XACML standard 
describes formal mechanics to enable a mapping of P3P policies into XACML, which can be 
matched and evaluated using XACML POP. In [149], the concept of XACML 
AttributeSelectors provides the technique for specifying constraints applicable to P3P where 
the RequestContextPath attribute can have a prefix value of "//P3P10/POLICES/", indicating 
that the policy instance refers to a P3P instance. Figure 7.12 is an example of the mapping 
between P3P and XACML. In this way, a communicating party can use P3P as the policy 
vocabulary for its Capabilities, to define PII that it is able and willing to release to a party, and 
can use P3P as the policy vocabulary for its Requirements, to describe its privacy preferences 
in terms of the usage of its released PII. This provides the mechanisms that allow both service 
provider and client to mutually negotiate for security and privacy preferences, using the 
capabilities of the W3C P3P policy framework already in place.
7.12 XTMAI Policy Framework
The XTMAI framework is a privacy trust authorization model infrastructure, developed by this 
work to intuitively and efficiently handle client-server privacy and confidentiality in a mutual 
manner. It empowers both client and server to perform security validation on each other before
<AppiyFunctionia="um;oaiis:names:tc:xacml:2.0Juncvon:xpath-expres5ion-subset">
<AnribuieSelec:orKeguestContextPmh*"//P3P10/POLICIES/POLlCY/STATEMENT/PURPOSe/-" 
DataType="(jrn:oafis:names:K:xacml.20:data-tvpe:xpath-expression"/>
<ApplyFunctionld="urn:oasis:namesicxacml20:function:xpath-expre55ion-bag">
<AnnbuteValueDataJype-"um:oasis.names:K:xacml:20:aata-type:xparh- 
expression">//P3P10/POUCIES/POUCY/STATEMENT/PUni>OSE/airrem</AttributeVa^e
<AttnbuteValueDtrtaType*"urn:oasis:names:tcxacml.20:clata-typf:xp(nh- 
expres5ion''>//P3nO/POLICIES/l>OUCY/STATEMENT/PUai>OSe/aamln</At1ributeValue>
<AtiributeValueDatttTvpe="urn.oaii5:names:tc:xaerTt:.2 0:data-type:xpath-
</Apply> 
</Apply>
Figure 7.12 WS-XACML - P3P Mapping 
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sharing sensitive information. To achieve this objective, the XTMAI framework makes use of 
two kinds of policies, namely:
  XACML policy rule: Purely for native XACML request decision evaluation;
  WS-XACML Assertion is an advertisement of policy assertions, usually to a remote 
party, which can be either a client or a server.
Even so, the two policy types require some kind of relationship between them, to link them up 
at runtime. Alternatively, the WS-XACML assertion policy can be constructed dynamically 
from the native XACML policy, but requires an efficient algorithm to do so. Figure 7.13 
depicts a typical relationship between a XACMLPrivacyAssertion policy element and a 
primitive XACML policy. In this case, the XACML policy is strictly for traditional resource 
control and the WS-XACML is for privacy protection and negotiations. The Apply element, 
which is a XACML predicate, must be semantically correct in both policy rules. In typical 
usage, the service includes the Apply element in the Requirements section of its WS-XACML 
assertion, which the client must satisfy, and then the service can express what it is willing and 
able to do for a client in the Capabilities section of the WS-XACML policy.
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Figure 7.13 XACML Policy and WS-XACML Assertion Relationship
7.13 Conclusion
This chapter described the conceptual design and development of the access control 
framework. The analysis of the XACML actors in a distributed environment, are critical to the 
understanding of how to use XACML to address the privacy problem. Equally, the 
investigation and understanding of the trust models are instrumental in determining how trust 
relationships can improve privacy assurance in distributed environments. The threat modelling 
and the security requirement analysis supplemented earlier assumptions about privacy and 
confidentiality, and significantly influenced the conceptualization of the XTMAI infrastructure. 
Overall the rationale for choosing XACML and WS-XACML as policy candidates for the 
framework resulted from the various analyses of the requirements for addressing privacy and 
confidentiality problems considered.
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Chapter 8. Obligation of Trust (OoT) Protocol
8.1 Introduction
So far, the general principles and conceptual framework that underline preserving privacy and 
confidentiality have been thoroughly examined and described, apart from remote enforcement 
of privacy. The basic concept is built upon the assumption that parties in distributed 
transactions have no means of enforcing obligating constraints placed on a remote party. In a 
traditional XACML model, an obligation is an action that should be performed by a PEP entity 
in conjunction with the enforcement of an access control decision. However, XACML 
describes an Obligation element as a set of attribute assignments, with an attribute FulFillOn 
which signifies whether the consuming PEP must fulfill the obligation if the access control 
decision is "Permit" or "Deny". When a PDP evaluates a policy containing obligations, it 
returns the access control decision and a set of obligations back to the PEP. However, in a 
distributed environment the service PEP is unlikely to be in the same security domain as the 
client. There is no guarantee that any obligations required by the client can either be 
incorporated into the policy used by the PDP, or even if they can, be enforced by the PEP. 
Given this, it makes sense to address the remote enforcement of obligations by allowing a 
service to convey back to the client an acceptance or rejection of their obligating constraints. 
The OoT protocol addresses this interaction.
In this chapter, the OoT protocol and its components are formally described. The encoding 
scheme and format describe the extension of a SAML request-response protocol schema, and 
how the WS-XACML assertion fits into the framework. Two trust negotiation strategies are 
described, which define the order and sequences of messages exchanged between negotiating 
parties plus the algorithm that implements the strategies. Additionally, the binding of the OoT 
protocol within the web services security environments in the SOAP header is described. 
Finally, the algorithms for matching two XACML assertions are presented.
8.1.1 The Formal OoT Protocol Definition
Obligation of Trust is a protocol that defines a standard mechanism enabling two or more 
communicating parties to exchange obligating constraints as well as proof of acceptance. The 
basic concept addresses the problem that a client currently has no means of enforcing
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obligations placed on a remote party. The protocol is divided into two steps: Notification of 
Obligation (NoB) (which may be signed or unsigned) and Signed Acceptance of Obligation 
(SAG) (which must be signed), and it is symmetrical. An initiating party sends a NoB outlining 
the obligating constraints it is placing on the other party, and the commitments it is willing to 
make if the other party accepts its obligations. The other party, after evaluation, sends back 
either a SAO of the constraints it accepts and the commitments it requires, or initiates more 
service negotiations with its own NoB, or rejects the request and terminates the session. 
Because the NoB and SAO are constructed using standard XACML policy constructs or XML 
documents, both communicating parties have a common language for expressing their 
requirements and commitments, and are able to feed these constraints directly into an 
appropriate decision engine and ensure their ultimate enforcement by their respective 
obligations services.
There are basically two ways the SAO can be constructed:
  The SAO can contain digitally signed Requirements and Capabilities of a party, 
signifying that this providing party is willing and able to provide the signed 
Capabilities if and only if the relying party satisfies the Requirements.
  Alternatively, the SAO can contain digitally signed Capabilities of the providing 
party and the Capabilities promised by the relying party. In this scheme, it indicates 
that the providing party agrees to release the Capabilities provided the relying party 
will reciprocate the same by releasing its own Capabilities.
The Obligation of Trust (OoT) defines a protocol for handling this important security aspect 
that allows the exchange of difficult-to-repudiate 13 information, and it is described in the 
following sections.
13 The term "difficult-to-repudiate" rather than non-repudiation is used since repudiation is a legal issue that has to 
be determined in a court of law. The technical constructs in the context of OoT should make it more difficult for 
an entity to repudiate their actions.
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Figure 8.1 is a sketch of the OoT protocol in operation, and shows how two parties may 
exchange signed components of the OoT. Party A wishes to access item X from party B, but it 
is assumed that party A knows nothing about the privacy or access control requirements for 
item X. Similarly, Party B knows nothing about the privacy requirements of Party A's 
attributes. Party A sends a request for item X and Party B responds with a NoB containing its 
Requirements and Capabilities. Figure 8.2 shows an outline of an algorithm for the decision 
making when a party receives a NoB. Party A checks whether it can satisfy Party B's 
Requirements, and whether party B's Capabilities can satisfy its own (party A's) 
Requirements. If Party B's Capabilities are acceptable and sufficient for Party A, and A can 
fully meet B's requirements, then A can send an SAG to B stating its pick of the offered 
Capabilities and its own Capabilities to meet party B's Requirements. If B's Capabilities are 
acceptable but not sufficient, or A has additional Requirements, A may send a counter NoB to
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— x I Request(X) without sufficient authorization informationQ [
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Figure 8.1 The OoT Protocol Sketch
B containing its additional or alternative Requirements. A's Requirements will determine the 
subset of B's Capabilities that it requires, and A may supplement them with additional ones of 
its own. A's Capabilities will include the subset of B's Requirements that it can provide, along
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with any additional ones it may be willing to provide. If Party B's Capabilities are insufficient 
for Party A, then A will either terminate the session or return a NoB with Requirements that 
supersede B's stated Capabilities. If A cannot meet all the stated requirements of B, then A 
may decide to terminate the session or add a reduced set of Capabilities to the NoB.
Party B evaluates party A's NoB and if satisfied with A's Capabilities and Requirements it 
returns a signed SAO stating in its Capabilities that it can fulfill all of party A's Requirements, 
and in its Requirements which of Party A's Capabilities it has chosen. If B is satisfied with A's 
Capabilities but not with A's Requirements, B may either send another NoB to A showing 
fewer Capabilities than A requires (along with its own Requirements), or terminate the session. 
If B is not satisfied with the Capabilities of A's NoB, it will either terminate the session or 
return a NoB with increased Requirements. If Party A receives another NoB, and this is 
satisfactory, it returns a signed SAO, otherwise it behaves as last time around. If Party A 
receives party B's SAO, and is satisfied with it, it returns its own signed SAO. Thus the parties 
continue to exchange NoBs until either party terminates the session (negotiated agreement is 
not possible) or returns a signed SAO. Once a signed SAO has been delivered, the recipient 
must either accept this by returning its own signed SAO or terminate the session. It is not 
allowed to return a NoB in response to a signed SAO, since this is in effect rejecting what one 
had previously offered in a prior protocol exchange. Once the negotiation is complete, and each 
party is in possession of the signed SAO of the other party, then Party A delivers the attribute 
values defined in Requirements B, and Party B delivers item X to A.
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Set flag initially to "SAG"
Evaluate received Requirements to determine whether I can meet them with my Capabilities
If so, construct offered Capabilities to match received Requirements
If not, either
terminate or
determine* whether additional Capabilities should be offered to match, and/or
construct Capabilities to match a subset of the received Requirements, plus additional alternative
Capabilities to be offered, and set flag to "NOB"
Analyse Capabilities to be offered by me (as determined above) and construct a revised list of (my)
Requirements.
Analyse sets of Capabilities received and compare with my list(s) of Requirements (as determined
above).
If all my Requirements are met from one set of offered capabilities, keep the above-defined
Requirements.
If all my Requirements are met from merged sets of offered Capabilities, construct Requirements
from these, set flag to "NOB"
If my Requirements are not met, either
terminate or
determine* whether Requirements can be relaxed due to alternative Capabilities being offered and
modify Requirements accordingly and set flag to "NOB"
If SAG flagged, send SAO, else send NOB.
(* "determine " could include the possibility to ask a human operator.)
Figure 8.2 Outline Algorithm for handling a NOB
In traditional trust negotiation, parties conduct bilateral negotiation based on challenge- 
response protocol in which in iteration, either a policy is released or a credential set to 
negotiate for service release. The OoT protocol reduces the amount of iteration in trust 
negotiation by combining the Requirements 14 (i.e. policies) and Capabilities^ (i.e. credential 
descriptions) in iteration. The order and sequence of what a party is able to release is generally 
termed its negotiation strategy in the literature [118]. The section that follows describes two 
strategies.
In the context of a traditional access control model, this is the policy or rules that govern access to protected14
resources.
15 Similarly, in traditional access control, these are the attributes expected to satisfy the access control policy 
governing the requested resources. In an XACML context, this is called the Request Context.
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8.1.2 GOT Negotiation Strategies
In traditional trust negotiation, a family of strategies determines the order and sequence of 
disclosure of policies and credentials. In [118, 162], a range of TN strategies are described to 
include eager, parsimonious, prudent, and hybrid strategies. The aim of using an interoperable 
strategy is to allow parties in negotiation to adopt a mutual order and sequence, which can 
make their negotiation, succeed whenever possible. In some cases, a negotiating party may not 
necessarily disclose credentials as demanded by a party, but instead, request that additional 
requirements be met by the party before disclosure of the requested credentials. The 
implication of not having a carefully crafted strategy is the possibility of recurring iterations. 
According to [163], properties of negotiation strategies include:
  a strategy which should advance in such a fashion that a deterministic outcome is 
reached, i.e. it should be complete;
  when success is impractical, failure should be gracefully communicated;
  a strategy which should optimize the iteration; justify the number of messages that 
have to flow in a typical negotiation session.
In the light of the above, descriptions of two strategies are given below along with their 
characteristics.
Parsimonious Strategy: Formally defined in [162], the parsimonious strategy characterizes 
trust requirement exchanges, which can advance to satisfying a specific trust goal. 
Theoretically, it kicks off by exchanging credential requests without the credentials, so that 
parties only exchange what has been unlocked by exploring all possible sequences of 
credentials that can be disclosed. The case here is slightly different because of the approach 
adopted. In this case, a party advertises its negotiation assertion that contains Requirements and 
Capabilities, which simplifies matters and makes the exchange more innovative. Recall that 
Requirements section contains constraints or rules the asserting party's recipient party must 
satisfy, and Capabilities that the asserting party is able and willing to do or release to another 
party if the requirements are satisfied. In this case, a party sends an SAG once a set of its 
capabilities can satisfy the asserting party's requirements on the one hand, and a set of the 
asserting party's capabilities can satisfy its local requirements on the other. In contrast, 
traditional trust negotiation sends either a credential or policy in iteration. However, the
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important thing to note about this strategy is that matching of the two alternate assertions must 
be TRUE, otherwise negotiation fails.
Persuasive Strategy: In some situations, either an asserting party's configured capabilities are 
insufficient to match a participant's requirements, or an asserting party's requirements are too 
great for a participant's capabilities. In this case the software might indicate to the recipient 
party that the participant's requirements are not covered by any of the asserting party's sets of 
capabilities. Theoretically, in this kind of situation, parties should be able to view the NoB 
request and possibly extend their capabilities or relax their requirements intuitively.
As an example, suppose a user has configured his Requirements' policy so that recipients are 
not to reveal the user's PII to third parties, but Service X offers very generous compensations or 
incentives (e.g. discount, 'buy one get one free', etc.) to Service C's users who are willing to 
sign up for X's new services. In this case, Service C could send the user a NoB containing a 
Requirement to provide permission for Service C to release their PII to Service X, in exchange 
for compensation. The user's agent does not have a Capability to match this Requirement, so 
the user's client software could display Service C's Requirement for the granting of permission 
to forward the PII to Service X, along with Service C's Capability to offer compensation to the 
user. If the user dynamically chooses to accept this contract, a new Capability is added to the 
user's set of policy assertions, for this and future use, and a signed SAO is sent to Service C.
The strategy that addresses the use-cases is referred to as a Persuasive Strategy, which can 
allow parties to refine their requirements and capabilities intuitively, if the initial sets were 
partially unsuccessful. In this arrangement, a party checks if any set of its capabilities can 
satisfy participant's requirements, and checks if the other party's capabilities can satisfy its 
local requirements. If there are mismatches, the party can refine its own assertion, by perhaps 
offering the participant some sets of alternative requirements or capabilities, as the case 
applies, to advance the negotiation.
Analyzing the two strategies, it is obvious that the parsimonious strategy is a naive approach, 
which causes negotiation to fail once disclosed Requirements and Capabilities cannot match 
the other party's. In contrast, the persuasive strategy attempts cautiously to offer options 
capable of advancing the negotiation by proposing alternative requirements and capabilities. 
The benefit of the parsimonious strategy is its tight coupling to minimal disclosure principles;
only the capabilities that can satisfy the participant's requirements are also included in the
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assertions and the minimal requirements that the other party's capabilities are likely to satisfy 
are included in the assertions. This scheme is suitable for simple cases where either party has 
no hidden requirements or rules that a party must unlock by a previous interaction.
It is important to mention that privacy trust negotiation, as described in this work, is a 
significant deviation from traditional TN, in the sense that a party discloses Requirements that 
contain constraints the participant must satisfy and Capabilities that contain what he is able and 
willing to do for the other party if its Requirements can be satisfied in a single iteration, which 
potentially reduces the number of iterations in a typical TN session. In sum, the concept of 
advertising a complete set of Requirements and Capabilities, by parties in business 
transactions, is plausible; it enables them to calculate the risk they may be exposed to before 
sharing sensitive information.
8.1.3 OoT Encoding Scheme
Using the built-in extensibility mechanism of WS-XACML and SAML Assertions, it is 
convenient to encode the components of the OoT as extensions of standard elements of a 
SAML request/response protocol. The NoB can be expressed as an instance of a 
XACMLPrivacyAssertion in which the desired obligating constraints are placed in the 
Requirements section of an assertion, and any obligations that the sender is willing and able to 
fulfill in the Capabilities section. The SAO can be expressed as an instance of a 
XACMLPrivacyAssertion, in which the Requirements section specifies the sender's 
understanding of what the recipient has committed to do, and the Capabilities section specifies 
the obligations that the sender has committed to undertake. In the privacy domain, these 
elements can be used to describe either the acceptable (Requirements) or supported 
(Capabilities) containing P3P policy constructs, also described in chapter 6. For example, if a 
recipient will only use the sender's sensitive information for the "current" transaction and 
"admin" purposes, and the information is only for the designated recipient, this can be sent as a 
P3P policy STATEMENT of PURPOSE expressed as a WS-XACML constraint. Figure 8.3 
shows the basic structure of the OoT scheme; the schema is available at [164] and documented 
in appendix A. The schema defined new SAML Request and Statement message protocol 
types, which are described below:
ObligationOfTrustQuery: This container encapsulates one or more XACMLPrivacyAssertions
that contain Requirements and Capabilities as a Notification of Obligation a party wishes to
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convey to another party in a privacy aware transactions.
ObligationOJTrustStatement: This container encapsulates & XACMLPrivacy'Assertion that holds 
Requirements and Capabilities as a Signed Acceptance of Obligation a party wishes to convey 
to another party in privacy aware transactions.
SAML ObliagtionOfTrust
XACMLPrivacy Assertion
Requirements
What asserter requires 
of the other party
What asserter is willing 
and able to do for other 
party, if Requirements are 
satified
Issuer 
Timestamp: 
ValidityPeriod: 
Signature
XACMLAssertionType
XACML Policy 
Or
AND(sequence of 
XACML predicates)
XACML Request
Or
(sequence of XACML
predicates
OrXML Documents)
Signature 
Component
Figure 8.3 SAML Obligation of Trust Model
Both elements contain attributes the values of which describe some characteristics of the 
negotiation including:
  ootID: This attribute uniquely identifies a particular OoT context message, which 
can be referenced subsequently in the negotiation.
  InResponseTo: This attribute identifies whether the message communicated to a 
party is in response to a previous OoT context sent by the recipient party. For 
instance, an SAO response can be because of NoB or SAO context; since each 
message context is uniquely identified, it makes sense to let the communicating 
parties identify whether a message is a response or a fresh message context.
  Issuerlnstant: This attribute relates to the instance at which the OoT context was 
issued.
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The OoT protocol defined in the section above logically makes use of the set of assertions at 
different stages of the privacy negotiations. The WS-XACML privacy negotiation assertions 
can be constructed dynamically from the XACML policy or retrieved from a static location. 
When constructed dynamically, they will depend on the prevailing outcome of a previous 
negotiation state. Intuitively, the combination of XACML and SAML in the WS-XACML 
profile provides flexibility in the handling of an access control process that is complex in 
nature, whilst assuring respect for the communication party's privacy. This permits the 
combination of different autonomous policies into one applicable policy at runtime, which is 
fundamental to an enterprise-wide security policy administration. In particular, its core 
properties make it more suitable for simultaneous treatment of privacy and confidentiality in 
distributed environments. For example, the European Union [28] privacy directive requires that 
adequate provision be made for the free flow of information, meaning that an individual cannot 
use privacy to inhibit the legitimate flow of information. In this case, it is realistic to combine 
the organization's specific privacy policy, departmental privacy policy and user's privacy 
policy in controlling access to the user's attribute information.
Lastly, it is important to note that autonomous security domains control access to their 
resources, based on their specific domain security requirements, and administration. Thus, the 
combination of XACML, SAML and OoT provides the interface that seamlessly allows 
communicating participants to share attribute information in a more friendly privacy manner.
8.1.4 SAML OoT SOAP Binding Profile
The SOAP model provides "extensibility" points that allow other messaging protocols to be 
layered on top of it in a standard way. This convenient flexibility provides a rich mechanism 
for layering the OoT protocol with other existing security schemes. The Web Services security 
(WS-Security) is a set of specifications that describe the means for providing various types of 
security protection over SOAP payloads. Whilst WS-Security has defined SOAP profiles for 
authentication, data integrity and data confidentiality at the messaging layer, WS-XACML 
assertion aspects have not yet been addressed to cater for privacy as described in this work. 
There is a need to describe a standard way to use the WS-XACML profile to address mutual 
privacy and confidentiality in Web services scenarios.
On the basis of the above, a SOAP binding profile for the OoT exchanges is defined. This is
expected to provide an appropriate mechanism to ensure that independently implemented
146
compliant OoT systems can interoperate using standard messaging protocols. The existing 
<wsse:security> container in the SOAP header provides this natural way to carry the OoT 
message payload, as depicted in figure 8.4. One noteworthy benefit is that other existing 
security profiles can coexist with the OoT mechanism, which further supplements existing 
security services other than those addressed by the OoT technique. Shown in figure 8.4 is the 
complete logical structure of the OoT SOAP binding plus other individual components.
ENV:SOAP
SOAP Header
WSSEiSecurity
OblfgationOfTnistQuery
SAMLAssertion
XACMLPrivacyAssertiion
Requirements
XACML Policy
Capabilities
XACML predicate
Signature 
SAML options
SOAP Body
Figure 8.4 SAML OoT SOAP Binding Profile
8.2 XACMLAssertionType Matching and Evaluation
The comparison and matching of XACMLAssertionType are crucial aspects of the processing of 
privacy and confidentiality decisions. The purposes are to determine assertions' compatibility, 
and if so, which Requirements and Capabilities have common characteristics that can facilitate 
privacy negotiation and decision making. The matching phase is carried out by computing the 
intersection of the Requirements in foreign XACMLAssertionType with the Capabilities in the 
local XACMLAssertionType, which in effect can result in a new XACMLAssertionType. This 
new assertion may contain in its Requirements the interception of the original Requirements 
with the original Capabilities of the local XACMLAssertionType, and containing in its
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Capabilities the intersection of the original Capabilities with the original Requirements of the 
foreign XACMLAssertionType.
Figure 8.5 illustrates the concept of matching two WS-XACML policies between a client and 
service in a typical negotiation interaction. Essentially, the outcome describes one or more 
instances of the requirements vocabulary that the owner of the assertion can expect from the 
other participating entity in the context of a policy Target. Similarly, the resulting Capabilities
XACMLAssertionType XACMLAssertionType
r .- 
iv-
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i~ '''
Client's Requirements
what client requires of 
service
Client's Capabilities
what client is willing and 
able to do for service if 
conditions in 
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Service's Requirements
What service requires of 
the client
Service's Capabilities
What service is willing and
able to do for the client if
conditions in
Requirements
are met
Client
Service
Figure 8.5 Matching of Two WS-XACML Assertion Types
express one or more instances of the capabilities vocabulary, which the assertion owner can 
supply to the participating entity in the context of a policy Target. Thus an 
XACMLAssertionType, when evaluated as TRUE, indicates that the assertion is satisfied; and 
this is applicable, if and only if all the Requirements in the assertion evaluate as TRUE against 
an actual set of values for an instance of an associated policy target, otherwise it evaluates as 
FALSE, which indicates that the assertions were not satisfied. The rules and match algorithms 
for matching two compatible XACMLAssertionTypes are shown in appendix B and are adapted 
from [165].
8.3 The OoT Processing
The OoT negotiation message exchange can result in any of the four types of messages, 
namely: NoB encapsulated in ObligationOfTrustQuery, SAG contained in 
ObligationOJTrustStatement, and SAML AttributeStatement, also contained in
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ObligationOjTrustStatement or in a Fault. Only one instance of the three types MUST be in the 
inbound or outbound OoT in a SOAP Header message context. According to the binding 
profile described in section 8.1.4, the OoT message is contained within the <wsse:Security> of 
the SOAP headers, and when included, MUST be processed by the recipient. The processing of 
the OoT context must conform to the required verification and validation rules defined in the 
SAML specification [153]. However, the processing of the OoT context further depends on the 
type of context.
8.3.1 Signing of the OoT Context
The rules applicable to signing the elements of <wsse:Security> capable of carrying a 
signature compliant with the XML signature standard within SOAP header block shall be 
observed when signing any part of the OoT context, particularly an SAG that MUST be signed 
[161]. In practice, it is expected that all message exchanges between two OoT parties shall be 
signed to ensure integrity, but particular attention is paid to the SAO, since it is devised to 
provide the mechanism for privacy assurance as a proof of acceptance of obligating 
constraints.
8.3.2 The Signing Key
There is usually a serious concern about the cryptographic key used in the production of a 
signature object; the signing key must be trusted by the relying party to belong to the subject 
presenting the SAO. Thus, the subject or the asserting party must be established by some 
mechanism, so that the relying party can be sure the entity is associated with the signing key. 
The PKI provides the mechanism that can establish or confirm that the asserting party 
possesses the signing key, but this requires that the parties must be PKI enabled, and obviously 
may require expensive processing of a trust path. The SAML standard defined two profiles for 
confirming a subject and can be used here.
Sender Vouches
In this profile, the attesting party, (presumed to be) distinct from the subject or negotiator, 
intends to vouch for the validity of the subject's attribute, such as the public key component of 
the subject. In order for the recipient to validate this claim, it must have an out-of-band existing 
trust relationship with the attesting party. The details of the Sender-vouches subject
confirmation method are described in [161], with which both the attesting and receiver party
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must comply.
Holder-of-Key
In this profile, the attesting party, (presumed to be) the subject, includes an XML signature 
object that can be validated with the key information in the <saml:ConfirmationMethod> of the 
SAML assertion, and referenced for keylnfo by the Signature. Usually, the attesting party uses 
the holder-of-key confirmation method to express that it is acting as the subject of the SAML 
assertion containing the holder-of-key <saml:SubjectConfirmation> element. Again, the details 
of the holder-of-key subject confirmation method and processing are defined in [161]. In this 
scheme, since there is no out-of-band trust relationship, the subject must show sufficient 
knowledge of the confirmation key, by using the confirmation key to sign content within the 
message context, and the results must be included in <ds:Signature> element as specified in 
[161].
8.3.3 OoT Security Timestamps
The OoT message container contains an Issuelnstant attribute which is employed to express the 
creation time of the security semantics in an OoT message context. What it does not contain is 
the expiration time requiring this to be done by application specific runtime policies. An 
alternative approach is to make use of the <wsu>Timestamp> element described in [161] to 
provide the timestamp service.
8.3.4 Processing of Notification of Obligation
According to the OoT schema definition, the ObligationOfTrustQuery instance can contain one 
or more instances of XACMLPrivacyAssertion that hold Requirements(R) and Capabilities (C). 
Similarly, the local XACMLPrivacyAssertion must have the same semantic structure and 
vocabulary. To differentiate the two assertions, the following notations apply.
  Let RF = Foreign Requirements contained in the incoming NoB assertion; 
" CF = Foreign Capabilities contained in the incoming assertion;
  RL = Local Requirements contained in the local assertion;
  CL = Local Capabilities contained in the local assertion.
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Figure 8.6 shows a NoB decision table detailing the possible combinations and the outcomes. 
In processing a NoB context, a check MUST be done to determine whether the context is in 
response to a previous NoB, or a fresh NoB. This is done by checking the InResponseTo 
attribute; which when empty means that the particular NoB has no previous context, and as 
such must be treated as a first NoB. Whereas, if the InResponseTo attribute is not empty, it
CL >= RF
CF >= RL
Can construct CL to match RF
Provider can construct C F to match RL
Indeterminate
Terminate
Send SAO
Send NoB
Send NoB with new Req or Cap
Send indeterminate
Human intervention
Y Y Y N
Y U N Y
Y
Y N
Y
X
X
X
X
X
N
Y
N
X
N
N
Y
Y
X
N
N
N
X
N
N
N
X
Y = yes, N= no, U= indeterminate, X=outcome
Figure 8.6 NOB Decision Table
means that the NoB is in response to an NoB previously sent by the recipient and is identified 
by the InResponseTo attribute value. The party receiving this MUST check the value against 
its session management mechanism that it generated in the earlier NoB, to which the reference 
is made.
However, in negotiation, two negotiation parties must adopt the same negotiation strategy 
described above for their negotiation to succeed or fail gracefully.
Note the SAO is sent once a party is happy with the sets of Requirements and Capabilities and 
doesn't wish to send another NoB. Once this is the case, the party MUST sign the SAO, and it 
expects the recipient party to reciprocate with its SAO.
8.3.5 Processing of Signed Acceptance of Obligation
The SAO context is a signed OoT context that contains one instance of 
XACMLPrivacyAssertion which MUST be verified and validated to ensure it has not been
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tampered with or arrived corrupted, and then logged to preserve the acceptance as too-difficult- 
to-repudiate technical evidence in the case of privacy breaches. The generation and processing 
of SAO must follow the same rules described in[161] for processing an XML digital signature 
compliant. Figure 8.7 depicts a SAO decision table. There are two cases in which to generate a 
SAO context; either when a foreign assertion is compatible with a local assertion [S(M) = 
C(M)] or a fresh SAO is received in response to the processing party's previous SAO. In which 
case the table shows the message that MUST be in the OoT response context.
S(M)= C(M) 
Received SAO
Send SAO 
Send unlocked Attributes 
Send indeterminate
Y 
Y
Y 
N
N 
Y
N 
N
X
X
X X
Y = yes, N= no, X=outcome 
Figure 8.7 SAO Decision Table
8.3.6 Processing of AttributeStatement
The processing of the OoT AttributeStatement MUST adhere to the processing rules specified 
in [153] in the first place, and subsequently the attribute values should be passed back to the 
component that consumes the attribute information. Usually, the attribute information shall be 
passed to XACML PDF via its ContextHandler to enable it to complete the access control 
decision.
8.3.7 Processing of a Fault
Standard SOAP error conventions MUST be taken into account. Errors as a result of OoT 
processing MUST be handled using a special container <NegotiationState>, and included in the 
SOAP body.
8.4 Conclusion
This chapter described the core concepts underlying the OoT protocol, WS-XACML construct, 
and matching and evaluation of alternate privacy assertions. Remote enforcement of privacy 
obligations is a critical requirement for privacy assurance, expected to enhance communicating
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parties' confidence that their sensitive information will be treated in a manner that respects 
their privacy. Although XACML defined a standard Obligation element with a set of attribute 
assignments, so that a consuming PEP can fulfill the obligations in conjunction with the 
enforcement of access control decision, the obligations do not actually reflect the client's 
privacy obligations.
The concept of the OoT model addresses this problem by enabling both the service and client 
to convey privacy obligating constraints and an acceptance or rejection of the constraints in a 
standard way. The privacy assertion encoding scheme, SOAP Binding profile for the OoT 
context, and sketch of the algorithms for processing the OoT message context have been 
provided. Although the OoT protocol is a significant development in addressing the remote 
enforcement of privacy and confidentiality guarantees, the formal verification of the protocol 
and algorithms would require a separate study and has been suggested for future work.
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Chapter 9. Implementation of an XACML Trust Management
Infrastructure (XTMAI)
9.1 Introduction
Henver et al [52] stated that "design research addresses research through the building and 
evaluation of artefacts designed to meet the identified business need". So far, the underlying 
conceptual elements underpinning this work have been described in the previous chapters, 
particularly chapters 7 and 8. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the software 
implementation of the resultant technical framework in Java programming language as a proof 
of concept. In practical terms, the resulting software is expected to address the privacy and 
confidentiality concerns already identified in the previous chapters. That is, the sharing of 
information between access control systems without compromising the confidentiality and 
privacy of personal information. The software design rely on object-oriented(OO) 
programming features, and it is divided into packages and classes using proven OO design 
strategies [166, 167], such as. AbstractBuilder, AbstractFactory patterns, etc. The XTMAI 
model makes use of two types of policies:
  Native XACML policy based on XACML version 2.0;
  XACMLPrivacyAssertion based on WS-XACML.
The policy framework that defines the rules governing the protection of privacy and 
confidentiality is structurally complex; as such, it requires a careful design strategy to abstract 
the complex operations, and the encapsulation of the various functionalities. This is 
implemented using the builder design pattern [166], and a UML class diagram that models the 
participating components. It is essential to mention here that whilst the native XACML policy 
can be made static, XACMLPrivacyAssertion will most frequently be constructed dynamically 
based on the underlying privacy negotiation requirements. Additionally, 
XACMLPrivacyAssertion can be constructed from pure XML constructs or derived from a P3P 
policy mapping to XACML at runtime.
This chapter focuses on the implementation of the software system supporting the XTMAI 
model, describes the software architecture, and the core APIs, especially the SunXACML
[168], which provided many of the access control functionalities. In addition, the various UML
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class diagrams of the core XTMAI modules are then presented, with a description of their basic 
features. Lastly, how XTMAI works is described as well as the technical validation of it.
9.2 Overview of System Infrastructure
Figure 9.1 depicts the XTMAI stack showing the core supporting APIs. Since the infrastructure 
is symmetrical, it requires that communication participants i.e. party A and B in a privacy 
aware environment should have identical software at both communication endpoints. The core 
supporting APIs provided the abstract functionalities upon which specific business logic was 
constructed. In particular, the SunXACML API package is significant and central to the 
software implementation.
Party A Party B
XTMAI
CpreOAVAAPl
Figure 9.1 The XTMAI Framework Stack
9.2.1 SunXACML API.
The SunXACML API is a well-documented open source implementation of the XACML 
standard, which provides an extensive suite of Libraries to facilitate XACML compliant 
application development, and it helps developers to concentrate on business logic concerning 
access control operations. The following section overviews the main components of the API.
com.sun.xacml is the key package, which contains the core XACML components and logic for 
matching and evaluating policy and PolicySet. In addition, it contains the POP class used for
the processing of access control decisions.
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com.sun.xacml.attr supports all the standard XACML attribute data types including 
designators, selectors, and the necessary base Factory objects to allow for the creation of new 
attribute types and values.
com.sun.xacml.combine is the package that contains all the standard combining algorithms, 
interfaces for building new ones, and the base Factory objects for extending the algorithms.
com.sun.xacml.cond is the package that provides standard conditions and functional logic. It 
also includes standard interfaces and classes for building new functions.
com.sun.xacml.funder offers support for locating attributes required by the PDF, such as 
finding applicable policies, looking for attributes not supplied by the request, resolving 
resource identifiers, as well as a set of classes that extends the usage of this package.
com.sun.xacml.ctx describes the XACML context types defined in the context schema, such as 
the request and response formats. It provides both encode and parse functionalities to enable 
XACML components to communicate with one another.
As depicted in Figure 9.3, the XACML POP, and PEP modules are vital components of the 
architecture. The SunXACML API provides an extensible point for extending the modules to 
solve specific business problems. In particular, the PEP and AFM entities are specific to 
application domains; and they offer a platform for the integration of the XACML into a 
particular application service.
9.2.2 Java API for XML-Based Web Services (JAX-WS)
JAX-WS is an extensive pluggable framework, and an important segment of the Java EE 5 
platform [169]. The Java EE is designed essentially for implementing enterprise-class SOA and 
emerging web technologies. JAX-WS provides the mechanics for writing XML-based web 
services, i.e. SOAP messages aimed at simplifying the task of developing web-base software 
using Java technology. It provides support for multiple protocols such as SOAP 1.1, SOAP 1.2, 
and other XML constructs. This API is used here for service layer integration, as well as 
handling the negotiation protocol based on SOAP headers capabilities. Readers interested in 
this API should visit the community website [170]. Figure 9.2 depicts the JAX-WS Service- 
Client architecture in the context of a SOAP message exchange between a client and a service.
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Figure 9.2 JAX-WS Service-Client Architecture
9.2.3 The SAML API
The SAML API contains base libraries that support the implementation of the SAML assertion 
related security services used by the infrastructure. Here, the SAML API is provided by Sun's 
Access Manager SAML API release. The API supports most of the SAML version 2 
specifications, but it is used in this work for the signing and validation of assertions, since the 
request-response message exchange is implemented as part of the OoT protocols.
9.3 The XTMAI Architecture
Figure 9.3 shows the core XTMAI architecture, and depicts two modes of interactions: service 
request/response and trust negotiation (TN) modes. The service request mode handles service 
request/response messages, and can support any Internet application Protocol or standalone 
clients. The TN mode is a backchannel that allows both XTMAI compliant systems to engage 
in privacy negotiation that will result in final access control decisions. To protect privacy, it is 
assumed that the initial service request context will contain a provable token obtained during 
the authentication phase that describes among others, the subject attributes in a native XACML 
request context, which a XACML PEP can pass to the PDP. It is important to mention that the 
token (usually an opaque handle) is critical to the trust negotiation phase between the two 
XTMAI compliant systems. It provides the initial mutual authentication, which establishes the 
trust context upon which subsequent high-level trust is built. In order to use the handle in the 
XACML request context, it should be mapped into the subject attribute of the XACML request 
context. The significant thing is that this initial token should be linked to the initiator's
attribute information by its authentication service, and passed to the initiator's XTMAI so that
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when the other privacy negotiating party sends an OoT message context to the initiator's 
XTMAI, it can associate the request with a particular initiator. This establishes the basis to use 
the initiator's privacy assertions to negotiate with the other party.
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Figure 9.3 The XTMAI Architecture
9.3.1 Service Interface Handler (SIH)
The Service Interface Handler (SIH) is an application specific security handler, which works 
together with the TNH and XACML PEP modules. Its purpose is to support other application 
layer protocols such as HTTP, FTP; SMTP, etc in a pluggable manner. In this implementation, 
the JAX-WS handler framework [170] [171] are utilized for pre-processing of inbound and 
outbound SOAP messages, such as security information contained in SOAP message headers. 
From the viewpoint of the SOAP message processing, the idea is to process security related 
information before processing other parts of the request by the endpoint. In JAX-WS API, two 
types of handlers: protocol (or SOAP) and logical are defined. The difference between the two 
is that protocol handlers are specific to a protocol, and can manipulate any part of the message, 
i.e. message header, whilst logical handlers are protocol-agnostic, they can modify only the 
body part of the message context. Figure 9.4 depicts the handlers and their logical workflow.
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and illustrates how both handlers can access and modify a part of a message context. The 
diagram demonstrates the coherent processing of the handlers in the context of service-client 
interactions. From the client's perspective, in an outbound message context, the logical 
handlers are processed before the protocol handlers. Conversely, in the inbound mode, the 
protocol handlers are processed before the logical handlers. The case is similar from the 
service's perspective. Figure 9.5 depicts the part each handler can access and modify in the 
SOAP message context. The protocol handler is specifically used in the implementation of the 
PEP and the TNH modules respectively, to handle the processing of security related 
information within the SOAP Header container in order to determine whether access can be 
allowed to a protected target.
Logical SOAP 
Handlers Handlers
JAX-VU5
SOAP Logical 
HapdUrs Handlws
Runtime _ _
Network
JAX'WS
Runtime
Figure 9.4 SOAP handlers Interaction in Service -Client Request- Response [170]
Figure 9.5 SOAP Message Context [170]
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9.3.2 XACML PEP
The PEP is an application specific component that intercepts access requests, where 
appropriate, asks the POP for an access control decision based on the attribute information 
made available to it, and then enforces the decision passed back by the POP. In many access 
control paradigms, the PEP serves as a gatekeeper to the protected resources or targets. This 
implies that the access filtering logic and session management be implemented at the PEP as 
described in chapter 7. This requires intercepting all incoming requests directed to the 
protected Target, which should also determine whether access control is required 16 . The PEP 
interacts with the POP based on the Context Handler, which encodes the request-response 
contexts in a manner that both can understand. Figure 9.6 shows the UML Class diagram and 
classes that participate in the XACML PEP Module. The following section briefly describes 
the object classes.
MessageContext Class
This is a core JAX-WS API class which abstracts the SOAP message context, and provides
convenient abstract methods for the processing of a SOAP message context.
XTMAIBaseSOAPHandler Class
This is a base class that extends MessageContext class, and defines a type-safe attributes for the
message context. The core methods defined in this class are briefly described as follows:
  The initHandler() method, which has @postConstruct annotation and it is invoked 
to initialize a set of parameters just prior to calling any message context processing 
method.
  The destroyO method that is called for the destruction of handler instances, which 
cleans up computing resources used during the handler operation.
  The handleFaultQ method that is invoked for fault message processing.
  The close () method that is invoked at the completion of a message exchange pattern 
before the JAX-WS runtime dispatches a message, a fault or an exception.
16 This applies in the case where the access control decision state is kept for sometimes to avoid asking an already 
authorized user to resubmit context decision information.
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  The setHandlerNameQ method that is called to set the name of a specific handler 
service.
SOAPHandler Class
The SOAPHandler is a core JAX-WS class, which defines a type-safe attributes for protocol 
handlers, and provides convenient mechanisms to operate on the SOAP message for either the 
request or response context. The methods defined in this class provide the functionalities that 
are used to operate on the SOAP header by the concrete handler service implementation.
XACMLPEPHandler
The XACMLPEPHandler is the concrete implementation of the handler service. It extends the
features of the XTMAIBaseSOAPHandler and SOAPHandler classes, and implements methods
MessageContext
Operation 
public MessageContextf )
XTAMIBaseSOAPHandler
Attribata
Operations
public void initHandler( )
public void destroy! )
public void handleFault(Tmc)
public void close! T me)
public void setHandlerName( String name )
public XTAMIBaseSOAPHandler( )
XACMLPEPHandler
Attributes
Operations
public XACMLPEPHandM ) 
public void initHandlerf ) 
public void destroy! ) 
public void handleFault(Tmc) 
public void close( T me) 
protected void setHandlerName( String name) 
public boolean handleMessage( SOAPMessage msg) 
public Set<QName> getHeaders( ) 
public void printMessage( SOAPMessage msg) 
private ResponseCbc evaluateRequestf RequestCtx reqCtx) 
private boolean isAllowd( ResponseCtx resCtx) 
private RequestCtx getXACMLContext( SOAPMessage msg)
Figure 9.6 XACML PEP Module UML Class Diagram
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that are used in message context processing. Many of the methods defined in this class are 
already described above. The two important methods that are central to the processing of the 
message context are described below.
  The handleMessage() is a method that handles the SOAP Message Context, and 
using the in-built MESSAGE_OUTBOUND_PROPERTY, it can determine 
whether a message context is inbound or outbound, and then processes the message 
appropriately based on the context type. In processing a message context, it invokes 
the evaluateRequestQ method, passing the XACML request context object, which is 
extracted from the inbound message context contained in the SOAP header 
container.
  The evaluateRequestf) is a method that processes the XACML request context by 
sending a decision request to the XACML POP module, which returns a XACML 
decision response context object. The response context object is then passed to the 
isAllowedQ method, which interprets the decision response to determine whether 
the PEP should allow access or not.
9.3.3 XACML PDF
The XACML POP is the access control decision engine that makes its decision based on the 
local policy against the request context passed onto it. One of the core features of the POP is 
the ability to find the correct policies and attributes that apply to a specific request. The POP 
typically uses the information contained in the request context to locate the appropriate access 
control decision information to use. In some cases, some of the request context attributes are 
missing; then, the PDP naturally invokes one or more PIPs in order to locate and retrieve the 
missing attributes. This particular feature is what makes XACML ideal for privacy 
negotiations. In this implementation, the Attribute Finder Module (AFM) provides the interface 
between the XACML PDP and PIP components. The PIP in this case may be an AA or 
IdP/STS where the client is originally authenticated before web service invocation. The 
XACML PDP module in this implementation is an extension of the SunXACML PDP engine.
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9.3.4 Attribute Finder Module (AFM)
The SunXACML API provides suitable mechanisms that help the POP to find missing context 
information (attributes) during policy evaluation. The concept of the Attribute Finder Module 
(AFM) is one such convenient service, which aids in the location of missing context 
information. The POP calls this service through the Context Handler whenever it cannot find 
sufficient information to process a request. Usually, either the missing information is defined in 
the Rule Target or Condition instance; then, using the notion of AttributeDesignator, described 
in the local policy, search is performed through the runtime Finder Module instances 
configured with the XACML PDP engine during setup. Doing this requires that sufficient 
information be passed to the AFM module to enable it know where to ask for the missing 
attributes. These features are critical to the launching of the privacy negotiations using the 
combined OoT protocol discussed in chapter 8. Figure 9.7 shows the AFM UML class diagram 
and the participating object classes. The following section describes the main classes.
AFMWSClient Class
The AFMWSClient is an interface that abstracts the JAX-WS client instantiation, which
provides support for the dynamic invocation of another XTMAI service endpoint.
AttributeFinderModule Class
The AttributeFinderModule is an abstract base class of the SunXACML API, which provides a
support for locating and retrieving of missing information in XACML request context.
AttributeFinderModule Imp Class
The AttributeFinderModulelmp class is derived from the AttributeFinderModule class, and 
implements the methods that provide the context attribute finding features. The implemented 
methods are those defined in SunXACML AFM class.
AFMProxy Class
The AFMProxy is the web service client implementation, which initiates interaction with 
another XTMAI aware service by invoking the TNH module. The TNH handles the actual 
negotiations between communicating parties, and returns a response to the AFMProxy, which 
is then passed back to the XACML PDP to complete the access control decision process.
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9.3.5 Trust Negotiation Handler (TNH) Module
The TNH manages the ordering and sequencing of privacy negotiations during OoT protocol 
message exchange. It intercepts an inbound message, determines the type of OoT message
AttributeFinderModule
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public boolean isDesignstorSupported( )
public Set getSupportedDe>ignatorType( J
public Set getSupportedldif )
public EwluationReiult «ndAnribule( )
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public EnluationResutt findAttributef )
Figure 9.7 AFM UML Class Diagram
context and performs the required processing. This module also sets the outbound OoT 
response message context based on the outcome (OoT assertion matching result) of the 
processed inbound message context. The class diagram of the TNH module is documented in 
appendix D, and shows the classes that participate in the TNH module. The following section 
describes the object classes.
XTMAIBaseSOAPHandler Class
This class and its methods are described in section 9.3.2
SAMLOoTNegotiationMessageHandler Class
This class implements the SOAPHandler class and extends the XTMAIBaseSOAPHandler 
class to provide concrete logic for processing the message context. It implements the 
handleMessage() method which is also described in section 9.3.2. In a typical process, if the
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message context is inbound, it calls the SAMLOOTMessageCtx object passing a 
MessageContext object as a parameter, whereas for outbound, it retrieves the response context 
message that is set by the setContextResponseQ method and binds it to the SOAP Message 
Header for outward transmission.
SAMLOoTMessageCtx Class
This class defines the methods that handle the inbound message context. The inbound message 
context is first filtered according to the OoT message type, and then passed to one of the 
context processors described below to handle the actual processing of the message context.
WSXACMLContextProcessorFactory Class
This is an abstract class which defines two methods for the OoT message context processing. 
Each context processor class extends this class, and implements the methods to provide a 
specific business logic functionality. The class defines the following abstract methods:
  The doProcessMessage() method that handles the processing of the OoT message 
context, and this depends on what message type it receives. There are four types of 
such messages, namely ObligationOfTrustQuery, ObligationOJTrustStatement, 
SAMLAttributeStatement, or a Fault message.
  The setContextResponse() method that handles the setting of an appropriate 
response context message after the doProcessMessage() method operation is 
completed.
WSXACMLNOBContextProcessor Class
This class extends WSXACMLContextProcessorFactory, and provides the business logic 
(implemented on the doProcessMessage() method) for the processing of the Notification of 
Obligation (NoB) message context. The NoB context is encapsulated in an 
ObligationOfTrustQuery element of the OoT message context. It is important to mention that 
the processing of a NoB context can take significant computing resources, i.e. the matching 
and evaluations of two XACMLPrivacy'Assertions, which uses one of the strategy algorithms 
discussed in chapter 8. The local XACMLPrivacyAssertion containing Requirements and 
Capabilities is matched against the received XACMLPrivacyAssertion, which also contains 
Requirements and Capabilities. The matching result determines the type of outbound message 
context to generate, and it is set using the setContextResponse() method.
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WSXACMLSAOContextProcessor Class
This class is invoked when the received message context is a Signed Acceptance of Obligation 
(SAG). In processing the SAG context, it invokes the Assertion Security Module objects to 
perform security functions such as verification and validation of the SAG, and then using the 
setContextResponseQ method, it sets an appropriate outbound message context. It is equally 
important to mention that the task handled by this class involves some cryptographic 
operations; which can take large amount of computing resources.
WSXACMLAttributeContextProcessor Class
This class is invoked if the received message context is a SAML AttributeStatament. In this 
case, if it is a signed assertion, security functions are performed, using the Security Assertion 
Module to verify and validate the assertion, before it is passed to the consuming object. In most 
cases, the attributes are passed to the AFMProxy which initiated the trust negotiation, and then 
to the PDF. Usually, this process completes the trust negotiations, and depending on the 
evaluation result, the PDF sends an appropriate XACML response context to the PEP for 
enforcement.
SAMLOOTFaultContextProcessor Class
This class is invoked when the received message context contains a fault due to OoT 
processing. There may be cases when the match operations can result in Indeterminate as 
defined in the XACML standard. In this case, a response message can be sent to a party with an 
indication of what caused the negotiation to fail. Ordinarily, this is not a SOAP fault, and is 
treated separately from a normal SOAP context fault. The SOAP context fault is handled by 
handleFaultQ defined in SOAPHandler implementations.
9.3.6 Assertion Security Module (ASM)
The Assertion Security module handles all the security related operations. This module uses the 
SAML API provided by Sun's Access Manager SAML API release and has two classes, one 
for performing the signature scheme and the other for verifying and checking the validity of 
signed objects.
9.3.7 The WS-XACML Module
The WS-XACML Module defines the auxiliary classes used by the TNH module for encoding,
parsing and matching of policy assertions based on the WS-XACML match algorithms. The
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module contains the classes that are used for the construction of the WS-XACML and OoT 
elements. Because the construction of XACMLPrivacyAssertion components is complex, the 
Builder Design Pattern [166] is used to abstract the essential details of the underlying complex 
objects. Figure 9.8 depicts the UML class diagram, and the components that participate in the 
WS-XACML module. The following section briefly describes the main classes.
ApplySection Class
This class provides a convenient representation of the Apply element, which can contain one or 
more Attribute Value, AttributeDesignator and AttributeSelector elements. These elements have 
their respective classes, which typically define the accessor and mutator methods for their 
respective attributes.
Apply Class
This class provides the methods for creating the Apply sub elements using the ApplySection
class and its methods.
Policy Class
This class is used to construct the XACML native policy. The SunXACML API provides 
helper classes for doing this. In addition, static policies can be loaded through this class, and 
then added to the XACMLPrivacyAssertion policy.
RequestCtx Class
This class is used to construct a native XACML request Context, which can be added to the 
Capabilities element of the XACMLPrivacyAssertion element, or used by a PEP to construct a 
request context object that is presented to a PDP.
Vocabulary Class
This class constructs a Vocabulary instance, as defined in the WS-XACML specifications. This 
implementation supports three vocabulary types, namely xacml, p3p and xml. The Vocabulary 
instance is a critical factor in the policy assertion matching process. For two 
XACMLPrivacyAssertion policies to be matched, their Vocabulary instances must be 
compatible, otherwise the matching of other segments of the assertion must be aborted, i.e. the 
evaluation of the assertions must not proceed. The basic idea is to ensure that the semantics of 
the assertions domain are applied correctly during the matching and evaluation.
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WSXACMLAssertionType class
This interface defines abstract methods that are implementable in the concrete classes that 
extend it. The concrete implementation provides the functionalities used for the construction of 
Requirements and Capabilities child elements.
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Figure 9.8 WS-XACML Module UML Class Diagram
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WSXAMLRequirements class
This is a concrete class that implements WSXACMLAssertionType, which provides 
convenient logic functionalities for building the elements contained in the Requirements 
section of XACMLPrivacyAssertion.
WSXACMLCapabilities class
This is another concrete class that implements WSXACMLAssertionType, which provides 
convenient logic functionalities for constructing the elements contained in the Capabilities 
section of XACMLPrivacyAssertion
WSXACMLBuilderFactory class
This interface defines abstract methods that are implementable by the classes that extend it,
which provides functionalities that are used in building the OoT message container.
XACMLPrivacyAssertionProxy
This class implements WSXACMLBuilderFactory and is used by ObligationOfTrustProxy
object to build the XACMLPrivacyAssertion contained in the ObligationOfTrust container.
ObligationOjTrustFactory class
This abstract class defines the abstract method that is used to finally build the
ObligationOfTrust container.
ObligationOfTrustProxy class
This class is the concrete implementation of the ObligationOfTrustFactory, which is used to
build the ObligationOfTrust container carried as part of the SOAP Header message context.
9.4 How It Works
The following section briefly describes how the XTMAI works in a typical distributed 
environment, and demonstrates the interactions between the core participants.
9.4.1 Overview
The XTMAI system has two security handlers, implemented as parts of the XACML PEP and 
Trust Negotiation Handler (TNH) respectively. The PEP security handler intercepts all access 
request attempts made to the targeted resources, determines whether access control is required,
and takes appropriate actions. The TNH security handler is used for the OoT negotiations,
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based on the SOAP request-response message exchange pattern. It is assumed here that the 
web service client (WSC) has performed authentication at its origin by obtaining a token 
handle, and a web service message is constructed with it. The authentication service of the 
WSC runs in the same runtime environment as XTMAI that protects the WSC's attribute 
information, and shares the same public key certificate.
The token handle serves as a reference link to the WSC's attribute store (PIP from XACML 
view point) on the one hand, and part of the subject descriptor in the XACML Request context 
on the other. The token handle which does not explicitly expose the WSC's information 
authenticates the fact that indeed the WSC comes from the token attesting origin and it is 
verifiable. In a distributed sense, this phase provides a mutual authentication between the WSC 
and the WS. Figure 9.9 demonstrates the interactions between the core participants in the 
XTMAI infrastructure. The following section describes the steps involved in the interactions.
Step 1: The WSC initializes and sends a web services request message to the WS endpoint, 
together with the token 123456789@xtmai.tcbportal.co.uk asking for a price list. The PEP 
handler intercepts this message and performs appropriate security checks.
I ____I TNH (Handler)
IMS /WS-XACM\[ AFMPraxy
V» M^BB «•••» •! til^M. ,|A I '
XTMAI
WS: Web services 
WSC : web service client XTMAI
Figure 9.9 XTMAI Core Components' Interactions
Step 2: The PEP handler constructs a XACML request context with 
123456789@xtmai.tcbportal.co.uk as the subject attribute, http://tcbportal.co.uk/pricelist/ as 
the resource attribute, and read as the action attribute, and presents it to the POP.
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Step 3: The PDF in an attempt to evaluate the request context against the local policy could not 
be completed due to the missing subject's attribute value(s) which must be provided in order to 
complete the decision process. The PDF uses the AttributeDesignator contained in the local 
policy to identify the required attribute type, and then calls the AFM to supply the missing 
attribute(s).
Sept 4: The AFM passes the request to the AFM proxy. The AFMProxy uses the WS-XACML 
module to construct a XACMLPrivacyAssertion containing the missing attribute in the 
Requirements section, plus other privacy requirements, and defines what this WS is willing and 
able to do for the WSC in the Capabilities section.
StepS: The TNH in the WS endpoint conveys the XACMLPrivacyAssertion using the OoT 
protocol in the SOAP header to the WSC's XTMAI endpoint. This is the initial privacy 
assertion advertisement in the context of OoT protocol message and can only be done in the 
NoB context.
Step 6: The WSC's TNH passes the received context to the WS-XACML module for 
processing, and depending on the outcome sends an OoT response context message. Note that 
steps 5 and 6 can be repeated as needed until the WSC and WS exchange a SAO context, 
followed by the actual attributes.
Step 7: The WS TNH returns a final response to AFMProxy containing the missing attribute(s), 
which is made available to the AFM.
Step 8: The AFM returns the missing attributes to the POP, and the POP completes request 
context evaluation.
Step 9: The PDF returns the XACML response context containing the decision result to the 
PEP handler.
Step 10: The PEP interprets the decision results, and enforces the decision by either returning 
the price list to WSC or a denied access response.
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9.5 Technical Validation
The validation phase of software is an important aspect that determines whether an application 
meets its requirement specifications. In other words, it is necessary to verify and validate some 
measurable quality attributes of a system [172]. In doing the validation test, the limitations 
imposed by a research environment were recognized, plus the difficulties in getting meaningful 
results. Nonetheless, it is important to perform some validation tests to substantiate some 
aspects of the software system thereby validating this research work. The aim of the validation 
is to verify and assess the software against the objectives and questions addressed by this study. 
A requirement-based approach [172] was chosen to perform two types of tests, namely, 
functional and performance tests. Although there is no explicit specification on performance 
issues, it seemed necessary to consider these because of the intensive computing involved in 
the processes. Both tests require executing some functions and examining of their inputs as 
well as corresponding outputs.
Figures 9.10, 9.11, 9.12 and 9.13 show different views of the User Interface (UI) test bed used 
in carrying out the various validation tests. On the whole, the activities and behaviours 
monitored are characterized by inputs initiated by a client, negotiation between a client and a 
service where appropriate, and output responses. In simple operation, a client initiates a 
resource request by first performing authentication with its domain STS, using a 
username/password pair as shown in figure 9.10. The STS authenticates the client and vouches 
for the client by issuing to it a security token, i.e. I2l490ll22877@xtmai.sts.co.uk as depicted in 
figure 9.11, the client uses the issued token to authenticate requests to the service. The service 
security handler, in this case the PEP, constructs the appropriate request context illustrated in 
figure 9.12 and submits the request to the PDP. The PDP issues a response context based on 
the outcome of the access control decision as shown in figure 9.13. In performing these tests, 
some of the actions are manually triggered in order to facilitate aspects of the interactions. The 
various validation tests are described in appendix C, and a more detailed discussion of the 
interpretation of the tests results will be provided in chapter 10.
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9.5.1 Functional Test
A set of functional tests was carried out to verify and validate the software against the research 
objectives and the main research question discussed in chapter 1. The range of tests was carried 
out using realistic datasets and was done in phases.
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Test Case 1 - Confidentiality: This test is concerned with the ability of a party to preserve 
confidentiality of resources in a typical transaction that requires access control measures. In 
performing the test, a client's request context is evaluated against the service local policy that 
governs access to the resources using two input data: (i) client's request is submitted with the 
right credentials, (ii) client's request is submitted without the right credentials. The local policy 
requires that a resource requestor provides a provable attribute to gain access to a protected 
resource. This test was conducted using a dataset, and the results indicate that access was 
permitted when the client invoked the service with the correct subject attribute credential e.g. 
1214901122877@xtmai.sts.co.uk, and denied when an incorrect subject attribute credential e.g.
'""*•"
<Request> 
<SubJeclSubJectCategorv-Mrn:oasls:nanies:tc:xacml: 1.0: subject-category access-subject" >
<Altribute Altributeld-'um:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subjecl: subject-id" DaiaTvpe-'urn:oasls:nam 
es:tc:xacml:1.0:data-tvpe:rrc822Name-><MrlbuieValue>1214901122877»!nTial.sts.coul<</lnrlb 
uteValue> </Artribute> 
< /Subject > 
<Resource>
< Attribute xatributeld""urn:oasis:nam«:tcxacml:1.0:resource: resource-id" DalaTvpe-"riUp://www 
w3.org/2001/XMlSchema#aiivORr></WributeValue>hnp://xlmal.tcbponal.com/</AnrlbuteValue>< 
/«trlbute> 
< /Resource > 
<Action>
<4ltribu!e Anributeld»"um:oasls:names:tc:xacml:1.0:actloir action-Id" DataTvpe="http://ww*.w3.o 
rg/2001/XMLSchema#string"> </WributeValue>read</jWributeValue></Altribute>
< /Request >
Rcgutn niinniaed _ read u Invoke icrrice
Wet Service Request
Figure 9.12 Request Context UI
1214901315128@pcg.org was used. The transcript of this test is documented in appendix E.I. 
The outcome simply indicates that the domain: xtmai.sts.co.uk is defined in the service local 
policy as an allowable domain, that is, tokens issued by this domain can be accepted, and 
access can be granted on this basis, whilst the pcg.org is not allowable. In this test-case, 
confidentiality is considered from the service perspective only, and privacy was not a concern 
for the client. This is so because the 1214901122877@xtmai.sts.co.uk does not explicitly 
expose the client's PII, though it does give a clue to the client's domain. The 1214901122877 
is a pseudonymized identifier for this client, and its properties are only known to the client's 
domain.
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Test case 2 - privacy and confidentiality (parsimonious strategy): The test here is concerned 
with simultaneous protection of privacy and confidentiality between the client and the service.
RtqutstToktn \ Rtqiust Descriptor [ mquVst/RMponsel
<Response>
<Result Resourceld-"hnp://xtmal.tcbportaUom/"> 
< Dedsion> Permit < /Decision > 
<Status>
<SlatusCode Value-'urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status:ok"/> 
< /Status > 
</Result > 
</Response>
Donc-l
Figure 9.13 Response Context UI
In this test-case, the local policy that governs access to the protected resources at the service 
end requires a requester to submit two different provable attributes before access can be 
allowed. In this case, the first attribute, which was a token served to authenticate the client in 
the context of its origin, and filtered requestors based on their domains. The second attribute, 
which must be submitted by the client before access to the resources is permitted, is considered 
sensitive by the client and would require privacy protection. Furthermore, the service requires 
that the resources released to the client be treated with some respect for privacy.
The client and service require a bilateral privacy negotiation in order to determine access to 
their various resources whilst ensuring privacy. To achieve this goal, the client submits a 
request to the service with the one out of the two attributes that is considered not sensitive, and 
allows the service to ask for the second. To validate this case, a complete set of subject 
attributes were submitted in one-shot; the result indicated that privacy negotiation was not 
initiated by the service. In contrast, when a request was made with a subject's attribute, privacy 
negotiation was triggered when the PDF at the service end made an attempt to retrieve the 
missing subject's attribute(s), and both parties exchanged OoT message contexts; upon
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successful negotiation, the client returned the missing attribute back to the service before the 
access decision was completed and a PERMIT response was sent back to the client. The 
complete transcript of this test-case is documented in appendix E.2.
Additionally, this test-case is used to verify the parsimonious strategy described in chapter 8. In 
the event that the client's request was not completed by the service PDF due to the missing 
subject attribute(s), the service sends an OoT context as a NoB describing its privacy assertion 
(Requirements and a set of Capabilities) to the client's endpoint. In performing the matching 
and evaluation operations at the client's side, service's Requirements is satisfied by a set of 
client's Capabilities on the one hand, and client's Requirements is satisfied by a set of service's 
Capabilities on the other. In response to the service NoB, the client sends back an OoT context 
containing an SAG message. Upon the validation of the client's SAG, the service sends a 
corresponding SAG back to the client. The client after validation sends back the OoT context 
containing the SAML AttributeStatement with the client's attribute, which is returned back to 
the service POP to complete the access control decision. A fragment of the service's privacy 
assertion is shown in figure 9.14, and also that of the client in figure 9.15. The service specified 
in its Requirements that a party must provide an attribute identified by peg-group and issued by 
pcg.org, and information given to a party must not be retained for more than 30 days. In its
<Requirements>
<Vocabulary>um:oasis:tc:xacml:3.0:vocabulary:xacml</Vocabulary> 
<Apply Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:function:must-be-present">
<Apply Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:function:integer-less-than-or-equal">
<AttributeDesignator Attributeld="um:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:action:max-data-rention-days"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer''/> 
</Apply>
<AttributeVaIue DataType="http://www.w3 .org/2001 /XMLSchema#integer">30</AttributeValue> 
</AppIy> 
<Apply Function] d="ura:oasis:names:tc:xacml. 1.0:function:string-one-and-only">
<SubjectAttributeDesignatorDataType="http://www.w3 .org/200 l/XMLSchema#string" 
Attributeld="pcg-groups" 
Issuer="admin@pcg.org'V> 
</Apply> 
</Requirements> 
<Capabilities>
<Vocabulary>um:oasis:tc:xacml:3.0:vocabulary:xacml</Vocabulary> 
<Apply Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0: function. must-be-present">
<Apply Attributeld="um:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:fimction:integer-less-than-or-equal">
<AttributeDesignator Attributeld="um:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:action:max-data-rention-days"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer"/> 
</Apply>
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/200 l/XMLSchema#integer">40</AttributeValue> 
</Apply> 
</Capabilities>
Figure 9.14 Fragment of Service's Privacy Assertion 
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<Requirements>
<Vocabulary>um:oasis:tc:xacml:3.0:vocabulary:xacml</Vocabulary> 
<Apply Attributeld="um:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:function:must-be-present">
<Apply Attributeld="um:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:fiinction:integer-less-than-or-equal">
<AttributeDesignator Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:action:max-data-rention-days"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer"/> 
</Apply>
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">45</AttributeValue> 
</Apply> 
</Requirements> 
<Capabilities>
<Vocabulary>um:oasis:tc:xacml:3.0:vocabulary xacml</Vocabulary> 
<Apply Attributeld="um:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:function:must-be-present">
<Apply Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:fijnction:integer-less-than-or-equal">
<AttributeDesignator Attributeld="um:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:action:max-data-rention-days"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer"/> 
</Apply>
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3 .org/200 l/XMLSchema#integer">25</AttributeValue> 
</Apply> 
<Apply Functionld="um:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:ftinction:string-one-and-only">
<SubjectAttributeDesignatorDataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" 
Attributeld="pcg-groups" 
Issuer="admin(o!pcg.org"/> 
</AppIy> 
</Capabilities>
Figure 9.15 Fragment of Client's Privacy Assertion
Capabilities, it promised to retain information released by a party for not more than 40 days. 
Similarly, the client's Requirements specified that a party must not retain information released 
by it for more than 45 days; and also in its Capabilities, it promised to release its peg-group 
attribute that is issued by pcg.org, and also that information received from a party will not be 
retained for more than 25 days. The test was extended to substantiate the case where a service's 
requirements are satisfied by a set of client's capabilities on the one hand, but the client's 
requirements were not satisfied by a set of the service's capabilities on the other. In response 
to this NoB, the client could not proceed with the negotiation. The client sends a failure 
notification signifying it is unable to continue with the negotiation. Next, the service PDF 
returns back an Indeterminate response because the access control could not be completed. In 
practice, the PEP should give a DENY response, because an adversary can exploit the 
Indeterminate response to launch more sophisticated attacks on the service.
Test-case 3 privacy and confidentiality (persuasive strategy): The test-case is similar to test 
case 3, except that it demonstrates the validity of the persuasive strategy described in chapter 8. 
The service sends an OoT context containing an NoB message describing its requirements and 
a set of capabilities. The service requirements are satisfied by a set of client's capabilities on 
the one hand, but the client's requirements are not satisfied by a set of service's capabilities on 
the other, i.e. the service's maximum retention period exceeds that of the client requirements,
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i.e. the service specified a 40 days retention period. The client sends back a corresponding NoB 
message to advertise its requirements and capabilities, to give the service an opportunity to 
refine its capabilities by offering to advance the negotiation. The service refines a set of its 
capabilities i.e. specifies a 20 days retention period, based on the client's requirements and 
sends back a fresh NoB to the client. The client processes the NoB as described above and 
returns an SAG response to the service. Upon successful verification of the client's SAG, the 
service sends a corresponding SAG to the client, and the client returns the attribute values 
defined in its Capabilities element in its policy assertion to the service. The service PDF then 
completes the access control decision and passes the decision back to its PEP. The PEP 
interprets the decision and returns its response to the client. The complete resulting transcripts 
of this test case are documented in appendix E.3.
Negotiation State Management: There are two ways the system tracks the negotiation state, 
which aids in determining the order and sequence of messages to be exchanged. The OoT 
container contains an attribute type InResponseTo i.e. lnResponseTo="l2l49055l29l7", which 
when present indicates that the message is in response to a previous message received from a 
party. The value corresponds to the value of the ootID attribute of that previous message, i.e. 
ootlD="l2l49055l29l7" A negotiating party could use the attribute to keep the negotiation state 
as well as determining the message to send. The alternative approach is to use the 
<NegotiationState> container contained in the <SOAP:Body> ,which is depicted in figure 9.16,
<NegotiationState>
<Service role="uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:service:role:client"> 
<State value="uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:state:sao" /> 
<Status value="uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:status:ok" /> 
</Service> 
</NegotiationState>
Figure 9.16 NegotiationState Container
and conveys information about the negotiation state. The <State> element describes the type of 
OoT message context and <Status> element tells about the processing result.
178
9.5.2 Performance Testing
In this test-case, the round-trip is measured to determine the response time between the various 
test-case interactions. It is important to mention that the round-trip response measurement 
cannot accurately reflect the real-world case, simply because there are a number of factors such 
as network characteristics, the computing processes at both communication endpoints, etc, that 
must be taken into consideration. These can greatly influence the testing results. Another factor 
peculiar to the measurement here, is that the client and service are in the same runtime 
machine. The implication is that some of the factors, such as network latency and other 
communication characteristics, cannot adequately reflect on the test. Nevertheless, the testing 
performed can reflect the various matching and evaluations, and the cryptographic operations 
done at both ends are important factors, which could affect performance. Figure 9.17 shows the 
response time for four consecutive tests using the same dataset. In this test-case, the client 
submits an attribute required by the PDF to make an access control decision, and the request
<Response>
<Result Resourceld="http://xtmai.tcbportal.com/"> 
<Decision>Permit</Decision> 
<Status>
<StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status:ok"/> 
</Status> 
</Result> 
</Response> 
total time: 13 seconds 
<Response>
<Result Resourceld="http://xtmai.tcbportal.com/"> 
<Decision>Permit</Decision> 
<Status>
<StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status:ok"/> 
</Status> 
</Result> 
</Response> 
total time: 15 seconds 
<Response>
<Result Resourceld="http://xtmai.tcbportal.com/"> 
<Decision>Permit</Decision> 
<Status>
<StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc rxacml:1.0:status:ok"/> 
</Status> 
</Result> 
</Response> 
total time: 12 seconds 
<Response>
<Result Resourceld="http://xtmai.tcbportal.com/"> 
<Decision>Permit</Decision> 
<Status>
OtatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status:ok"/> 
</Status> 
</Result> 
</Response> 
total time: 11 seconds
Figure 9.17 Performance Test Case 1 
179
resulted in a PERMIT response. The average response time was 12.75 seconds. The processing 
in this case involves only the PDF that performed the matching and evaluation at the service 
endpoint. This is the case because the client submitted the correct attribute information that is 
required by the POP to make access control decision.
Similarly, figure 9.18 depicts another test-case, where the client submits the two attributes 
required by the POP to make an access control decision, and this request resulted in a PERMIT 
response. The average response time was 21.25 seconds. It is important to differentiate the 
characteristics of the two tests. Test-case 2 involved more processing because of the need to 
also evaluate the two attributes of a subject.
<Response>
<Result Resourceld="http://xtmai.tcbportal.com/"> 
<Decision>Permit</Decision> 
<Status>
OtatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status:ok"/> 
</Status> 
</Result> 
</Response> 
total time: 19 seconds 
<Response>
<Result Resourceld="http://xtmai.tcbportal.com/"> 
<Decision>Permit</Decision> 
<Status>
<StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status:ok"/> 
</Status> 
</Result> 
</Response> 
total time: 23 seconds 
<Response>
<Result Resourceld="http://xtmai.tcbportal.com/"> 
<Decision>Permit</Decision> 
<Status>
OtatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status:ok"/> 
</Status> 
</Result> 
</Response> 
total time: 22 seconds 
<Response>
<Result Resourceld="http://xtmai.tcbportal.com/"> 
<Decision>Permit</Decision> 
<Status>
<StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status :ok"/> 
</Status> 
</Result> 
</Response> 
total time: 21 seconds
Figure 9.18 Performance Test Case 2 
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Figure 9.19 depicts another performance test whereby the client submitted an attribute out of 
two attributes required by the PDF to make an access control decision, and privacy negotiation 
was triggered. The same set of data as in confidentiality test-case II was used, but privacy and 
confidentiality were processed simultaneously at both ends of the communication, which also 
involved some considerable interaction between the client and the service. The average 
response time recorded was 27.25.
As can be seen from the various tests, the performance in terms of response time depends on a 
number of factors including the availability of computing resources, the number of iterations 
and the access control input data. Due to the test environment, the resulting response time has 
not taken network latency into consideration. More discussion of the technical validation will
1215449772103@xtmai.sts.co.uk 
<Response>
<Result ResourceId="http://xtmai.tcbportal.com/"> 
<Decision>Permit</Decision> 
<Status>
OtatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status :ok"/> 
</Status> 
</Result> 
</Response> 
total time: 27 seconds
1215449889174@xtmai.sts.co.uk 
<Response>
<Result Resourceld="http://xtmai.tcbportal.com/"> 
<Decision>Perrait</Decision> 
<Status>
OtatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status:ok"/> 
</Status> 
</Result> 
</Response> 
total time: 25 seconds 
1215450022589@xtmai.sts.co.uk 
<Response>
<Result Resourceld="http://xtmai.tcbportal.com/"> 
<Decision>Permit</Decision> 
<Status>
OtatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status :ok"/> 
</Status> 
</Result> 
</Response> 
total time: 25 seconds
1215451596431@xtmai.sts.co.uk 
<Response>
<Result ResourceId="http://xtmai.tcbportal.com/"> 
<Decision>Permit</Decision> 
<Status>
OtatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status:ok"/> 
</Status> 
</Result> 
</Response> 
total time: 28 seconds
Figure 9.19 Performance Test-case 3 
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be given in technical evaluation section of chapter 9.
9.6 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated the implementation of a proof of concept, that is, a software 
system that makes obvious the important capabilities of the artefact developed in this work. 
The design and development used systematic approaches, and are vital in order to extend the 
system to real-world application with minimal effort. The details of the architectural modules 
and base APIs have been discussed. The technical validation has demonstrated that the 
proposed framework fulfilled its intended purpose, and can help the future implementers of this 
work in improving the system.
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Chapter 10. Evaluation
10.1 Overview
This chapter is an attempt to evaluate the framework developed, and validate it against some 
measurable metrics. Three constructive assessments are employed in this context to justify the 
outcome of the work. Firstly, technical validation seeks to test the functionality [51, 173] of the 
solution against the objectives and research questions outlined in chapter 1. Two techniques are 
chosen for this purpose, namely experimental and simulation using realistic artificial data. 
Secondly, performance evaluation [173] measures the average response time during privacy 
negotiation. Thirdly, critical comparative assessment of XTMAI is carried out against related 
systems. Trust-X [126], TrustBuilder [120] and Shibboleth [62] are selected for this purpose. 
The rationale for the choice is that Trust-X, and TrustBuilder shares some similarities with 
XTMAI in terms of negotiation, and Shibboleth is a widely used distributed access 
management system within academia [113, 114, 128, 174]. Again, it shares some common 
characteristics with XTMAI. Six characteristics were selected, namely architecture, protocol 
and negotiation approach, support for policies and credentials, interoperability, privacy and 
negotiation capabilities, upon which to base the comparative evaluations.
10.2 Technical Evaluation
In chapter 1, five questions were enumerated that are addressed by this study essentially from 
the point of view of the question: "how can privacy be preserved when a communicating 
party's personal information is involved in access control operations?" In context, a 
communicating party here does not simply refer to a human user, but to any entity, disclosure 
of whose attribute information may result in embarrassment of any sort. Thus, this study 
considered end-to-end privacy and confidentiality, using a policy driven infrastructure that 
makes the solution scalable and extensible. In this section, the author looks back to the main 
question in an attempt to verify and assess the technical usefulness of the resultant framework.
1 Unauthorized Disclosure of PII: One key step in access control is to ensure the 
enforcement of the minimal disclosure principle. Confidentiality of resources in this 
context is achieved by the expression of an XACML policy that governs a resource and is 
matched against an XACML request context that describes the characteristics of access
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control decision information. A validation test described in test-case 1 section 8.5 of 
chapter 9 using a set of XACML request context, and the resulting XACML response 
contexts, validates the capability of the system to filter out access requests based on the 
local policy that governs access to the resources. In this case, access was allowed when 
the client submitted the right access token, and when the client submitted an incorrect 
token, access was denied. The resulting outcome validates the capability of the system to 
restrict access to protected resources based on the XACML request context and a policy 
made available to it.
2 Communicating party's active participation: In the scope of the present work, the 
developed framework provides a novel interface that can allow a communicating party to 
express its privacy assertions in the Requirements section of the policy, which can be 
evaluated against any request for the retrieval or exposure of the information. Test-cases 2 
and 3 described in chapter 9 demonstrate the system's capability in evaluating a 
communicating party's privacy assertion against another party's capabilities (what this 
participant is willing and able to do or release) before the party discloses sensitive 
information. The full test results are documented in appendices E. However, it is 
important to mention that active participation is not considered from the usability 
viewpoint, and this aspect is left out as part of further work.
3 Privacy Assurance. One fundamental question this work has attempted to answer is 'how 
can privacy be guaranteed across security domains of trust?' That is, the provision of a 
mechanism that will enable a communicating party to evaluate the risks of giving out 
sensitive information, and determines the degree to which to trust a party in a privacy 
negotiation. The use of privacy assertions, in which mutually communicating parties 
express their privacy assertions in Requirements and Capabilities sections, which can be 
evaluated against each other, addressed this particular question. The concrete 
implementation of privacy negotiation strategies further provided a novel framework for 
gradual and incremental negotiation, in particular a persuasive strategy which allows the 
parties to refine their Requirements and Capabilities in a negotiation session. In addition 
to this, test-case 3 validates the capability from the technical perspective, by generating a 
SAG in the cause of privacy negotiation between the client and the service. This feature 
potentially provides a mechanism that can aid in resolving social/judicial aspects of
privacy disputes and liabilities amidst other considerations.
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4 Remote enforcement of privacy guarantees: The remote enforcement of privacy 
guarantees is uniquely addressed by the OoT mechanism. It provides a novel interface 
through its core components: the NoB and SAG, and the protocol, whereby two parties 
can exchange difficult-to-repudiate digitally signed obligating constraints or NoB, which 
detail their requirements for the release of their sensitive information to a party, and a 
proof of acceptance or SAG, which acknowledges the conditions under which they are 
accepting another party's information. Additionally, the OoT mechanism provides a 
framework for the exchange of digitally signed commitments in a tamper-proof manner; 
technical evidence that can be made available when parties do not conform to their 
commitments. Test-cases 2 and 3 authenticate these requirements based on the test results 
documented in appendices E2 and E3. The capability of the parties to receive the SAG 
before the release of sensitive information uniquely addresses this question.
5 The individual security preferences can be balanced against the legitimate free flow of 
information naturally using an XACML PolicySet. The XACML allows one policy to 
refer to another policy, or a combination of separately created policies, which can be 
processed at runtime by specifying an overriding policy and the relevant XACML 
combining algorithm. With this setup, any conflict resulting from an evaluation of the 
individual policy rules and that of the super policy (enterprise-wide policy, or country- 
wide policy) can be resolved into a valid access control decision.
10.3 Performance Evaluation
It is recognized that this work is not concerned with the software engineering aspect; 
performance issues were not explicitly defined as one of the problems addressed by this work. 
Nonetheless, given the application environment, it was imperative to undertake a set of 
performance tests in order to give an indication of the complexity of the processes involved in 
the framework. As mentioned in chapter 9, the tests carried out have some inherent limitations 
due to the research environment. Thus related factors in performance testing were not taken 
into consideration. These related factors among others include optimization of the software 
algorithms, network latency, computing processing power, etc. Nevertheless, the interpretation 
of the set of performance tests described in chapter 9 indicates that a number of factors can 
affect the response time. The resulting average response time shows an increase that is based 
on the set of input policies, the number of iterations, matching and evaluations, and the
185
cryptographic operations on data; how much these individually affect the systems could only 
be determined in a real testing environment. Particularly, it is important to know that in each 
interaction, matching and evaluations must be performed, and perhaps cryptographic 
operations at both ends. These can greatly influence the response time or throughput. In 
summary, the performance of the systems will depend on the complexity of the computing 
operations, network latency, and other network characteristics.
10.4 Comparative Critical Evaluation
In this section, three other systems are compared with XTMAI. The Trust-X and TrustBuilder 
systems represent novel architectures currently in the trust access control management domain, 
whilst Shibboleth is a widely deployed federated access management system.
10.4.1 Trust-X and TrustBuilder
Both Trust-X and TrustBuilder were overviewed in chapter 4, and are attribute-based access
control architectures. Both are trust access control management infrastructures, in which 
transaction parties can conduct bilateral and iterative exchanges of policies and certified 
credentials, to negotiate for the release of resources. These systems are the results of 
accumulated research outputs in the area of trust negotiation [8, 118, 119, 123, 162], and are 
well grounded in trust negotiation theories. The following components are used as the basis for 
the comparison.
Architecture
Both systems are symmetrical with respect to their architecture and are similar to XTMAI 
though their functional blocks are different. For example, in TrustBuilder, the component that 
performs security functions is called the Credential Verification Module, whilst in XTMAI it is 
referred to as the Assertion Security Module (ASM), which performs similar tasks. Both 
modules verify and validate credentials and assertions used in the trust negotiation operations. 
In the case of XTMAI, it includes methods for creating digital signatures over XML constructs. 
While the Trust-X and TrustBuilder Compliance Checkers are based on IBM Trust 
Establishment software, XTMAI uses an open source SunXACML PDF engine [168] for 
access control decisions. This entails XTMAI using an open standard that has some inherent
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advantages over TrustBuilder and Trust-X from the viewpoint of the implementation. Given 
that XACML has enjoyed wide spread support, potentially XTMAI can easily be implemented 
and/or extended in real world applications with minimal effort.
Protocol and Negotiation
In terms of protocol, Trust-X and TrustBuilder are based purely on a challenge-response 
protocol [102], as opposed to the request-response message pattern and mutual assertion 
advertisement used in XTMAI. In their operations, each phase of iteration is either a policy or 
credential disclosure, meaning that there may be several rounds of iterations (where there are 
many counter policy exchanges), which have to be executed before reaching a typical 
negotiation goal. The rationale is that since a party in the negotiation will not be fully aware of 
what it stands to benefit from the release of its attribute information, it can issue a counter 
policy in return, which must be satisfied before it can return the credentials that will satisfy the 
other party. In contrast, in the work described here, the Requirements and Capabilities of one 
party are exchanged in one phase of iteration. In doing this, the providing party indicates what 
it requires from the recipient in the Requirements section, and what it is willing and able to do 
for the recipient in the Capabilities section. The advantage is that a recipient is well informed, 
and so can make a quick decision by weighing the risk of giving its information against the 
benefit, and potentially would not necessarily issue a counter assertion where there is minimal 
satisfaction. Additionally, the advertisement of requirements and capabilities offers the benefit 
of allowing a party to offer alternatives to what is advertised by another party. Once a party is 
satisfied with the Capabilities of a party, and that its own Capabilities can satisfy party's 
Requirements, it signs its assertion and conveys it to the participant.
In the case of negotiating strategies, both Trust-X and TrustBuilder have an extensive family 
of strategies [118] that can be adopted by negotiators in order to find the best way to reach their 
goals. In contrast, XTMAI implemented two strategies described in chapter 8, but can be 
extended to accommodate other negotiation strategies.
Policy and Credential Standard Support
In the case of policy expression language, both systems use a proprietary XML-based language 
to encode their disclosure policies, as opposed to XTMAI that makes use of XACML and its 
variant WS-XACML (both industry standards) for the representation of disclosure policies.
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Similarly, for credential format, both currently support X.509 certificates, unlike XTMAI that 
naturally inherits all the credentials supported by XACML and SAML including X.509 
certificates, SAML assertions, etc.
Inter operab ility
Interoperability is important for models targeted to open environments. The underlying 
concepts that drive the systems are yet to be formalized and standardized. The implication is 
that it is potentially difficult to adapt them in real-world scenarios, except for their proprietary 
uses. In contrast, XTMAI is based on the XACML and SAML models, which makes it 
extensible, and more practicable and easily adaptable.
Obligation Capabilities
Given that privacy is a socio-economic problem having contractual properties, it requires a 
technical solution that derives its concepts and message exchanges from open standards, and a 
business solution that draws its trust from the enforcement that is provided by the legal and 
regulatory infrastructure. Consequently, privacy protection entails enforcing privacy 
obligations that reflect the basic privacy principles [48]. This shaped the development of a 
mechanism that allows privacy negotiating participants to express such contractual obligating 
constraints and generate too difficult-to-repudiate technical evidence. It is an attempt to fulfill 
most of the basic privacy obligation principles. Particularly, this framework merges a technical 
solution with possible social/judicial aspects for better security assurance in distributed open 
system transactions. TrustBuilder and Trust-X never considered this important aspect of 
privacy.
Privacy Capabilities
In Trust-X and TrustBuilder, privacy is tackled from a different perspective than described in 
this thesis. Arguably, it can be concluded that Trust-X and TrustBuilder consider privacy from 
a confidentiality point of view, which does not reflect important basic privacy characteristics. 
In this framework, there is a greater emphasis on foundational privacy, which is addressed in a 
range of ways, including through the use of pseudonymity described in chapter 7, 
XACMLPrivacyAssertion, and the OoT protocol described in chapter 8. In addition, privacy is
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considered based on the recommendations of FIPs, and the inclusion of the P3P standard into 
the solution, potentially making it simpler for enterprises already using P3P to plug in.
Although the Browser Based Trust Negotiation system [127] addresses some of the limitations 
of TrustBuilder, the framework differs in many respects from XTMAI. The BBTN's protocol 
is similar to TrustBuilder, which involves disclosure of a policy in an iteration and credential in 
a separate iteration. In terms of privacy protection, enforcement of privacy and obligating 
constraints were not considered by the author. The concepts of NoB and SAG described in 
chapter 8 help in the enforcement of obligating constraints, and provide a mechanism for 
strong binding of the two statements of commitments, i.e. Requirements and Capabilities, that 
define transaction parties' actions, expectations, offers and acceptance of one another.
10.4.2 Shibboleth
Shibboleth is one of the first federated access management to be implemented and has had 
significant impact in sharing users' information in a secure and trusted manner. The purpose of 
the information sharing is to facilitate authentication, authorization, content personalization, 
particularly in enabling single sign-on across autonomous boundaries of trust. Shibboleth is 
based on open standards, essentially SAML and has no explicit support for XACML. It has two 
asymmetric distributed subsystems namely: Identity Provider (IdP) and Service Provider (SP). 
In a normal process, users' information is sent from a home origin IdP to a target SP. In the 
comparison between Shibboleth and XTMAI, the same components are employed as follows.
Architecture
The Shibboleth infrastructure comprises two main distributed software systems that are 
asymmetric in characteristics. The IdP serves as a SAML Authority that issues assertions to a 
user's browser that has successfully performed authentication with it. Based on the assertions, 
the user can connect to a resource site of which the SP software is the gatekeeper. The SP 
software can decide to grant or deny access to the user, or optionally ask the IdP for more 
attributes of the user. The SP software uses an in-built callback mechanism to ask the IdP for 
the attributes, and in turn, the IdP uses an in-built ARP to decide whether to release the 
attributes to the requesting SP. This is unlike XTMAI, which is symmetrical when deployed at 
both endpoints and which allows both the user and SP to conduct iterative and bilateral 
exchange of resources. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the callback mechanism is designed
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to achieve the minimal disclosure principle and further protects the user's privacy in the 
Shibboleth case.
However, the dissimilarity with this framework is the lack of mutual interaction and the ability 
to negotiate for the release of resources. In Shibboleth, the SP sends an AttributeRequst 
message, which does not contain the purpose for which the SP is requesting more attributes. In 
contrast, XTMAI uses an ObligationOfTrust context which describes privacy requirements 
(e.g. the purpose, retention period, etc.), which the SP is willing and is able to do for the client, 
as well as what it expects from the client. In XTMAI, the client responds with another 
ObligationOJTrust context, which may be an NoB or SAG depending on the message, and the 
interaction can continue until they can mutually agree to release their sensitive resources.
Protocol and Negotiation
The Shibboleth uses a synchronous request-response message exchange pattern (MEP) which 
is essentially based on HTTP browser protocol. The XTMAI uses the same synchronous 
request-response protocol, particularly the SOAP MEP, but defines a service interface to take 
into account other application level protocols, including HTTP browser. The Shibboleth 
infrastructure has no mechanism for message level negotiation as presented in this thesis, and 
so is a unilateral access control paradigm.
Policy and Credential Standard Support
The Shibboleth uses ARP and SAML assertions in the full life-cycle of access control of 
service resources and users' attributes. In chapter 4, the defect of the ARP structure was 
discussed, and its lack of support for foundational privacy principles. Nevertheless, in terms of 
credentials, it supports many of the credential profiles defined in the SAML specifications. 
XTMAI uses XACML, WS-XACML and SAML assertions for the full life-cycle access 
control of service resources and users attributes. The WS-XACML extends the capability of 
native XACML to enable robust, scalable and mutual privacy assertion negotiations. The WS- 
XACML has a natural way to allow the SP to convey its privacy statement to a client, using the 
P3P policy framework in a web services interaction. Given the above comparison, XTMAI is 
more flexible in terms of access control policy expression than the Shibboleth, and potentially 
covers a wide range of access control use-cases.
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Interoperability
Both systems have the characteristics of interoperability since they are based on industry 
standards. In the case of Shibboleth, it is a distributed system with well defined semantics and 
syntax, and has been implemented in many software languages and platforms. In contrast, 
XTMAI still has to undergo some further analysis in system design and protocol refinement to 
make it more mature.
Obligation Capabilities
It has been established by this thesis that privacy is a socio-economic problem with contractual 
properties. These properties are backed up by law, legislation and principles that must be 
considered by privacy aware systems [48]. In this framework, privacy protection has been 
considered from this background, which led to the development of a mechanism that allows the 
expression of contractual obligating constraints, to deal with privacy obligations between 
transaction participants. Additionally, the OoT makes it possible to generate too difficult-to- 
repudiate technical evidence, in an attempt to address remote enforcement of privacy. This 
potentially merges a technical solution with possible social/judicial aspects, for better privacy 
assurance in distributed transactions. Shibboleth never viewed privacy from this perspective at 
all.
Privacy Capabilities
Both systems have privacy as a primary goal, except that they achieved it in different ways. In 
the Shibboleth scenario, privacy is achieved by means of pseudonymity and the ARP. In 
XTMAI, privacy is achieved by pseudonymity, WS-XACML assertion and the OoT 
mechanism. Arguably, Shibboleth's privacy mechanism did not take into account the basic 
privacy principles, and it could be considered as satisfying confidentiality requirements rather 
than privacy requirements, as has been distinguished in this thesis. Again, the privacy solution 
is considered from a wider perspective including privacy law, legislation and principles as 
presented in chapter 3; this Shibboleth is yet to do. The use of WS-XACML and the OoT 
protocol is a significant improvement in the treatment of privacy, compared to Shibboleth's 
privacy provision.
To sum up the comparative assessment, it is important to highlight that the remote enforcement 
of privacy and confidentiality in distributed environments is critical and complicated. The
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development of OoT with its components NoB and SAG has attempted to address the remote 
enforcement of privacy obligating constraints, and is a key step towards the achievement of 
privacy assurance. Transaction parties can assert their requirements and willingly accept the 
assertions of others about their requirements and reach mutual agreements on their capabilities. 
This is a unique contribution to the body of knowledge in the general area of security and 
privacy.
10.5 Conclusion
This chapter has evaluated the XTMAI framework against three other approaches that address 
parts of the problem of maintaining privacy in access control. It has shown that the framework 
has the potential to improve privacy in distributed environments. This work has therefore met 
the objectives defined in chapter 1, and addresses a need that was identified through the 
secondary research reported in chapters 4, 7 and 11.
192
Chapter 11. Conclusion and Future Work
11.1 Overview
This thesis has described work carried out to investigate how privacy can be protected when a 
communicating party's identifiable attribute information is involved in access control 
operations. The work undertaken has successfully followed established methodological 
approaches in the analysis, design, implementation and evaluation of Privacy Trust Access 
Control Infrastructure using XACML, and its proof of concept, the XTMAI. This work is 
based on existing and relevant Internet standards, specifications and security enhancement 
technologies. The goal is to ensure that the resultant technical solution is adaptable, 
interoperable and extensible. This is the main rationale for choosing the XACML and SAML 
models, which are industry standards developed to address a number of access management 
security problems in open environments.
This study commenced with an extensive investigation, analysis and assessment of existing 
access control management systems [7, 18, 116, 126, 128]. It was felt that policy based security 
services will address privacy more appropriately than most anonymous systems [85, 88, 175]. 
An Access management system is a major security service that addresses application level 
security, by restricting the use of computer resources to authorized users, i.e. entities with 
provable credentials. It was realized that the rise in cross-organizational transactions requires 
this important security service which may involve both authentication and authorization 
techniques.
However, for access control decisions to take place, the underlying system makes decisions 
based on its local access policy against certain attribute information presented to it. This, in 
many cases, is in the form of identifiable attributes of the access control actors. It has been 
sufficiently established by this thesis that one critical item of information that is usually 
contained in the attribute information, is what is often referred to as PII. This significantly 
highlights the concern for privacy and confidentiality, which are the primary focus of this 
work. More importantly, it has been established through the analysis of the relevant literature 
that privacy options can no longer be completely isolated from the notions of confidentiality 
and trust, in the sense that in many occasions, they need to work together to achieve the desired 
privacy security goals.
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After a critical analysis and assessment of current systems, it was concluded that existing 
access control systems often treat privacy, confidentiality and trust independently, on the basis 
that privacy is the client's concern, while confidentiality is that of the service provider's. This 
treatment has resulted in access control systems that prevent unauthorized access to enterprise 
resources, but without adequate consideration for privacy. Overall this thesis has exposed the 
gap in most existing access management systems which are asymmetrical in architecture, 
except trust access management systems that have a symmetrical architecture. Nevertheless, 
trust based access management systems have a significant weakness with respect to privacy 
and confidentiality highlighted in chapter 4.
The initial findings of the research were fed into the conceptual design of XTMAI presented in 
chapter 7, which was developed as a result of the detailed analysis of related privacy literature 
in chapter 3, access management in chapter 4 and privacy enhancement technologies and 
standards in chapters 5 and 6. In general, the resultant artefact is designed based on the 
identified weakness in existing systems, and certain factual principles that were evident from 
an early stage of the work. The following outlined factors were instrumental to the overall 
development of this work:
1 The unilateral or non-mutual treatment of privacy and confidentiality in most existing 
attribute-based access control system architecture i.e. client-server. In many of these 
systems, the client is required to disclose personal information unconditionally to the 
server, irrespective of whether the service can adhere to the security preferences of the 
client; otherwise access to the service cannot be allowed.
2 The lack of privacy assurance mechanisms; the client is unable to enforce how 
information passed to another party can be restricted and used only by the authorized 
parties and for the intended purposes only. There is an absence of techniques to make an 
attribute consuming party to convey an acceptance or rejection of obligating constraints 
imposed by the providing party before the release of attribute information.
3 Current systems overlook server side privacy. Where existing systems consider privacy 
[11, 18, 123], they do not draw on the fundamental principles underpinning privacy 
protection [14]. However, service providers on the other hand may have certain provable 
attributes that the client would like to see, which disclosed to arbitrary strangers might
leak important business information.
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In the development and design of the technical solution, a security threat modelling in chapter 
7 was done to supplement and validate earlier assumptions made about privacy, confidentiality 
and trust. The essence was to uncover privacy vulnerabilities from an infrastructure viewpoint, 
determine the likelihood of threats, and establish the applicability of privacy protection tools 
within the context of access control operations in distributed environments. The analysis of 
how distributed XACML model actors can participate to enable bilateral request-response 
message exchange pattern was undertaken. The investigation and analysis of suitable options 
for the remote enforcement of privacy led to the conceptualization of the OoT protocol. It is 
considered a significant development that provides a concrete approach to enhancing privacy 
assurance with strong binding of obligating constraints, and its development led to refereed 
publications [31, 47].
11.2 Strengths
This framework is based on broadly accepted industry security standards i.e. XACML, SAML, 
etc, and it combines a variety of other concepts, i.e. trust negotiation, fair information 
principles, etc, to address important privacy and confidentiality concerns in a mutually bilateral 
manner. It considers open systems characteristics, separating the authentication and 
authorization phases of access control in a fashion that enables privacy negotiation between 
two communicating parties. Given that most existing systems overlook mutual treatment of 
privacy and confidentiality, the architecture being symmetrical, enables the service provider 
and client to evaluate the risks of transactions that involve identifiable or contractual 
information that is of privacy value, before the exchange of such information. Being based on 
industry standards that have the spirit of extensibility, the work is extensible to the point that 
potentially it can be used to address other foreseeable privacy and security threats.
An additional strength of this work over traditional TN is that it has the potential to reduce the 
number of iterations between negotiating parties. This may mean a significant improvement in 
the average response time since both Requirements and Capabilities can be conveyed in a 
single payload rather than separately. The overall design of the XTMAI makes it stand out 
from among other access control infrastructures. The emphasis of XTMAI in the treatment of 
privacy and confidentiality in which XACML, SAML and P3P are combined makes it 
adaptable even to existing systems. Web service providers can plug their existing P3P policy 
statements written in XML into XTMAI, and use them for privacy negotiation with minimal
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effort.
Lastly, a mechanism that demonstrates noteworthy improvement in the provision of privacy 
where "difficult-to-repudiate" services are vital is essential, to assure each communicating 
party in distributed transactions that their information will be used in accordance with their 
wishes.
11.3 Benefits
The central benefit of this work is that parties in open systems transactions can evaluate the 
risks involved in sharing their sensitive resources, whether they are computer resources, 
policies that govern access to resources, contractual agreements or identifiable attribute 
information. The risk evaluation criteria using trust negotiation depend less on public key 
infrastructure, and more on provable attributes or abilities of the participants. The negotiations, 
cautiously based on gradual and incremental revelation of the provable attributes that enable 
the building of trust, help the parties involved to compute the trust threshold and make 
informed decisions about the release of their resources. Given that the framework provides the 
mechanics to negotiate 'difficult-to-repudiate' technical evidence, it has the potential to 
increase the level of trust and confidence between the communicating parties and may reduce 
the liabilities of regulated organizations.
The use of two related policy frameworks allows separation of duty in the treatment of privacy 
and confidentiality. This separation is critical since some enterprise resources, though sensitive, 
may not have privacy values, since privacy is guarded by laws, legislation and principles that 
are obviously influenced by other factors including culture, religion, as well as regional 
peculiarities.
11.4 Vulnerabilities
Both the XACML and SAML specifications named known security threats inherent in open 
networks, and described a number of countermeasures to address them. These threats include 
amongst others, man-in-middle attack, message modification, message deletion, message 
insertion, session hijack, replay, impersonation without re-authentication, probing, inferential 
attacks, etc, and are innate open and distributed security threats. It is important to mention that 
XTMAI by its nature inherits these vulnerabilities. Whilst most of the threats have existing
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countermeasures, i.e. session management, XML encryption, XML signature and TLS, threats 
such as probing and inferential attacks are specific to trust based access control models. 
Descriptions of some of these are listed below with suggestions for possible counter-measures.
Unauthorized disclosure of access control decision information: In many access control 
operations, the undesirable disclosure of the properties of the access control actors may 
constitute major security breaches. In other words, the correctness or reliability of the 
properties of the various actors is as sensitive as the protected resources. For example, the 
disclosure of an access control policy may expose important business information that can be 
exploited by malicious parties. Threats in this regard include messages in transit, undesirable 
disclosure due to elevation of privileges. Generally, there are existing techniques for addressing 
this kind of threat and they are encouraged here. Nevertheless, XACML policy language has 
extensive ways to enable minimal policy disclosure, which can limit the undesirable disclosure 
of information about the attributes of actors. In fact the OoT, when used correctly, can mitigate 
these types of vulnerabilities by including minimal requirements and capabilities that are 
sufficient to advance the trust negotiation.
Message Replay: This aspect results from a malicious party's ability to record and replay 
legitimate messages between transaction parties, which can also lead to denial-of-service 
attacks. It is possible for a malicious entity to intercept OoT messages and use them to launch 
an attack. This kind of attack might be addressed by ensuring that messages are fresh, which 
can be made possible by using the issuerlnstant attribute value of the SAML assertion and 
setting an allowable time interval i.e. validity of assertions. This is a notable use of short-lived 
security tokens.
Message Insertion: This threat is common as an adversary can inject privacy assertions in the 
sequences of OoT between negotiating parties. Nonetheless, there are existing solutions that 
can mitigate this attack, including mutual authentication of every message to ensure its 
integrity.
Message Deletion: An adversary can delete OoT messages in the sequence between two OoT 
actors. Existing message sequence integrity safeguards can be utilized to mitigate the threat.
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Message Modification: The integrity of OoT messages is critical, if a malicious party is able to 
modify their content, it will alter the negotiation outcome, which will invalidate the 
negotiation. To mitigate against this, message integrity techniques should be utilized.
Negotiation Outcomes: The handling of negotiation failures should not reveal information that 
is sufficient for an adversary to launch an attack. In the case of a native XACML authorization 
decision of "NotApplicable" the recommendations described in [37] apply.
Cyclic Effect: The persuasive negotiation strategy has the tendency of introducing an 
unnecessary cyclic effect between negotiating parties, which can be exploited for denial-of- 
service attacks. This effect can be resolved by setting a limit to the number of NoB contexts 
that can be exchanged using the inbuilt InResponseTo attribute to monitor the interaction state.
Probing and Inferential: A malicious party can mount bogus negotiations in order to infer or 
extract information from another party. In this case, the threat can potentially be mitigated by 
crafting the XACML policy in such a way that a sensitive negotiation policy can be protected 
against undesirable disclosure [30]. This can be done by using the extensive filtering 
mechanism to filter inbound requests from the top-level of the policy. Using the Target scope 
in the Policy element or the PolicySet element a knowledgeable policy writer can express first 
level filters that filter out untrusted domains.
It is important that appropriate countermeasures be taken to ensure the security of the 
infrastructure and its components. Resource policies are themselves as sensitive as the 
resources they protect. Unnecessary disclosure of an access control policy can reveal the details 
of subject descriptors, which a malicious party can use to establish how to get unauthorized 
access.
11.5 Limitations
Nevertheless, the XTMAI system has a number of limitations. A few of these limitations are 
inherent due to the need for a PKI, others are imposed by the security standards upon which it 
was based, as well as the lack of formalization of the OoT protocol itself. A few of these 
limitations are presented in this section.
A private key stored in a party's computer, protected by a username/password has a few flaws:
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  The party can only sign data on that particular computer; for a server, or an 
application, this is not an issue. For a human user it is obviously an issue.
  The underlying security of the key depends entirely on how secured the computer 
is. It is possible to copy the private key.
A malicious party who gains control over a party's computer may substitute a user application 
with a malicious one. This will potentially, tricks a party into signing any data. This limitation 
could be solved by ensuring that applications calling the signing software are properly 
authenticated.
However, a more secure alternative is store the private key in a tamper-resistant device, such as 
smart card. But, smart card technology introduces an additional overhead in terms of the need 
to manage its life-cycle, including activating it with personal identification number (PIN). 
Although with the smart card, it is potentially difficult to copy the private key, the card can be 
lost easily.
The XTMAI requires token issuing authorities to be PKI enabled, so that the tokens can be 
verified and validated using public key cryptography. Public key cryptography is known to be 
a time and computing intensive process; consequently, it can take time to perform 
cryptographic operations including the validation of PKI certificate path.
Privacy and confidentiality as presented in this thesis assume that a form of primary trust 
model exists. There is a need to establish how one participant can come to believe that a given 
key is exclusively associated with a unique identity, so that the key can be trusted to sign or 
verify the assertions of other integrity and non-repudiation services. The means to establish 
relationships between the transaction parties may require a combination of two or more trust 
models.
Digital signature schemes do not provide certainty about the time and date, at which the 
signature was applied by a party. The implication is that a signer may use a timestamp (i.e. a 
clock that is not synchronized with a time server); this may give a malicious signer the lean 
way to manipulate the date and time the signature was applied. This limitation can be mitigated 
by using a trusted time service.
The XTMAI infrastructure relies on two policy types: a native XACML policy and a WS-
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XACML policy assertion to simultaneously deal with privacy and confidentiality. The two 
policy sets must be linked somehow in order to enable privacy negotiation and the exchange of 
policy assertions. This approach may have undesirable consequences for the users. However, to 
overcome these limitations, it is possible to have one static native XACML policy set, and then 
construct a WS-XACML assertion dynamically. The implication is that other policy mappings 
such as the P3P-XACML mapping must be done in a static mode.
One key benefit of OoT is the capability to generate complete hard-to-repudiate technical 
evidence of distributed transactions. Nonetheless, it was recognized that there may be some 
limitations from the legal point of view. That is, in some situations, a "non-repudiable 
signature" is not sufficient evidence for legal cases, although it can be considered important. 
Other factors include 'how active' was a participating human user, in deciding to sign the other 
party's privacy obligating constraints or whether software automatically generated a signature 
on behalf of the human user; did the human user understand the complexity of privacy 
obligating constraints, and under what type of user interface (UI) did the user click "Agree" 
resulting in the signature, are critical limiting factors. Obviously, there are significant legal 
issues involved in providing digital evidence for privacy solutions, the attempt to provide 
tenable evidence should not be considered a substitute for proper consideration of legal issues; 
the debate about what is legally admissible is outside the scope of this work. However, the EU 
in [176], clarified the legal status of digital signature, and guidelines are defined in order to 
ensure their basic legal recognition and validity.
The other limitation of this work is the lack of formalization of other components of OoT such 
as the negotiation strategy. Though, the OoT protocol is an extension of the SAML 
request/response protocol, there are quite a number of limitations imposed by the OoT 
negotiation by itself. The exchange of messages, order and sequence of the messages may be 
limited by the negotiation strategy the parties adopt. The fact that the framework incorporates a 
few of the negotiation strategies may limit its use in some complex privacy negotiations. 
Similarly, the absence of a formal usability study is a drawback,
11.6 Summary of Major Contributions to New Knowledge
The work described by this thesis has made contributions in a variety of domains. In the earlier 
survey of the literature, it was supported that a asymmetric approach in access control systems
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in distributed environments cannot guarantee the privacy of the client's attribute information, 
and with other collaborators a paper was published on how XACML can fit into trust 
negotiation [30]. This paper is based on a critical assessment of trust negotiation systems that 
are currently neither standardized nor based on any known standards. As the work progressed, 
the analysis of alternative architectures to existing ones resulted in a further publication [45], in 
which a potential infrastructure was proposed for addressing the privacy problem. Furthermore, 
in the course of the work, a use-case based on an e-procurement platform for the construction 
industry was developed. The modelling, deconstruction of the access control participants in 
distributed sense, and the critical analysis of the various interactions and trust contexts, which 
formed part of chapter 6 resulted in yet another publication [46].
An infrastructure for the bilateral privacy negotiation that is symmetric in architecture has been 
developed, and a proof of concept implemented that validates the concepts developed over the 
duration of this work. Looking back at the literature reviews in chapters 3 and 4, it is evident 
that very few systems were in place or had viewed the solution from the same perspective that 
underpinned this work. Therefore, it can be concluded that the work described by this thesis in 
many ways supplements work carried out by others, plus providing an insight on the current 
status of existing systems. It has provided an alternative approach in addressing the privacy 
problem with a viable technical framework that attempted to provide a solution to it.
Significantly, in the domain of privacy and confidentiality, this work has made a concrete 
contribution in the field of Internet security with the development of the OoT, which is 
potentially a valuable step in protecting privacy across autonomous security domains. The 
author developed the concepts surrounding the design of its protocol components, whilst the 
contribution of other collaborators in the full realization of the OoT is acknowledged; all the 
foundational work was the author's. A more complete description of the OoT concepts was 
disseminated in recent publications [31, 47], which details the characteristics of the problem it 
attempts to address and the benefits of the approach. Finally, another noteworthy contribution 
has been in the area of security architecture design and development. The adoption of several 
Internet Security standards and putting them into a logical architecture is in itself a pragmatic 
contribution to the body of knowledge.
On the whole it is considered that the work described by this thesis has established new 
knowledge, made valid and unique contributions theoretically and practically to the field of
201
privacy and security. In particular, the results of this research have already been made available 
to the academic community in publications, conferences and workshops.
11.7 Suggestions for Future Work
Besides addressing the above mentioned limitations and deficiencies of this work, there are 
more grey areas in which to extend the framework. The OoT protocol would require 
enhancement to support other access control requirements. For example, in some cases, 
policies governing the authorization of high-value security transactions may require 
simultaneous actions by more than one subject or actor. In the case of distributed environments 
involving more autonomous security domains, if the subjects that are required to execute the 
action are from different domains, and the attribute information required to perform the actions 
are considered with respect to privacy, it may require simultaneous but separate negotiations to 
obtain the various attribute information in order to perform the joint access control actions. The 
above case requires enhancement of the OoT protocol by way of devising strategies to handle 
such complex cases.
Furthermore, the introduction of ontology and semantic web technologies into the OoT 
mechanism could provide the basis for advanced intelligent reasoning, and the composition of 
privacy assertions that are purely constructed dynamically, based on certain risk threshold 
calculations. The idea is to provide transactional parties with more sophisticated ways for 
dynamic and intuitive handling of their Capabilities or Requirements during privacy 
negotiations.
Additionally, it is recognized that usability is an important aspect of an Information system as 
such, a formal usability study would be necessary to evaluate the work from a user's 
perspective.
11.8 Conclusions
This work has provided a unified framework for protecting privacy on the one hand and 
confidentiality of service outputs plus service meta information on the other. In the design and 
development of the work, privacy and security characteristics were examined in the context of 
access control systems, relevant legal and regulatory literature were reviewed as well as critical 
appraisal of current systems. It is been made clear that this work derived its concepts and
202
message exchanges from broadly accepted standards. The proposed technical solution is driven 
by the need to support privacy protection on the basis of the legal and regulatory frameworks. 
To the best of the author's knowledge, none of the current systems provide a mechanism for 
the remote enforcement of privacy obligations as presented in this thesis. The implication is 
that the absence of such an important security service might reduce communicating parties' 
trust, since it is uncertain that their information will be treated in a manner that respects their 
privacy.
To the best of author's knowledge, this work is among the first to introduce the remote 
enforcement of privacy obligations, particularly, the development of the OoT protocol to 
support its implementation. The OoT mechanism provides an extensible means to support 
potential social/judicial solutions for security assurance in distributed open systems. The NoB 
and SAO mechanisms equally provide a standard way for the dynamic exchange of other 
obligating or contractual documents such as SLAs, BLAs, which provide possible automation 
of contractual document exchanges, which can improve traditional methods that are time 
consuming and costly. The OoT mechanism provides significant improvement over traditional 
trust negotiation; it has the potential to reduce the number of iterations between negotiating 
parties compared to other mechanisms that were examined, so that the effect of negotiation 
response-time is reduced significantly since both requirements and capabilities can be 
transmitted in a single payload rather than separately.
Nevertheless, the framework described by this thesis has a small number of limitations, which 
require further investigation and analysis. Some useful suggestions on the areas of 
improvement have been suggested, which potentially should address some of the limitations 
mentioned. Apart from these limitations, it can be concluded that this work has met the 
objectives defined in chapter 1, and addresses a need that was identified through the secondary 
research and the evaluation reported in chapter 10.
Finally, another innovation of this work is the benefits of the OoT mechanism. More 
importantly, the OoT provides a mechanism that allows communicating parties to indicate their 
willingness to accept constraints imposed on their use of information provided by a party. 
More so, it provides the capability to express what a party is willing and able to do for the other 
party before they can reveal or exchange sensitive information, which is a momentous 
improvement in guaranteeing privacy. In other words, the parameters to gauge the level of
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assurance and/or confidence that should be associated with a given transaction, in reality 
should depend on the level of trust established by communicating parties themselves. Overall, 
the development of the OoT concepts is a significant concrete approach to enhancing privacy 
assurance across autonomous security domains, and is considered a major contribution to the 
field of security and privacy.
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Appendix A: SAML Obligation of Trust Schema
The code below is the XML schema document which describes the structure of the SAML
Obligation of Trust protocol request-response messages, discussed in chapter 8. Obligation of 
Trust protocol is an extension of the SAML request-response protocol discussed in chapter 6.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<schema
targetNamespace="http://infosec.salford.ac.uk/names/oot/"
xmlns="http://www. w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:xsi="http://www. w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:saml=''urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
xmlns:samlp="um:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
xrnlns:oot="http://infosec.salford.ac.uk/names/oot/"
xmlns:ws-xacml="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:profile:webservices:vl.0:schema"
elementFormDefault="unqualified"
attributeFormDefault="unqualified"
blockDefault="substitution"
version="WD 1">
<import namespace="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
schemaLocation="http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-schema-assertion-2.0.xsd"/> 
<importnamespace="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
schemaLocation="http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-schema-protocol-2.0.xsd"/> 
<import namespace="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:profile:webservices:vl.0:schema"
schemaLocation="http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/21411/xacml-3.0-profile-webservices- 
schema-v 1.0-wd-7.xsd"/> 
<annotation>
<!-- The Target Namespace, Document identifier and Location are provisional  > 
<documentation>
Document identifier: oot-wd-1 
Location: http:// 
</documentation> 
</annotation> 
<!- ->
<element name="ObligationOfTrustQuery" xsi:type="oot:ObligationOfTrustQueryType" /> 
<complexType name="ObligationOfTrustQueryType"> 
<comp lexContent>
<extensionbase="samlp:RequestAbstractType"> 
<sequence>
<element reP=''ws-xacml:XACMLPrivacyAssertion" minOccurs="l" maxOccurs="unbounded" /> 
</sequence> 
</extension> 
</complexContent> 
</complexType> 
<!-- ->
<complexType name="ObligationOfTrustStatementType"> 
<complexContent>
<extensionbase="saml:StatementAbstractType"> 
<sequence>
<element ref="ws-xacml:XACMLPrivacyAssertion" minOccurs="l" maxOccurs=" 1" /> 
</sequence> 
</extension> 
</complexContent> 
</complexType> 
<!- ->
</schema>
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Appendix B Matching Algorithms
The table below describes the various WS-XACML matching algorithms in the context of 
evaluating the OoT message contexts discussed in chapter 8.
Foreign XACMLAssertion 
Requirements
Local XACMLAssertion 
Capabilities
Match Algorithm
Missing Requirements element Any Always TRUE. The providing 
party of the foreign 
XACMLAssertion is not willing 
to provide Requirements, but is 
indicating that an XACML 
policy MAY be applied at the 
time of the interaction.
Any Missing Capabilities element Always TRUE. The providing 
party of the local 
XACMLAssertion is not willing 
to provide Capabilities, but is 
acknowledging that an XACML 
policy MAY be applied at the 
time of the interaction.
Empty Requirements element Any Always TRUE
Xacml:policy or 
xacmhpolicySet
Xacml-context: Request or 
xacml:ResourceContent
TRUE if the vocabularies match 
AND if there is at least one 
Request or ResourceContent 
element in the Capabilities that 
when evaluated against policy or 
PolicySet according to the 
XACML standard returns 
"Permit"; otherwise "False"
Xacml:Policy or 
xacml:policySet
Xacml: Apply Not defined
Xacml: Apply Xacml-context:Request or 
Xacml-context:ResourceContent
Consider the Requirements to be 
semantically equivalent to the 
XACML policy by the 
Requirements spec. TRUE if the 
vocabularies match AND if 
there is at least one Request or 
ResourceContent element in the 
Capabilities that when evaluated 
against the Policy according to
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the XACML standard returns 
"Permit"; otherwise "False".
Xacml: Apply XACML:Apply TRUE if the vocabularies match 
AND if, for each Apply element 
in the Requirements, there is at 
least one Apply element in the 
Capabilities for which the 
intersection defined in Appendix 
A in [165] is non-empty; 
otherwise "FALSE".
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Appendix C Test Plan
The table below provides a complete description of the various test-cases used in the technical 
validation discussed in chapter 9, and shows the purpose of each test, actual test carried out and 
an expected result.
Test PURPOSE TEST CARRIED OUT EXPCTED 
RESULT
Test-case 
1
The test seeks to test the capability of the 
system to restrict access to protected 
resources to guarantee that only users with 
the right tokens are authorized to access the 
resources. In this test privacy is not a 
concern, the client submits the token issued 
by its domain STS because the token does not 
explicitly expose client's PH.
The test is performed using 
a set of data representing 
request context and 
resource policy as inputs. 
Two tests will be carried out 
in which one test should 
have the appropriate subject 
descriptor attribute and the 
other without.
It is expected that 
the request with the 
required subject 
descriptor attribute 
will be allowed, and 
the other denied.
Test-case 
2
The test seeks to evaluate the ability of the 
system to respond to access requests with 
insufficient information in the subject 
descriptor. This test aims to achieve two 
purposes. From the client's perspective, it is 
not ready to supply all the information 
required in one got without determining first 
how the recipient is going to treat the 
information. From the service provider side, 
it is not prepared to advertise full access rules 
to arbitrary strangers. So both parties want to 
ensure privacy and confidentiality using the 
trust negotiation.
The test is performed using 
a set of policies between the 
client and service, and 
request context as inputs. 
The service has a local 
resource policy and a 
privacy assertion policy. 
The client has the request 
context and privacy 
assertion policy. In the test, 
the two parties performed 
privacy negotiation, 
advertised their 
Requirements and 
Capabilities, and the 
systems performed 
matching and evaluation 
with corresponding results. 
This test demonstrates the 
parsimonious strategy in 
which parties are not 
willing to refine their 
Requirements or 
Capabilities during 
negotiation.
It is expected that 
both parties can 
meet each other's 
Requirements by a 
set of Capabilities 
to make the 
negotiation succeed 
without too many 
iterations. The 
successful 
negotiation will 
result in issuance of 
SAO by both parties 
as a guarantee that 
they have agreed to 
respect each other's 
privacy.
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Test-case 3
Test-case 4 
(Performance
test)
The test is similar to test-case 2
but differs in the negotiation
strategy. This is suitable where
parties may not want to advertise 
all their Requirements and 
Capabilities, but would expose
their privacy assertions
incrementally and gradually to
advance the threshold of trust.
This is equally useful for
mitigating against probing or
inferential attacks.
This test seeks to measure the 
throughput in terms of average
response time in the full cycle
of an access control session
including the privacy
negotiation between two
parties.
This test demonstrates
the persuasive
strategy in which
parties are willing to 
refine their 
Requirements or 
Capabilities during
negotiation wherever
there are mismatches
in their privacy
assertions.
A set of data 
representing request
context and policies
were used as inputs to
carry out a range of
tests. The different
datasets represent
workloads on the
systems In order to
measure different
response times.
It is expected that one
party's Requirements
will not be met by the
other party's set of 
Capabilities, so that 
this party sends a 
counter NoB to
advertise its
Requirements and
Capabilities to enable
the party to refine its
Capabilities and if
appropriate
Requirements to
advance the
negotiation success.
The successful
negotiation will result
in issuance of SAO by
both parties as a
guarantee that they
have agreed to respect
each other's privacy.
It is expected that 
different datasets will
give different
response times. The
response time
depends on a number
of factors including
the volume of the
input dataset to be
processed by the
system.
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Figure Appendix D TNH Module Class Diagram discussed in Chapter 9
Appendix E: Test-Cases Transcripts
The complete transcripts of the various test-cases discussed in chapter 9 are documented in the 
following section.
E.I: Test case 1: XACML request contexts, and XACML response contexts discussed in 
chapter 9
<Request>
<Subject SubjectCategory="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1,0:subject-category:access-subject">
<Attribute Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:subject:subject-id" DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1 .Oidata-
type:rfc822Name"xAttributeValue>1214901122877@xtmai.sts.co.uk</AttributeValuex/Attribute>
</Subject>
<Resource>
<Attribute Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI"><AttributeValue>http://xtmai.tcbportal.com/</ Attribute Value>
</Attribute>
</Resource>
<Action>
<Attribute Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"xAttributeValue>read</AttributeValuex/Attribute>
</Action>
</Request>
<Response>
<ResultResourceId="http://xtmai.tcbportal.com/">
<Decision>Permit</Decision>
<Status>
<StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:status:ok"/>
</Status>
</Result>
</Response>
<Request>
<Subject SubjectCategory="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:subject-category:access-subject">
<Attribute Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id" DataType="um:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data- 
type:rfc822Name"xAttributeValue>1214901315128fa!pcg.org</AttributeValue></Attribute>
</Subject>
<Resource>
<Attribute Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:resource:resource-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI"><AttributeValue>http://xtmai.tcbportal. co m/</ Attribute Value> 
</Attribute>
</Resource>
<Action>
<Attribute Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:action:action-id" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"xAttributeValue>read</AttributeValuex/Attribute>
</Action> 
</Request>
<Response>
<Result ResourceId="http://xtmai.tcbportal.com/"> 
<Decision>Deny</Decision> 
<Status>
<StatusCode Value="um:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:status:ok"/> 
</Status> 
</Result> 
</Response>
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E. 1.2: XACML Local Policy used in test case 1
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<Policyxmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:policy"
xmlns:xsi="http://www. w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
PolicyId="GeneratedPolicy"
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.1 :rule-combining-algorithm:ordered-permit-overrides"> 
<Description>
</Description> 
<Target> 
<Subjects> 
<AnySubject/> 
</Subjects> 
<Resources> 
<AnyResource/> 
</Resources> 
<Actions> 
<AnyAction/> 
</Actions> 
</Target>
<Rule RuleId="CommitRule" Effect="Permit"> 
<Target> 
<Subjects> 
<Subject>
<SubjectMatchMatchld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:rfc822Name-match"> 
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3 .org/200 l/XMLSchema#string''>HBHHHiH</Atti"ibuteValue> 
<SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:data-type:rfc822Name"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id"/> 
</SubjectMatch> 
</Subject> 
<Subject>
<SubjectMatch Matchld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:function:rfc822Name-match"> ___ 
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www. w3 .org/200 l/XMLScherna#string f '>^HM|||^BH</Attribute Value> 
<SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:data-type:rfc822Name"
Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:subject:subject-id"/> 
</SubjectMatch> 
</Subject> 
</Subjects> 
<Resources> 
<Resource> 
<ResourceMatch Matchld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:ftmction:anyURI-equaT^^^^^^^^^^^^
<AttributeValue DataType="hrtp://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI''>^^^HBBHBBBH/</AttributeValue> 
<ResourceAttributeDesignatorDataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURJ"
AttributeId=''urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"/> 
</ResourceMatch> 
</Resource> 
</Resources> 
<Actions> 
<Action>
<ActionMatch Matchld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/200 l/XMLSchema#strmg">^H</Attri r)uteValue> 
<ActionAttributeDesignator DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"
AttributeId=''um:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"/> 
</ActionMatch> 
</Action> 
</Actions> 
</Target> 
</Rule> 
<Rule Ruleld-'FinalRule" Effect="Deny"/>
</Policy>
E.2.1 NoB context sent to the client by the service described in test case 2 in chapter 9
<S:Envelopexmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"xmlns:oot="http://infosec.salford.ac.uk/names/oot" 
xmlns^aml2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope"xmlns:ws- 
xacml="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:profile:webservices"xmlns:wsse="http://schema.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/xx/sece" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
<S:Header>
<wsse:Security MustUnderstand=" 1 ">
<oot:ObligationOfTrustQueryIssuerInstant="2008-07-01T09:04:16Z"ootID="1214903056554"> 
<saml2:AssertionID="1214903056554"IssueInstant="2008-07-01T09:04:16Z"> 
<saml2:Issuer>http://xtmai.sts.salford.ac.uk/service</saml2:Issuer> 
<ws-xacml:XACMLPrivacyAssertion> 
<Requirements>
<Vocabulary>um:oasis:tc:xacml:3.0:vocabulary:xacml</Vocabulary> 
<Apply Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:function:must-be-present">
<Apply Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:flinction:integer-less-than-or-equal">
<AttributeDesignator Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:action:max-data-rention-days"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer"/> 
</Apply>
<AttributeValueDataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">30</AttributeValue> 
</Apply> 
<Apply Functionld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:function:string-one-and-only">
<SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType="http://www. w3.org/200 l/XMLSchema#string" 
Attributeld="pcg-groups" 
Issuer="admin(2>pcg.org"/> 
</Apply> 
</Requirements> 
<Capabilities>
<Vocabulary>um:oasis:tc:xacml:3.0:vocabulary:xacml</Vocabulary> 
<Apply Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:function:must-be-present">
<Apply Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:function:integer-less-than-or-equal">
<AttributeDesignator Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:action:max-data-rention-days"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer"/> 
</Apply>
<AttributeValue DataType="http://ww\v.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">40</AttributeValue> 
</Apply> 
</Capabilities>
</ws-xacml:XACMLPrivacyAssertion> 
</sam!2: Assertion> 
</oot:ObligationOfTrustQuery> 
</wsse:Security> 
</S:Header> 
<S:Body>
<startNegotiation xmlns="http://provider.ws.xacml.xtmai.iris.salford.ac.uk/"/> 
<NegotiationState>
<Service role="uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:service:role:client"> 
<State value="uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:state:nob"/> 
<Status value="uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:status:ok"/> 
</Service> 
</NegotiationState> 
</S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
<S.Envelope xmlns:S="http //schemas.xmlsoap org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:oot="http://infosec salford.ac.ukynames/oot"
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E.2.2 SAO context sent to the service by the client described in test case 2 in chapter 9
xmlns.saml2="um:oasis:names tc SAML:2.0:assertion" xmlns.soap="http.//schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope" xmlns.ws- 
xacml="um.oasis names tc:xacml:3.0:profile:webservices"xmlns:wsse="http://schema.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/xx/sece" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
<S:Header> 
<wsse:Security MustUnderstand=" 1 ">
<oot:ObligationOfTrustStatementInResponseTo="1214903056554"IssuerInstant="2008-07-01T09'04:16Z"ootID="1214903056590"> 
<sam!2:AssertionID="1214903056590"IssueInstant="2008-07-01T09:04:16Z"> 
<saml2.Issuer>http.//xtmai sts salford.ac uk/client</saml2:Issuer> 
<ws-xacml:XACMLPrivacyAssertion> 
<Requirements>
<Vocabulary>um:oasis.tC'xacml:3.0:vocabu]ary xacml</Vocabulary> 
<Apply Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc-xacml:3.0:function:must-be-present">
<Apply Attributeld="ura:oasis:names:tc:xacml.l.0:function: integer-less- than-or-equal"> 
<AttributeDesignator Attributeld="urn.oasis:names tc:xacml3.0:action-max-data-rention-days"
DataType="http://www. w3 .org/200 l/XMLSchema#integer"/> 
</Apply>
<Attribute Value DataType="http //www. w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#mteger">45</AttributeValue> 
</Apply> 
</Requirements> 
<Capabilities>
<Vocabulary>um:oasis:tc:xacml.3.0:vocabulary.xacml</Vocabulary> 
<Apply Attributeld="um oasis:names tc xacml'3.0.function:must-be-present">
<Apply Attributeld="um:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1 .0 function:integer-less-than-or-equal">
<AttnbuteDesignator Attnbuteld="urn:oasis names:tc:xacml:3.0 action. max-data-rention-days"
DataType="http://www w3.org/200 l/XMLSchema#integer"/> 
</Apply>
<Attribute Value DataType="http.//www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">25</AttnbuteValue> 
</Apply> 
<Apply Functionld="um.oasis:names:tc.xacml 1 .0:function strmg-one-and-only">
<SubjectAttributeDesignatorDataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#stnng" 
Attributeld=" peg-groups" 
Issuer="admin@pcg.org"/> 
</Apply> 
</Capabilities>
</ws-xacml:XACMLPrivacyAssertion> 
<Signature xmlns="http.//www w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
<SignedInfo>
<CanomcalizationMethod Algorithm="http V/www. w3.org/2001 /1 0/xml-exc-cl4n#WithComments"/> 
<SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#dsa-shal "/> 
<Reference URI=""> 
<Transforms>
 ^Transform Algonthm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/> 
</Transforms>
<DigestMethod Algonthm="http //www w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#shal "/> 
<DigestValue>j/XO/AjdqOEPyppMcmVGDp6eZRs=</DigestValue> 
</Reference> 
</SignedInfo> 
<SignatureValue>Z8olPbv7+103m+oXbfOdG2HnuRAuoZETJFQcVpWxvNeINgJ3DPP17w=</SignatureValue>
<Keylnfo> 
<KeyValue> 
<DSAKeyValue>
<P>/KaCzo4Syrom78z3EQ5SbbB4sF7ey80etKII864WF64B8 1 uRpH5t9jQTxeEuOImbzRMqzVDZkVG9xD7nN 1 kuFw=
</P>
<Q>li7dzDacuo67Jg7mtqEm2TRuOMU=</Q>
<G>Z4Rxsnqc9E7pGknFFH2xqaryRPBaQ01khpMdLRQnG541Awtx/XPaF5Bpsy4pNWMOHCBiNUONogpsQW5QvnlMpA=</G>
<Y>qcDjwkOfNNxItgis6yZvOblRDtfZWvFjpLZX27zqbaZZxWhOcnl7pD9fhyjV6XMHWSh8QgxyxbzyLXld+ZrXrw==
</DSAKeyValue> 
</KeyValue> 
</KeyInfo> 
</Signature> 
</sam!2 Assertion> 
</oot.ObligationOfTrustStatement> 
</wsse'Secunty> 
</S Header> 
<S Body>
<NegotiationState xmlns="">
<Service role="uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:service:role:provider"> 
<State value="uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:state:sao"/> 
<Status value="uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:status:ok"/> 
</Service> 
</NegotiationState> 
</S:Body> 
</S:Envelope>
E.2.3 SAG context sent to the client by the service described in test case 2 in chapter 9
<S Envelopexmlns:S="http.//schemas xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:oot="http.//mfosec.salford.ac.uk/names/oot" 
xmlns:saml2="um:oasis names tc SAML:2.0:assertion" xmlns:soap="http://schemas xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope" xmlns:ws- 
xacml-"um:oasis:names:tc:xacml.3.0:profile:webservices"xmlns'wsse="http://schema.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/xx/sece" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www. w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-mstance"> 
<SHeader>
<wsse Security MustUnderstand=" 1 ">
<oot ObligationOfTrustStatement InResponseTo="1214903056590" IssuerInstant="2008-07-01T09:18:28Z" ootID=" 12 14903908 126"> 
<sam!2 Assertion ID="1214903908139" IssueInstant="2008-07-01T09 18 28Z"> 
<saml2.Issuer>http.//xtmai.sts.salford.ac.uk/service</saml2:Issuer> 
<ws-xacml:XACMLPrivacyAssertion> 
<Requirements>
<Vocabulary>um oasis:tc:xacml.3.0:vocabulary xacml</Vocabulary> 
<Apply Attributeld="um:oasis names:tc:xacml 3.0:function.must-be-present">
<Apply Attnbuteld="um:oasis names. tc:xacml: 1 .0:function integer-less-than-or-equal">
<AttributeDesignator Attnbuteld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0 i action:max-data-rention-days" 
DataType="http://www. w3 .org/200 l/XMLSchema#mteger"/> 
</Apply>
< Attribute Value DataType="http://www.w3 org/2001/XMLSchema#mteger">30 
</AttributeValue> 
</Apply> 
</Requirements> 
<Capabihties>
<Vocabulary>um oasis tc:xacml:3.0. vocabulary xacml</Vocabulary> 
<Apply Attributeld="um:oasis names:tc xacml:3.0.function:must-be-present">
<Apply Attnbuteld="urn:oasis.namestc:xacml: 1 .0:runction integer-less-than-or-equal">
<AttributeDesignator Attnbuteld="um:oasis:names.tc:xacml.3 0:action:max-data-rention-days" 
DataType="http://www w3 org/2001/XMLSchema#integer"/> 
</Apply>
<AttributeValue DataType="hnp.//www.w3 org/2001/XMLSchema#mteger">25 
</AttributeValue> 
</Apply> 
</Capabilities>
</ws-xacml:XACMLPrivacyAssertion> 
<Signature xmlns="http.//www w3 org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
<SignedInfo>
<CanomcalizationMethod Algorithm="http V/www w3 org/2001/10/xml-exc-cl4n#WithComments"/> 
<SignatureMethod Algorithm="http.//www.w3 org/2000/09/xmldsig#dsa-shal "/> 
<Reference URI=""> 
<Transforms>
<Transform Algorithm="http 7/www.w3 org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/> 
</Transforms>
<DigestMethod Algorithm="http //www w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#shal "/> 
<DigestValue>SHWlLpElngchIW4tFI9n8UguHU4=</DigestValue> 
</Reference> 
</Signedlnfo>
<SignatureValue>aOznOADt2exarnOXjOELMKPi6JlWHntlaqneDh3P62qegnq57qHDwg=</SignatureValue> 
<KeyInfo> 
<K.eyValue> 
<DSAKeyValue>
<P>/KaCzo4Syrom78z3EQ5SbbB4sF7ey80etKII864WF64B8 1 uRpH5t9jQTxeEuOImbzRMqzVDZkVG9xD7nN 1 kuFw= 
</P> 
<Q>h7dzDacuo67Jg7mtqEm2TRuOMU=</Q>
<G>Z4Rxsnqc9E7pGknFFH2xqaryRPBaQ01khpMdLRQnG541Awtx«PaF5Bpsy4PNWMOHCBiNUONogpsQW5QvnlMpA=
<Y>w4Cl+T2vRRGIsBuoD5DfRw76LdiIsIs/5E4mdtb4MyWgFp/dS+ouFOQxa4dxhXEMBMdDdll883Alr5DSiD/ybA=
</DSAK.eyValue> 
</KeyValue> 
</KeyInfo> 
</Signature> 
</sam!2 Assertion> 
</oot:ObligationOfTrustStatement>
</wsse:Security> 
</S:Header>
<S:Body>
<startNegotiationxmlns="http://provider.ws.xacml.xtmai.iris.salford.ac.uk/"/>
<NegotiationState>
<Service role="uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:service:role:client"> 
<State value="uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:state:sao"/> 
<Status value="uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:status:ok"/> 
</Service> 
</NegotiationState> 
</S:Body> 
</S:Envelope>
E.2 .4 SAML attribute assertion sent to the service by the client described in test case 2 in 
chapter 9
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:oot="http://infosec.salford.ac.uk/names/oot" 
xmlns:saml2="um:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope" xmlns:ws- 
xacml="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:profile:webservices" xmlns:wsse="http://schema.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/xx/sece" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
<S:Header>
<wsse:Security MustUnderstand="l">
<oot:ObligationOfTrustStatementInResponseTo="1214903908126"IssuerInstant="2008-07-01T09:18:28Z" 
ootID="1214903908534">
<saml2:AssertionID="1214903908535"IssueInstant="2008-07-01T09:18:28Z"> 
<saml2:Issuer>http://salford.ac.uk/client</saml2:Issuer> 
<sam!2: AttributeStatement>
<Attribute Attributeld=''pcg-group" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" 
Issuer="http://salford.ac.uk/service" xmlns=""/>
<AttributeValue xmlns="">PCG Contractor</AttributeValue> 
</saml2:AttributeStatement> 
</saml2:Assertion> 
</oot:ObligationOfTrustStatement> 
</wsse:Security> 
</S:Header> 
<S:Body>
</ns2:startNegotiationResponse> 
<NegotiationState xmlns="">
<Service role="uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:service:role:provider"> 
<State value="uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:state:attribute"/> 
<Status value="uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:status:ok"/> 
</Service> 
</NegotiationState> 
</S:Body> 
</S:Envelope>
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E.2.5 Service XACML local policy used in test case 2.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8'">> 
<Policy xmlns="urn.oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1 ,0:policy"
xmlns:xsi="http://www. w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
Policy Id="GeneratedPolicy"
RuleCombmingAlgId="um:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1 . 1 :rule-combining-algonthm:ordered-permit-overrides"> 
<Target>
<Subjects> 
<AnySubject/>
</Subjects>
<Resources> 
<AnyResource/>
</Resources>
<Actions>
<AnyAction/> 
</Actions> 
</Target>
<Rule RuleId="CommitRule" Effect="Permit"> 
<Target> 
<Subjects> 
<Subject>
<SubjectMatch Matchld="um oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1 .0:function:rfc822Name-match"> 
<Attribute Value DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">tcb.sts.org</ Attribute Value> 
<SubjectAttributeDesignatorDataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml.l.O:data-type:rfc822Name"
AttributeId="um:oasis'names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id"/> 
</SubjectMatch> 
</Subject> 
<Subject>
<SubjectMatch Matchld="um:oasis.names-tc:xacml- 1 .0:function:rfc822Name-match"> 
<Attribute Value DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">xtmai.sts.co.uk</AttributeValue> 
<SubjectArtnbuteDesignator DataType="urn oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1 0 data-type:rfc822Name"
Attributeld="um:oasis:namestc i xacml: 1 .0:subject:subject-id"/> 
</SubjectMatch> 
<Subject> 
<Subject>
<SubjectMatch Matchld="um:oasis:names:tc:xacml. 1 .0 function. rfc822Name-match">
<AttributeValueDataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">pgr.salford.ac.uk</ Attribute Value> 
<SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType="ura:oasis names:tc-xacml: 1 0:data-type:rfc822Name"
Attributeld="um.oasis:names:tc:xacml 1 .0:subject:subject-id"/> 
</SubjectMatch> 
<Subject> 
</Subjects> 
<Resources> 
<Resource>
<ResourceMatch Matchld="um'oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1 .0:function:anyURI-equal">
<Attribute Value DataType="http://www.w3 org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI">http://xtmai.tcbportal.coin/</ Attribute Value> 
<ResourceAttributeDesignatorDataType="http://wwww3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI"
Attributeld="um:oasis names:tc:xacml 1 0 resource:resource-id"/> 
<7ResourceMatch> 
</Resource> 
</Resources> 
<Actions> 
<Action>
<ActionMatchMatchId="um:oasis:names:tc.xacml:1.0:function.string-equar l > 
<AttributeValueDataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#strmg">read</ Attribute Value> 
<ActionAttributeDesignatorDataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#strmg"
AttributeId="um:oasis:names.tc:xacml:1.0.action:action-id"/> 
</ActionMatch> 
</Action> 
</Actions>
arget>
<Condition Functionld="um:oasis:names:tc .xacml: 1 .0:function.string-equal"> 
<Apply Functionld="um.oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1 .0:function:strmg-one-and-only"> 
<SubjectAttributeDesignatorDataType="http://wwww3.org/2001/XMLSchema#stnng" 
Attributeld="pcg-groups" 
Issuer="admin@pcg.org"/>
</Apply>
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">PCG Contractor</AttributeValue>
</Condition> 
</Rule>
<Rule RuleId="FinalRule" Effect="Deny"/> 
</Policy>
E. 3.1 XACML request context used in test case 3
<Request>
<Subject SubjectCategory="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access-subject">
<Attribute Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:subject:subject-id" 
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:data-type:rfc822Name">
<AttributeValue>1214908470680@xtmai.sts.co.uk</AttributeValue> 
</Attribute> 
</Subject> 
<Resource>
<Attribute Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#anyURI">
<AttributeValue>http://xtmai.tcbportal.com/</Attribute Value> 
</Attribute> 
</Resource> 
<Action>
<Attribute Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:action:action-id" 
DataType="http://wvw. w3.org/2001/XMLSchernatfstring' 1 >
<AttributeValue>read</Attribute Value> 
</Attribute> 
</Action> 
</Request>
227
E. 3.2 NOB context sent to the client by the service, which is described in test case 3 of the 
chapter 9.
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:oot="http://infosec.salford.ac.uk/names/oot" 
xmlns:saml2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope"xmlns:ws- 
xacml="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:profile:webservices" xmlns:wsse="http://schema.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/xx/sece" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
<S:Header>
<wsse:Security MustUnderstand="l">
<oot:ObligationOfTrustQueryIssuerInstant="2008-07-01T09:45:12Z"ootID="1214905512917"> 
<saml2:AssertionID="1214905512932"IssueInstant="2008-07-01T09:45:12Z"> 
<saml2:Issuer>http://xtmai.sts.salford.ac.uk/service</saml2:Issuer> 
<ws-xacml:XACMLPrivacyAssertion> 
<Requirements>
<Vocabulary>urn:oasis:tc:xacml:3.0:vocabulary:xacml</Vocabulary> 
<Apply Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:function:must-be-present">
<Apply Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:function:integer-less-than-or-equal">
<AttributeDesignator Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:action:max-data-rention-days"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer"/> 
</Apply>
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3 .org/200 l/XMLSchema#integer">30</AttributeValue> 
</Apply> 
<Apply Functionld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:function:string-one-and-only">
<SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType="http://www. w3 .org/2001 /XMLSchema#string" 
Attributeld="pcg-groups" 
Issuer="admin@pcg.org"/> 
</Apply> 
</Requirements> 
<Capabilities>
<Vocabulary>urn:oasis:tc:xacml:3.0: vocabulary :xacml</Vocabulary> 
<Apply Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:function:must-be-present">
<Apply Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml: 1.0:function:integer-less-than-or-equal">
<AttributeDesignator Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:action:max-data-rention-days"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer"/> 
</Apply>
<AttributeValueDataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">40</AttributeValue> 
</Apply> 
</Capabilities>
</ws-xacml:XACMLPrivacyAssertion> 
</saml2:Assertion> 
</oot:ObligationOfTrustQuery> 
</wsse:Security> 
</S:Header> 
<S:Body>
<NegotiationState>
<Service role="uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:service:role:client"> 
<State value=''uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:state:nob"/> 
<Status value="uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:status:ok"/> 
</Service> 
</NegotiationState> 
</S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> ______________
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E. 3.3 NOB context sent to the service by the client, which is described in test case 3 of 
the chapter 9.
<S Envelope xmlns S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns oot="http://infosec.salford.ac.uk/names/oot" 
xmlns:saml2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0 assertion" xmlns soap="http://schemas xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope" xmlns:ws- 
xacmr="um:oasis:names:tc:xacml:30:profile webservices" xmlns.wsse="http.//schema.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/xx/sece" 
xmlns xsd="http://www w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www w3.org/200l/XMLSchema-instance"> 
<S:Header> 
<wsse:Security MustUnderstand=" 1 ">
<oot ObligationOfTrustQuery InResponseTo="1214905512917" Issuerlnstant="2008-07-01T09 45 13Z" ootID="1214905513059": 
<saml2:AssertionID="1214905513059"Issuelnstant="2008-07-01T09:45:13Z"> 
<saml2.Issuer>http://xtmai.sts.salford.ac.uk/client</saml2 lssuer> 
<ws-xacml:XACMLPrivacyAssertion> 
<Requirements>
<Vocabulary>um:oasis.tc.xacml 3.0:vocabulary:xacml</Vocabulary> 
<Apply Attributeld="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:function:must-be-present">
<Apply Attnbuteld="um:oasis names:tc xacml: 1.0:function:mteger-less-than-or-equal">
<AttnbuteDesignator Attributeld="um oasis:names:tc:xacml:3 0:action:max-data-rention-days"
DataType="http://www w3 org/2001/XMLSchema#integer"/> 
</Apply>
<AttributeValue DataType="http.//www w3 org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">25</AttributeValue> 
</Apply> 
</Requirements> 
<Capabilities>
<Vocabulary>um:oasis l tc:xacml 3.0:vocabulary:xacml</Vocabulary> 
<Apply Attnbuteld="um oasis names.tc xacml 3.0:ftmction:must-be-present">
<Apply Attnbuteld="um oasis names:tc xacml. 1.0:ftmctionmteger-less-than-or-equal">
<AttributeDesignator Attnbuteld="urn:oasis:names tc.xacml.3.0:action max-data-rention-days"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer"/> 
</Apply>
<AttributeValueDataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#mteger">25</AttributeValue> 
</Apply> 
<Apply Functionld="um oasis names.tc:xacml.l.0:function stnng-one-and-only">
<SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType="http:/Avww.w3 org/2001/XMLSchema#stnng" 
Attribute Id=" pcg-gro ups" 
Issuer="admin(a ) pcg.org"/> 
</Apply> 
</Capabilities>
</ws-xacml:XACMLPnvacyAssertion> 
<^saml2:Assertion> 
</oot.ObligationOfTrustQuery> 
</wsse Security> 
</S Header> 
<S:Body>
<NegotiationState xmlns="">
<Service role="uk:ac salford.iris ootservice role:provider"> 
<State value="uk:ac'salford:ins:oot state.nob"/> 
<Status value="uk ac salford iris'oot.status ok"/> 
</Service> 
</NegotiationState> 
</S:Body> 
</S:Envelope>
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D. 3.4 SAG context sent to the service by the client, which is described in test case 3 in chapter
<S:Envelopexmlns:S="http://schemas xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:oot="http://infosec.salford.ac uk/names/oot" 
xmlns:saml2="um:oasis:names'tc.SAML:2.0:assertion" xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope" xmlnsiws- 
xacml="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:profile:webservices"xmlns:wsse="http://schema.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/xx/sece" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-mstance"> 
<S:Header>
<wsse:Security MustUnderstand=" 1 ">
<oot:ObligationOfTrustStatement InResponseTo="1214905512917" IssuerInstant="2008-07-01T10.46 30Z" ootID="1214909190494"> 
<sam!2 Assertion ID="1214905840995" IssueInstant="2008-07-01T10:46:30Z"> 
<saml2.Issuer>http://xtmai.sts.salford ac uk/client</saml2:Issuer> 
<ws-xacml XACMLPrivacyAssertion> 
<Requirements>
<Vocabulary>um:oasis:tc:xacml 3.0. vocabulary :xacml</Vocabulary> 
<Apply Attributeld="urn. oasis names:tc:xacml 3.0:function:must-be-present">
<Apply Attributeld="um oasis:names:tc:xacml. 1 .0:function:integer-less-than-or-equal">
<AttributeDesignator Attribute Id="urn:oasis:names.tc:xacml:3.0:action:max-data-rentioD-days" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#mteger"/>
</Apply>
<AttributeValue DataType="http //www w3 org/2001/XMLSchema#mteger">25</AttributeValue> 
</Apply> 
</Requirements> 
<Capabilities>
<Vocabulary>um:oasis:tc:xacml:3.0:vocabulary:xacml</Vocabulary> 
<Apply Attributeld="um:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3 0:function.must-be-present">
<Apply Attributeld="um-oasis-names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:mteger-less-than-or-equal">
<AttributeDesignator Attributeld="urn oasis:names:tc:xacml 3 0:action max-data-rention-days' 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#mteger"/> 
</Apply>
<Attribute Value DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#mteger">25</ Attribute Value> 
</Apply> 
<Apply Functionld="um:oasis:names tc:xacml: 1 .0:function:strmg-one-and-only">
<SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType="http://www w3 org/2001/XMLSchema#string" 
Attributeld=" peg-groups" 
Issuer="admin@pcg.org"/> 
</Apply> 
</Capabihties>
<7ws-xacml XACMLPrivacyAssertion> 
<Signature xmlns="http://www w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
<SignedInfo>
<CanonicalizationMethod Algonthm="http //www.w3 org/2001/10/xml-exc-cl4n#WithComments"/> 
<SignatureMethod Algonthm="http.//www w3 org/2000/09/xmldsig#dsa-shal"/> 
<Reference URI=""> 
<Transforms>
<Transform Algorithm="http //www. w3 ,org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/> 
</Transforms>
<DigestMethod Algonthm="http //www.w3 .org/2000/09/xmldsig#shal"/> 
<DigestValue>Ld5Q8zmByMntGqJUOuSBs2s+asI=</DigestValue> 
</Reference> 
</SignedInfo> 
<SignatureValue>To/zjHbUx/E5HhfiUDJvPODXlul82IYa+obVf4sCitN8r4emzthGCQ==</SignatureValue>
<KeyInfo> 
<KeyValue>
<DSAKeyValue>
<P>/KaCzo4Syrom78z3EQ5SbbB4sF7ey80etKII864WF64B8 1 uRPH5t9jQTxeEuOImbzRMqzVDZkVG9xD7nN 1 kuFw== </P> 
<Q>li7dzDacuo67Jg7mtqEm2TRuOMU=</Q>
<G>Z4Rxsnqc9E7pGknFFH2xqaryRPBaQO 1 khpMdLRQnG54 1 Awtx/XPaF5Bpsy4pNWMOHCBiNUONogpsQW5Qvnl
MpA= </G> 
<Y>TPu3ZNktDiCdrkaYCsUPIMX80Wr6uuqtOBZ41elObcHwNrA4OwOIOkalw9StcLv8D2Zi/fh2GfWbubxfrDtH2Q=
</DSAKeyValue> 
</KeyValue> 
</KeyInfo> 
</Signature> 
</sam!2 Assertion> 
</oot:ObligationOfTrustStatement> 
</wsse Security> 
<VS:Header> 
<S:Body>
<NegotiationState xmlns=""> 
<Servicerole="uk.ac.salford:iris.oot:service:role.provider">
<State value="uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:state:sao"/> 
<Status value="uk:ac:salford:iris:oot:status:ok"/>
</Service> 
</NegotiationState> 
</S:Body> 
</S:Envelope>
D. 3.5 SAO context sent to the client by the service, which is described in test case 3 in chapter 
9.
<S:Envelopexmlns S="http //schemas xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:oot="http.//mfosec salford.ac.uk/names/oot" 
xmlns:saml2="umoasis:names.tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope" xmlns:ws- 
xacml="um:oasis.namestc:xacml:3.0:profile:webservices" xmlns:wsse="http://schema xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/xx/sece" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"xmlns:xsi="http://www. w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-mstance"> 
<S:Header> 
<wsse:Security MustUnderstand=" 1 ">
<oot ObligationOfTrustStatement InResponseTo=" 12 14909190494" IssuerInstant="2008-07-01T09.50:41Z" ootID="1214905840995"> 
<sam!2. Assertion ID=" 1214905841008" Issuelnstant="2008-07-01T09:50.41Z"> 
<sam!2 Issuer>http://xtmai.sts.salford.ac.uk/service</saml2:Issuer> 
<ws-xacml . XACMLPrivacyAssertion> 
<Requirements>
<Vocabulary>urn oasis tc xacml 3 O'vocabulary.xacml</Vocabulary> 
<Apply Attributeld="um oasis:names tc xacml 3.0:function must-be-present">
<Apply Attributeld="um oasis:names.tc:xacml: 1 .0 function:integer-less-than-or-equal">
<AttributeDesignator Attributeld="um. oasis names:tc xacml 3 0:action:max-data-rention-days"
DataType="http://www w3 .org/200 l/XMLSchema#mteger"/> 
</Apply>
<Attribute Value DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">30</AttributeValue> 
</Apply> 
<Apply Functionld="um:oasis:names:tc xacml: 1 .0:function:stnng-one-and-only">
<SubjectAttributeDesignatorDataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#stnng" 
Attnbuteld="pcg-groups" 
Issuer="admin@pcg.org"/> 
</Apply> 
</Requirements> 
<Capabilities>
<Vocabulary>um oasis:tc:xacml:3.0:vocabulary xacml</Vocabulary> 
<Apply Attributeld="um:oasis names tc:xacml 3.0.funcuon:must-be-present">
<Apply Attributeld="um oasis names tc:xacml 1.0:function:integer-less-than-or-equal">
<AttributeDesignator Attributeld="urn:oasis:names tc:xacml.3.0:action max-data-rention-days"
DataType="http://www.w3org/2001/XMLScherna#integer"/> 
</Apply>
<Attnbute Value DataType="http //www. w3. org/200 l/XMLSchema#mteger">20</ Attribute Value> 
</Apply> 
</Capabilities>
</ws-xacml:XACMLPrivacyAssertion> 
<Signaturexmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
<SignedInfo>
<CanomcalizationMethod Algonthm="http.//www w3 org/2001/10/xml-exc-cl4n#WithComments"/> 
<SignatureMethod Algorithm="http //www w3 org/2000/09/xmldsig#dsa-shal"/> 
<Reference URI=""> 
<Transforms>
 ^Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3 org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/> 
</Transforms>
<DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www w3 org/2000/09/xmldsig#shal"/> 
<DigestValue>+lcwMrT/+5fab393BAMNrBtfR+Ss=</DigestValue> 
</Reference> 
</SignedInfo> 
<SignatureValue>icAGNNLacPcswPlTZQ2xvBOjtWhhvIdsSrA9Cl+BCLACUlZSBgwN6Q=</SignatureValue>
<KeyInfo>
<KeyValue> 
<DSAKeyValue> 
<P>/KaCzo4Syrom78z3EQ5SbbB4sF7ey80etKII864WF64B81uRpH5t9jQTxeEuOImbzRMqzVDZkVG9xD7nNlkuFw=
<Q>li7dzDacuo67Jg7mtqEm2TRuOMU=<^Q> 
<G>Z4Rxsnqc9E7pGknFFH2xqaryRPBaQ01khpMdLRQnG541Awtx/XPaF5Bpsy4pNWMOHCBiNUONogpsQ
W5QvnlMpA= </G> 
<Y>XGdQOI5TpOIjKv/cgim+vupSrmOOLVLYxGixJqx7JdGPXFUM6+NShN8kb7TkxN5nzo6LW/iGBXXWsQ
jn7x02TQ= </Y> 
</DSAKeyValue> 
</KeyValue> 
</KeyInfo> 
</Signature> 
</sam!2:Assertion> 
</oot:ObligationOfTrustStatement> 
<ywsse:Security> 
</S:Header> 
<S:Body> 
<NegotiationState>
<Service role="uk:ac salford ins oot service role:client"> 
<State value="uk:ac:salford:ins oot state. sao"/> 
<Status value="uk:ac:salford:ins:oofstatus.ok"/>
</Service> 
</NegotiationState> 
<S:Body> 
</S:Envelope>
D. 3.6 SAML attribute assertion sent to the service by the client, which is described in test case 
3 in chapter 9
<S:Envelopexmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:oot="http://infosec salford.ac.uk/names/oot" 
xmlns:saml2="unroasis:names tc SAML 2.0:assertion" xmlns soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap org/soap/envelope" xmlns:ws- 
xacml="um:oasis names:tc:xacml:3.0.profile:webservices" xmlns:wsse="http //schema xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/xx/sece" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http.//www.w3.org/200l/XMLSchema-instance"> 
<SHeader> 
<wsse:Secunty MustUnderstand=" 1 ">
<oot:ObligationOfTrustStatement InResponseTo=" 1214905840995" IssuerInstant="2008-07-01T10 50.17Z" ootID="1214909417608"> 
<sam!2.Assertion ID=" 1214909417608" Issuelnstant="2008-07-01T10.50.17Z"> 
<saml2:ksuer>http//salford.ac.uk/client</saml2.Issuer> 
<saml2:AttributeStatement>
<Attribute Attributeld="group" DataType="http:/Avww.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" Issuer="http //salford.ac.uk/service" 
xmlns=""/>
<Attribute Value xmlns="">PCG Contractor 
</AttributeValue> 
</saml2:AttnbuteStatement> 
</sam!2:Assertion> 
</oot:ObligationOfTrustStatement> 
</wsse Security> 
</S Header> 
<S Body>
<NegotiationState xmlns="">
<Service role="uk ac salford.iris.oot:service:role:provider"> 
<State value="uk:ac salford ins:oot state attribute"/> 
<Status value="uk ac: sal ford iris:oot:status:ok"/> 
</Service> 
<NegotiationState> 
</S:Body> 
</S:Envelope>
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